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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis, the continuous dialogue between state-centered and human-centered 
approaches to security studies is discussed in the context of their ability to explain emerging 
threats within the international system. One emerging threat that has received a particularly 
large amount of attention is the possibility of water wars in the future. Water Wars are 
deemed to be conflicts that have water as their primary driving force, both in the onset and 
continuation. Through the use of the Chad River Basin and the Nile River Basin, this thesis 
will determine how each approach to security studies explains a particular conflict over water 
by, considering how each of them explain a “water war” within these Basins. Importantly, 
through this approach, the thesis aims to determine in what way, if any, the human- centered 
approach offers a better explanation to water-related conflict than state-centered security.  In 
doing so, the thesis unpacks the various factors relating to the use, distribution and 
management of shared watercourses. While the findings in this thesis are not exhaustive, it is 
hoped that it will provide insight into how one ought to understand who is likely to be party 
to water wars and what is likely to be threatened in these water wars. 	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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
1.1 Introduction  
 
In the absence of clear examples of water wars between states, it is not clear that State 
Security can explain conflict over water.1 To this end Human Security has emerged as an 
alternative explanation for the factors that motivate conflict over water. In the Chad River 
Basin a multitude of factors not located within the context of Human Security, played an 
important role in the onset of conflict within the region. These factors range from the effect 
that access to water has on food security to the ability to sustain economic growth in a time 
that is increasingly dependent on alternative forms of energy production.2 The ontological 
status of water as a security concern can therefore not be confined to traditional security 
concerns such as an arms race or nuclear weapons proliferation.   
In this thesis, the author examines the extent to which both state security and human security 
explain the onset of conflict over water in order to determine in what way, if any, human 
security offers a better alternative to state security in explaining water conflict, particularly as 
it is likely that conflict over water will not limited to soldiers of a national army or even a 
particular location in terms of a battlefield.3 In this chapter the conceptual grounding for the 
thesis is clarified. It includes an introduction to why the way in which water is understood as 
a security concern is relevant to the debate over water within Security Studies. In addition, it 
makes clarifications to the scope of various concepts, such the criteria for a case to be 
considered a conflict that will be used within the thesis. The second chapter will discuss the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Allan, J.A, Hydro-Peace in the Middle East: Why No Water Wars? A Case Study of the Jordan River Basin” 
SAIS Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2, 2002, pp. 255-272 
2 Brown, L.R., and Halweil, B., “ China’s Water Shortage Could Shake World Food Security” World Watch, 
July/August 1998 , http://wefts.org.au/downloads/policy/China's%20Water%20Shortage%20lester_brian.pdf  
pp.10-21 
3 There is an increasing trend in literature that examines future threats to security that focusses on what the 
future conduct of warfare might entail. For example, an advance in the field of technology has meant that 
information related to the conduct of war has become more accessible in terms of the speed of communication 
and so on. What it also means is that battlefields in addition to the mode of attack and even how one identifies 
the enemy is increasingly hard to identify. An example of this is cyber-warfare in which both the enemy and the 
battlefield cannot easily be designated to one particular location, see  Ignatius, D., “The Future of Warfare” in 
The Washington Post, 2 January 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123104128.html (date accessed: 2012-10-22) 
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two ways in which water as a security concern can be understood, namely state centric and 
human centric security.  The third chapter introduces the Lake Chad River Basin as a case of 
inter-state conflict over the appropriation and use of a Transboundary water resource. The 
fourth chapter introduces the Nile River Basin as a form of inter-state water conflict 
specifically by discussing the case of the Suez Crisis of 1956.  The fifth chapter concludes the 
thesis by summarizing the debate of the preceding case studies and explaining the 
significance of the findings for the debate of water as a security concern within Security 
Studies.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
In 1985 it had been stated by Boutros Boutros Ghali that wars in the future are likely to be 
fought over water.4 However, the absence of clear evidence for such a war to date in 
combination with the fact that many scholars on water politics ultimately see water as 
grounds for cooperation rather than conflict does not give any empirical grounding to the 
water wars hypothesis. The hypothesis claims that water is likely to become a focal point on 
wars fought between states in the future and is exacerbated by both climate change and 
increasing population density.5 The objections to the former United Nations (UN) Secretary 
General’s observation are justifiably grounded in the widely held belief that water has never 
been a direct motive for inter-state conflict.6 Notwithstanding the former, there are cases in 
which water has been an indirect motive for interstate conflict. Moreover, where water has 
been mentioned as a potential direct cause of conflict, it is very difficult to separate the issue 
of water from other political issues, which are more likely to sit at the root of conflict.7 The 
problem remains that if water is going to be a motive for conflict between states, it is not 
clear how one ought to characterise that motive. To fully understand how water could be a 
motive for conflict it is important to understand how water security, which refers to “the 
reliable availability of water for health, livelihoods and production, coupled with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Klare, M.T., Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, Owl Books, New York, 2001 pp.12-13  
(e-book loc. 435) See also Priscoli, J.D, “Water, Security and Global Water Policies” in Water Climate Lecture 
Series, Princeton University, 3 March 2010, p. 3 (available online at   www.princeton.edu/pei/water-
climate/priscoli_jerry.ppt date accessed: 2012-11-12) 
5 This is a term that is used in the literature for those who examine the relationship between conflict and water, 
see Cooley, J.K., “The War Over Water” Foreign Policy,  No 54, 1984 , pp. 3-26 see also Starr, J., “Water 
Wars” Foreign Policy,  No 82, 1991, pp. 17-36  
6 Wolf, A.T., “Water Conflict and Cooperation” in Water Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1998 (available online in html 
format at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/conflict_coop: date verified 2012-09-15)  
7Wolf, A.T., (et.al.) “Managing Water Conflict and Cooperation” in  State of the World, The Woldwatch 
Institute, 2005, p. 83 
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acceptable level of water related risks”, is threatened.8 It is equally important that one 
determines exactly who the referent object of water security is and by extension exactly who 
is threatened when water security is threatened. In this way one would have a clear indication 
of how water security is threatened, while at the same time having an indication of exactly 
who experiences threats to water security. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate an alternative approach in understanding water as a security 
concern. It argues that a human-centric approach, which is grounded in the principles of 
Human Security, offers a better alternative to the state-centric approach. The state-centric 
approach by contrast to the human-centric one sees the process of water conflict as one that 
occurs at the state level, rather than individual level.9 Therefore the problem of water as a 
source of conflict is located within the sphere of political interaction amongst states rather 
than that of the individuals that make use of water for daily activities.  
1.3 Rationale for this Research 
Literature on water related conflicts and how they ought to be understood is seemingly 
dichotomised by state-centric and human centric approaches to hydropolitics.10 What this 
means is that the literature as it stands tends to focus on water security whose referent object 
is either states themselves or people and does not consider one against the other within the 
same case.11 
However, very little if any of the current literature focus on the merits of the arguments they 
oppose. Furthermore, they do not explicitly give empirical grounding to their findings other 
than to select cases that fit their desired conclusion.12  In this study is that reader will be 
invited to consider both state-centric and human-centric views within the same case study. 
Ultimately while the human-centric approach will be argued as the better alternative, it does 
not mean to say that the state-centric approach lacks legitimacy altogether.  
In summary by the end of this dissertation, the reader will be in a better position to 
distinguish the ways in which conflict over water can be understood. In addition the reader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Muller M., (et.al) “Water Security in South Africa” in Working  Series Paper No. 12 Development Planning 
Division, Development Bank of South Africa, Midrand, South Africa, 2009, p. 8   
 9 This is argued by those who maintain that war as a tool of statecraft and national interest is exclusive to the 
State as an actor within the international system.   
10 Turton, A., “Report on the Hydro political Dimension” in Strategic View of River Research, Water Research 
Commission Project, WRC Report No. 1198/1/03, February, 2003, pp. 65-67 
11 For a in depth discussion on the dichotomy within the literature see: Kerr, P., The Evolving Dialectic Between 
State-Centric and Human Centric Security, Working Paper 2003/2, Department of International Relations, 
Australian National University, September, 2003, pp.4-6 
12 As will be argued later, Thomas Homer-Dixon in particular is accused of this.   
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will have a better understanding of how both the state-centric and human-centric approaches 
to water conflict are characterized. 
1.4 Literature Review 
	  
The debate on the possibility Water Wars has been rife within the last twenty years.13 The 
emergence of the debate within this period is partly a function of the shifting focus of 
Security Studies after the end of the Cold War.14 Those active in the debate include, but are 
not necessarily limited to politicians, policy-makers, the media and academia.15 The debate 
itself has largely concerned itself with whether or not such wars are likely to occur between 
states. It is also concerned with what the contributing factors for such a war would be.16 For 
the sake of brevity, in this thesis this debate will be called the water-wars hypothesis.  
The water-wars hypothesis and those who support it have increasingly had the legitimacy of 
the hypothesis challenged. The challenge is centered on the lack of empirical validation in 
that water has not been a driving force for the onset of war, even when conceding that 
politicians have threatened the use of force where water has been identified as a strategic 
end.17 However, the lack of an inter-state war fuelled by water does necessarily mean that 
conflict over water is not likely or is impossible. It does not follow from the fact that because 
water-wars between states are historically absent that water wars are unlikely in the future.  
The issue then is less about the possibility of wars over water but rather who would be the 
parties to such war.  
This presents another problem for the water-wars hypothesis in that current literature is not 
very clear on what is considered to be “war”. War, for example, can refer to an absolute war 
in which the entire resource pool of a state is directed towards warfare or achieving a political 
goal.18 Alternatively, it could refer to war in a Clauswitzean sense where war is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This contention is justified taking into account the numerous articles written by Ashton, Turton and Gleick. 
For a comprehensive bibliography see Turton, A., “Report on the Hydro political Dimension”, Op.Cit. pp. 65-67 
and pp. 71-82  
14 Baldwin, D.A., “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War” in World Politics, Vol. 48, Iss, 1, 1996, p.117 
15 Katz, D., Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risk of Water Wars in 
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 11 Iss.1, February 2011, p. 12  
16 Ibid pp. 19-20.  For Katz, the debate concerning the water wars-hypothesis concerns multiple actors within 
the international system that have their own motives for either supporting or critising the possibility of Water 
Wars. In some cases these incentives are shared  
17 Baylis, J and Wirtz., “ Introduction” in Baylis, J., Cohen, E., Gray, C.S., and Wirtz, J, (eds) Strategy in the 
Contemporary World Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, pp. 2-13 
18 Loc.Cit.  
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continuation of politics by other means.19  For this reason, Katz concedes that “water wars” 
refers to water based conflict rather than war in a traditional sense and therefore highlights a 
variety of state interactions that qualify as “water wars”.20  However, this is perhaps less 
analytically useful than it initially seems, since it now allows for any skirmish or 
disagreement to be labeled as conflict. In essence it provides those in favor of the water wars 
hypothesis with the empirical validation that they are accused of not having. For this reason, 
it is necessary to determine the scope of the term “conflict”. Wolf suggests that determining 
the scope of “conflict” is what drives the lack of consensus on the water wars hypothesis.21  
Katz for example uses a definition that encompasses the most common understanding of 
conflict by both those who support and oppose the water wars hypothesis, which takes “the 
potential for use of armed force or armed conflict” into account.22 However, this is 
problematic for two reasons. One is that “armed” needs to be specified such that it is clear 
whether or not by armed one means traditional military arms or whether or not “armed” could 
include the use of non-traditional weaponry such as biochemical agents, such as Anthrax or 
technology-based weapons such as computer viruses. The other reason is that it provides little 
insight into exactly who the combatants for these conflicts would be. In terms of applying the 
human-centric approach to water conflict, the process is made redundant if the definition of 
conflict falls outside the scope of the human-centric approach, which would be case if armed 
were defined in the traditional sense, since traditional military forces fit within the scope of 
the state-centric approach. For the purpose of this dissertation, the term conflict will refer to a 
dispute in relation to the use and/or allocation of water resources between two parties 
regardless of being state or not state actors. In addition, a case of conflict would also need to 
meet the requirement of 25 conflict related deaths per calendar year in order to qualify as a 
conflict.23 With this definition in hand, the potential combatant in “war wars” is not restricted 
to the state nor is the way in which the conflict is fought restricted to traditional means. The 
addition of a limitation on deaths arising out of such a dispute lends itself to eliminating 
trivial conflicts from being considered.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For a discussion on Clauswitzean thought see: Paret, P., “ Clausewitz Life and Thought”, Chapter 7 in 
Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey 1992, pp. 95-122 
20 Katz, D. Op.Cit, pp. 13-14 
21 Wolf, A., Giordano, M., and Yoffe, S  “International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk” Water Policy, Vol. 
5, Iss 1, 2003, pp. 29–60  
22 Katz, D., Op.Cit. pp.13-14 
23 See Section 1.6 under the term conflict for a brief discussion concerning this use of the term “Conflict” 
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The positions for and against the water wars hypothesis will be presented in order to highlight 
the literature, as well as to provide preliminary insights into the contribution of this 
dissertation to that literature, the arguments are considered next.  
1.4.1 Arguments in Favour of the water wars hypothesis 
	  
Arguments in favour of the water wars hypothesis can be viewed in three different categories. 
The first category are the statements made by politicians, which demonstrate the “political 
rhetoric” argument, the second is that water is increasingly becoming a strategic tool that can 
be used to achieve other political ends, especially within the international community, and the 
final category looks at water wars forming part of the larger “Resource Wars” argument for 
war.  
The political rhetoric of the potential for conflict over water is evident in comments made by 
political figures both within state and non-state organizations. These include the often cited 
former Secretary General of the UN (UNSG) Boutros Boutros Ghali and former World Bank 
Vice-President Ismail Seragaldin as prominent political figures of their time.24 Katz in 
particular agrees with a sentiment stated previously that cases in support of the water wars 
hypothesis tend to be anecdotal and are often selective.25 Many of the cited conflicts that fall 
within this category include conflicts in the Middle East and parts of Asia in which water is 
often peripheral to other broader political issues; this is the case with the Middle East in 
terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict.26 The legitimacy of the political rhetoric argument is 
evident in that those directly involved in state policy making-or at the very least have a strong 
influence on state policy, such as former Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and UNSG 
Boutros Ghali, are the very ones that are warning of the likelihood of water wars between 
states.  
The second argument for the water wars hypothesis is that water will increasingly become a 
strategic tool that will be used to further some other political end.27 The historical importance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Crossette, B., “Severe Water Crisis Ahead for the Poorest Nations in the Next 2 Decades”, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/10/world/severe-water-crisis-ahead-for-poorest-nations-in-next-2-
decades.html (date accessed: 2012-05-10) note: this article is cited by others, including Katz, as the basis for 
political rhetoric in support of the water wars hypothesis.  
25 Katz specifically discusses how writing on water-wars uses Null Hypothesis testing to “keep the issue alive” 
Katz., D., Op.Cit. p. 28 
26 Ibid. pp.14-15 
27 Gleditsch, N.P., “Environmental Change, Security and Conflict” in Aall, P, Crocker, C.A., and Hampson F.O. 
(eds.) Unleashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, University of Peace Press, 
Washington D.C. 2008 p. 190 
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of water is most evident in regions of water scarcity such as the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA).28 Water that lends itself to water wars in terms of the relationship between riparian 
countries and the access to the supply of water. The strategic nature of water is explained 
succinctly in the relationship between up-stream and down-stream riparian countries where 
the former has the ability to control the supply that the latter receives. When related to the 
concept of strategy, up-stream riparian countries can easily coerce their down-stream 
counterparts into making decisions that they otherwise would not have by influencing either 
the quantity or the quality of supply. The relationship between adequate supply or quality of 
water and riparian countries using water as a strategic tool is further evident in the increasing 
pressures that climate change is placing on the supply of global waters.29 Water as a strategic 
tool is therefore seen in riparian countries responses to the increasing water-deficit, where the 
water that is supplied does not meet water demanded.30 An example of which would be a 
country that has a higher per capita withdrawal rate of water resources relative to its renewal 
rate of those resources-such as Egypt and other MENA countries31  
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is an example of how water is a strategic tool, 
as well as target in times of war, in the context of bilateral inter-state relations. The LHWP in 
principle is meant to reroute 2986 million cubic meters of water per year from the Katse and 
Mohale dams within the Lesotho Mountains to South Africa’s Vaal dam.32 The project is 
designed to improve the economy of Lesotho in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
while at the same time providing the South African economy with a much-needed water 
supply. The South African government uses the water from the LHWP to offset shortages in 
domestic supply as well as to provide water for hydroelectric ventures.33 The LHWP 
demonstrates a correlation in water as a strategic interest if one considers the 1998 incursion. 
Although water plays an important role in the relationship between South Africa and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Allan, T., “Water resources in semi-arid regions: Real deficits and economically invisible and politically 
silent solutions” in   Henwood, R., and Turton A. (eds.), Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern 
African Perspective, African Water Research Unit, 2002, p. 23 
29 Turton, A., “Hydropolitics: The Concept and its Limitations” Op.Cit. p. 14, see also Homer-Dixon, T.F., “On 
the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict” International Security, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, 
1991, pp. 77-78 
30 Allan, T., Op.Cit. pp.26-27 
31 The assumption here is that per capita withdrawal indicates demand while per capita renewal indicates supply. 
The argument could possibly be extended to countries whose withdrawal is disproportionate to their 
contribution in the case of transboundary watercourses, see withdrawal relative to contribution for Egypt in 
Chapter 4 
32 Pretorius, L., “Lesotho Highlands Water Project in numbers”, Financial Mail 3 May 2012, 
http://www.fm.co.za/Article.aspx?id=170867 (date accessed: 2012-05-19) 
33 Loc.Cit.  
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Lesotho, its role is indeed one of strategic value.34 From this it is argued that the South 
African Military’s defense of the Katse Dam can be seen as an example of exactly how water 
has strategic value within the context of Southern African geo-politics.35 It is actions similar 
to this one on the part of governments that gives validity to the argument that water is 
forming an increasingly larger proportion of national interest.    
The final way in which the water wars hypothesis can be defended is by demonstrating water 
wars to be a form of “Resource Wars”. The term refers to wars that are and will be fought 
over access to valuable commodities such as gold, oil and other valuable minerals.36 One 
argument that is presented in principle by those such as Sadat, Ghali and current Egyptian 
politicians, who believe in the possibility of water wars, is that water is one of these valuable 
resources. This is because Egypt has traditionally closely linked its national interest to water, 
primarily because of Cairo’s dependence on the Nile for various water-dependent industries, 
such as agriculture.37 As a result of this close link to national security, in 1979 upon signing a 
peace treaty with Israel, Anwar Sadat suggested that water was the only resource Egypt 
would protect through the conduct of war if necessary.38 The analysis of water as a resource 
over which states will go to war suggests that water has intrinsic value; the question however 
is what exactly makes water valuable and why should one consider water wars as a form of 
resource wars? 
Klare argues that water, like oil, is increasingly vulnerable to shortages given that supply is 
rapidly diminishing. In addition, the ability to renew supplies of water is also strained given 
that population increases and climate change impact both distribution and structural 
availability.39Water therefore faces problems of both demand-induced and supply-induced 
scarcity. Water is important since it, like oil, is instrumental for the functioning of modern 
society, but water is unique in that there is no substitute for it40 At its very essence, water is 
essential for both human health and survival. It is used for drinking, sanitation and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Meissner, R., “Water and South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho” African Water Issues Research Unit,  
Occasional Paper, http://www.awiru.co.za/OccasionalP.asp#m (date verified: 2012-09-15) 
35 Loc.Cit. 
36 Klare, M.T., Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, Owl Books, New York, 2001 pp.12-
13(e-book Loc. 435) 
37 Darwish A, “Water Wars: The next major conflict in the Middle East” MidEastNews.com 
www.mideastnews.com/WaterWars.htm (date verified: 2012-12-21)- the article as it appears on MidEast News 
is an extract of a lecture present by Darwish at the Geneva Conference on Environment and the Quality of Life 
in June 1994.  
38 Loc.Cit. 
39 Klare, M.T., Op.Cit. p. 20 (e-book 466) 
40 Ibid. pp. 20-21  
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production of food.41 According to World Bank (WB), the minimum requirement for water 
supply is 25 liters per day (10cm3 per annum). A “reasonable supply” for maintaining health 
is around 100-200 liters per day (40-80cm3), per capita.42 The supply for the maintenance of 
health fits well with the understanding of domestic uses of water, where people use water on 
a day-to-day basis for the purpose of cooking, cleaning and sanitation. This however is only a 
fraction of the uses of water, when one adds the demands of agriculture, industry and energy 
production (all of which are essential in their own right for human survival) the minimum 
requirement is closer to 1000 cm3 per capita, per year.43 Of all the uses of water, irrigation 
(used predominately in agriculture) accounts for roughly 70 percent of global freshwater 
water consumption.44 This in turn means that the food production required to sustain the 
current global population is vulnerable to both increases in demand.  
In addition to the strain on demand, the potential for supply-induced water scarcity has 
become equally contested. In section 1.4.3, which discusses water-related rather than 
supporting the water wars hypothesis directly, Thomas Homer-Dixon presents the argument 
that increased environmental pressures, the most notable of which is climate change, will lead 
to problems in the structural supply of water.45 While Homer-Dixon’s analysis will be 
explicated further at a later stage, he makes an important contribution to how one might view 
water as a valuable resource. He demonstrates that demand is only one side of water a 
valuable resource and that even if demand was stabilised, potential problems in supply could 
also lead to a situation in which demand cannot be met. In addition, Homer-Dixon also 
suggests that structural availability of water when threatened could have an impact on the 
production of food crops.46 Subsequently one can draw a connection between the supply of 
water needed for human survival and the potential for conflict in which people (or states) will 
fight to either maintain or gain access to water for their survival.  
 The arguments in favour of the water- wars hypothesis hinge on the relationship between 
supply deficits and the extent to which states will engage in conflict to correct those deficits. 
While the water wars hypothesis lacks empirical validity, in that it is not clear that water has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid. p. 140 (e-book Loc. 2460) 
42 World Bank, A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle-East and North Africa, World Bank, Washington 
D.C., 1994, p. 11  
43 Klare, M.T., Op.Cit. p. 140 (e-book 2460) 
44 Ibid.p.143 (e-book 2527) 
45 Homer-Dixon, T.F., “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict” International 
Security, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, 1991, p.77 
46 Loc.Cit.  
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been the focal point of any conflict, it is very clear that an incentive for conflict over water 
does exist. This potential for conflict is evident in the multiple uses of water and dependence 
that human life has on the availability of water.  However, those in favour of the possibility 
of water wars in the future are met with criticism. This criticism pivots on the co-operational 
nature of hydropolitics as well as the incentives for over-emphasizing the water wars 
hypothesis within the political arena and the media.  
1.4.2Arguments against the Water Wars Hypothesis:  
Arguments against the Water Wars Hypothesis can be seen in two categories. The first is in 
direct contrast to the arguments for Water Wars in that water is likely to be a catalyst for 
cooperation rather than conflict. The second category argues that water has at best only been 
a catalyst for conflict and Boutrous Boutrous Ghali and Ismail Seragaldin have therefore 
mistaken water as a direct cause of conflict. 
Over the last 50 years, roughly 105 water- related Treaties have been ratified, or at the very 
least are in the process of being ratified world-wide, while during the same time only 37 
“acute disputes involving violence” over water were recorded. 47 Moreover, in many cases 
such as Lake Titicaca, shared by Chile and Bolivia, water has proven to be a central part of 
historical cooperation rather than motivate conflict.48  The response from the international 
community has been even more impressive. It has seen the formation of various policy 
documents, awareness campaigns and inter-organizational collaboration on water-related 
issues.49 So from what can be seen within the literature there is an acknowledgement that 
water-related issues have become important within the context of the international arena and 
that it continues to form part of many inter-state relationships, as is the case with Lake 
Titicaca.  
Jagerskog argues that water regimes are an important element of co-operation over water 
resources, since they promote norms and values that are conducive to the convergence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Giordano, M.A., and Wolff, A.T., “Sharing the Waters: Post-Rio International water management” in New 
Resources Forum, 27, 2003, pp. 163-164 
48  Newtown, J.T.,  “Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Lake Titicaca” Oregon State University 
Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation, 
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Lake_Titicaca_New.htm (date accessed 2012-
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interests.50 So co-operation then can be explained by appealing to an interdependent nature of 
the international community. However, Jageskog concedes that cooperation within the 
context of a water regime does not occur in isolation from other issues.51 Water co-operation 
is therefore more a function of historical agreement and interdependence than an agreement 
in its own right. This analysis would seemingly explain the co-operation between Chile and 
Bolivia as one in which both States have had historical converging interests and have 
acknowledged those interests. It also explains the lack of co-operation over water within the 
Middle East as something that is not historically grounded. In this way water within the 
Middle East is best seen as a policy area that lacks historical convergence, but is not deprived 
on convergence altogether.52 An example of convergence within the Middle East can be seen 
in Article 6 of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, which specifically addressed equitable sharing 
of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers.53 In both the original Treaty and various 
annexures the concept of cooperation over water is given specific attention, which suggests 
that water is not as peripheral to conflict (armed or otherwise) as Gleditsch suggests. The 
point here is that if water does in fact form an important part of political relationships such 
that it is enshrined in Treaties, then it seems difficult to suggest that co-operation over water 
is unlikely even in the Middle East in spite of its structural as well as supply-induced 
deficiency.  In terms of water regimes, Jagerskog could argue that even in regions where 
cooperation is difficult to achieve and distrust is rife, water-related cooperation is still 
possible. Therefore any lack of cooperation over water in the Middle East could be seen as 
relatively acute, and should not be taken as a reflection of the history of cooperation and 
securing common interests in the Middle East.      
The importance of co-operation over water and the need to enforce it has also not gone 
unnoticed by the international community. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
adopted The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (The Water Courses Convention) on the 21 May 1997.54 The Convention is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Jagerskog, A.,  “Contributions of Regime Theory in understanding inter-state water cooperation: Lessons 
learnt from the Jordan River Basin” in Henwood, R., and Turton A. (eds.), Hydropolitics in the Developing 
World: A Southern African Perspective, African Water Research Unit, 2002, p.  
51 Jagerskog, A., Op.Cit p. 76 
52 Gleditsch, N.P., Op.Cit. p. 182 
53 Various copies of the Treaty are available. A copy is available in html format from the Cyber Library of 
Jordan, see Treaty of Peace between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israel, 26 October 
1994, www.kinghussein.gov.jo/documents.html (date verified: 2012-12-21)      
54 Eckstein, G.E., “Development of international water law and the UN Watercourse Convention” in    
Henwood, R., and Turton A. (eds.), Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective, 
African Water Research Unit, 2002, p 81 
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meant to provide structure in the process of drafting bi-lateral agreements and disputes on the 
use of water.55 The Convention is often credited to have succeeded the Helsinki rules adopted 
in 1966, since the latter had become known for its appeal to non-navigational uses of water 
despite containing clauses that were aimed at navigational use as well.56 The importance of 
managing water within the context of bi-lateral relations is demonstrated even further by The 
Harmon Doctrine, which seeks to set precedent for historical claims to the access of water, as 
was the case between Mexico and the U.S. in 1984 and 1985.57It is clear based on the 
progression from the Harmon Doctrine to the Helsinki Rules to the Watercourses Convention 
that water management is important within the context of developing acceptable practices in 
terms of the uses and distribution of water supply amongst riparian countries. However, the 
process itself casts doubt on the sustainability of co-operation. The level of disagreement 
amongst riparian countries is evident in the fact that it took 25 years, 13 separate reports and 
five rapporteurs to finalize the text of the convention.58 Moreover, the process of adopting the 
Water Courses Convention seemingly divided riparian countries into two groups; namely, up-
stream versus down-stream riparian countries. It can be argued on this basis that in spite of 
the increased attention that is given to water management through the adoption of the Water 
Courses Convention, international law itself does not necessarily guarantee the co-operation 
of States within the international community. So while co-operation in a historical sense 
negates the water wars hypothesis, it is not clear how co-operation is feasible when the 
historic context is absent from the bi-lateral relationship, as is the case for many of the 
MENA riparian countries.  
The statements and assertions of politicians that have been associated with tendencies to 
confirm the likelihood of the water wars hypothesis have not escaped scrutiny either. In his 
explanation of the critique of the hypothesis, Katz notes that there is no statistical correlation 
between the statements of politicians showing their willingness to go to war and the onset of 
the related conflict.59 Based on this it is not clear that one ought to place much emphasis on 
the political rhetoric of politicians, since their words are not always followed by the 
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56 Ibid. p. 83 
57 Akweenda, S., “From Harmon to Helsinki: The Evolution of Key Principles in International Water Law” in 
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58 Ekstein, G.E., Op. Cit. p. 83 
59 Katz, D., Op.Cit pp. 24-25  see Leng, R. “Influence Strategies and Interstate Conflict”, in  J. David Singer(ed)  
The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models, Free Press, New York  1980, 124–157 for the 
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mentioned action.  In addition, Katz’s article focuses on the incentives for what he calls over-
emphasizing the possibility of water wars.60  He argues that both politicians and the media 
benefit from over-playing the potential that water wars are likely. In the case of politicians, 
the utility behind emphasizing the risk of water wars rests in its ability to garner public 
support for such a war as well as serve as a negotiating tactic when there is a feeling that 
water resources are no longer sufficient to maintain demand. Regardless of the intention of 
politicians and policy-makers, there is an indication that emphasizing the ties between 
national security and water wars is not without merit. It is a fundamental part of co-riparian 
relations in the case of a shared water source, since it serves as a negotiating tactic where a 
disagreement over repatriation arises.61 The threat of war over water is therefore essentially a 
leveraging tactic. In spite of the appeal of using water as a leveraging tactic, it has 
traditionally been a means to an end. For example the use of water in the form of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and the extended political distrust between Turkey and 
Syria indicates water’s peripheral nature in political discourse. The so-called Arab refusal of 
Turkey’s gesture to provide drinking water to water poor countries by laying a pipe from 
Anatolia to the Arab Peninsula can be seen as a fear of water being used as a tool for Turkey 
to gain political leverage, which is very much seen as a threat to Arab national security.62 The 
role of water as a leveraging-card has historically been used by Syria when it perceived a 
threat to its water supply supporting the Kurdish separatist movement.63 The support of the 
Kurdish separatist movement has at times also generated increased military tensions, when in 
1998 Turkey deployed 10, 000 troops and coordinated various low-altitude flights on the 
Syrian border in response to the October Crisis of 1998.64 In this case water had a peripheral 
role in the militarized approach adopted by Turkey, so much so that Damascus agreed to 
discuss the “security question without reaching political compromise on the water 
problem”.65 Regardless one might argue that the GAP project and Syria’s support of the 
Kurds when it felt threatened in terms of water access did play an indirect role in the October 
Crisis of 1998. Therefore even if one were to concede that there is a correlation between the 
statements of policy-makers and politicians and the occurrence of war over water as a form of 
political leverage, it remains difficult to see how water is the focal point of such leverage.         
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The media plays a slightly more perplexing role in the public debate concerning the water 
wars hypothesis. For the media, the possibility of war over water serves as a marketing 
strategy to sell more papers and in so doing increase profits, which is not problematic in its 
own right. What is problematic, however, is that the very nature of reporting does not lend 
itself well to the type of analysis needed to support the water wars hypothesis. This can be 
seen in two ways: the first is that the media often have to process very complex issues in 
“bite size” information that can be understood easily by readers; the second is that the media 
tend to focus on elements of coverage that are most likely to get attention.66 The former is 
problematic in that the finer details concerning the possibility of water wars are not easily 
explained or examined appropriately within the constraints placed on reporters. The reality is 
that issues concerning hydro-politics, including the possibility of water wars whether 
referring to water related conflict or otherwise, are often the focus of entire dissertations by 
higher degree candidates, where the scope of debate is much larger. It is important to notice 
that the scope of reporting does not allow for fleshing out of issues to the extent that clear 
connections between water and war can be drawn. Ultimately this means that the media do 
not portray a competently balanced picture on the possibility of water wars, as the reporting 
does not present the complex issue in its entirety.  
The second in which the media is inadequate in reporting the complexities and by extension 
on the possibility of water wars is that media reports are written in such a way that they get 
more attention, rather than out of responsibility for reporting all elements of complex 
political issues. This seems to link fairly well with the contention that, in some cases, the 
media reports are written to generate mass hysteria a sensationalist notion of water wars. Katz 
argues an additional factor could be that these reports are written to appeal to sensation rather 
than speak to any causal factor that water might have on the outbreak of war. In summation 
then, the media ought not to be seen as a credible source of viewing water wars as a reality, 
since the issues relating to water wars are not fleshed out properly nor is it particularly 
evident that such media reports intend to make broad-sweeping statements about the causal 
relationship between water and war.  
In summary, the first category of arguments against the water- wars hypothesis concerns the 
lack of empirical evidence for such a war, as was noted through the absence of a war that has 
been fought where water was the direct cause of the onset of war. The appeal to historical co-
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operation and intentional law does not only seek to curtail the water wars hypothesis, but also 
directly opposes it. The second category concerns showing that the reliability of the media in 
reporting on the possibility of such wars, since it is not clear that the media can present the 
complexities of waters wars as it would be in academia for example. Moreover, the motive 
behind the media’s portrayal of the possibility of such wars cannot be separated clearly from 
the lucrative financial benefits of selling newspapers.  
1.4.3 Water-Related Rather than Water Wars 
Despite the reasons given to doubt the validity of the water wars hypothesis, particularly the 
lack of empirical evidence for such a war, there is still seemingly something counter-intuitive 
about claiming that water would not lead to conflict. Pieter Gleick and Thomas Homer Dixon 
argue that this is because there are clear connections between water and security, such as the 
dependence on water for agriculture, and subsequently food security.67 The crux of the claim, 
at least on the part of Gleick and Homer-Dixon is that environmental factors such as the 
access to water have an increasing influence on the likelihood of conflict. In Homer-Dixon’s 
view the onset of violent conflict can often not be separated from issues that concern the 
environment such as the access to water that is used for agriculture could lead to violent 
conflict if indeed food supply is less than demand from increasing populations.68 Homer-
Dixon even further argues, at least implicitly, that environmental concerns such as climate 
change ought to form part of already established literature that seeks to redefine the scope of 
security.69 This leads Homer-Dixon to posit that if acute conflict can be related to 
environmental concerns, then it stands to reason to suggest that it is feasible to consider the 
possibility of widespread conflict over inter alia water. Gleick argues conflict of the future is 
likely to be exacerbated by factors such as the access to water in achieving political 
goals.70This would seemingly find favour with those who seek to defend the validity of the 
water wars hypothesis, since Gleick argues that water is one resource that will increasingly 
become the focus of strategic political maneuvering, particularly amongst States in the 
conduct of warfare.71 The indirect relation to water in the onset of conflict gives some 
validity to the water wars hypothesis. It does so by giving empirical validation to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Gleick, P.H, “Environment and Security: The Clear Connections” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists vol. 47, Iss.3, 
17-21 see also Gleick, P.H, “Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International Security”, 
International Security Vol. 18, Iss. 1, 1993, pp. 79-112 
68 Homer-Dixon, T.F., Op.Cit.  pp. 77-78 
69 Homer-Dixon invites the reader of the article cited above to read: Ullman, R.H., ”Redefining International 
Security” International Security, Vol 8, No.1, 1983 pp. 129-153 
70 Gleick, P.H., Op.Cit. pp. 83-86 
71 Ibid. pp.86-89 
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hypothesis, albeit a weaker version of it. Gleick for example uses water as the main catalyst 
in the 1967 war between Egypt and Syria as an instance in which water can be linked to 
conflict even if one cannot separate the war from broader political issues.72  The focus of the 
water wars hypothesis is therefore less about predicting a war over water and more about 
showing how water can act as a catalyst to the onset of conflict. Homer-Dixon would also 
defend a watered-down version of the hypothesis such as this one. What is important to take 
notice of is that Gleick and Homer-Dixon are not suggesting that conflict over water is 
completely unlikely, as those who argue that water is more a means for cooperation would. 
The argument is rather that the relationship is not a direct one and would need to be specified 
more accurately. 
Opposition most notably from Jon Barnett, Nils Gleditsch and Marc Levy has also evident in 
the literature for the argument presented for water-related rather than water wars. The most 
noteworthy of the former in the context of this debate is Marc Levy, owing to his part in what 
has become known as the Homer-Dixon-Levy Debate. In essence Levy suggests that the link 
that Homer-Dixon and others who support the environment-security nexus is fundamentally 
flawed and that the issues raised within the nexus’ debate forms part of the debate in the 
context of high politics.73 Levy specifically claims that the cases chosen by Homer-Dixon 
were done rather selectively as Homer-Dixon studied cases where conflict has already been 
evident and simply identified what environmental factors were involved. Levy claims that 
this cannot speak to the validity of environmental factors as a causal mechanism for 
explaining why conflict occurs, given the importance of variables such as population growth 
and decreasing water supply.74 By taking this view Levy supports the efforts of Deudney and 
Barnett in establishing opposition to the notion that the environment and by extension water 
can be linked to national security.75  
Jon Barnett claims that the link that Homer-Dixon and others who seek to defend the 
environment-security nexus do so from a theoretical rather than empirical perspective. In so 
doing Barnett not only refutes the water wars hypothesis but claims that it is a case of North-
South relations and that the media in particular over-emphasize the importance of the link 
between the environment and security. He claims that the connection is more political in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Ibid, pp.85-86 
73 Levy, M.A., “Is the Environment a Security Issue?” International Security Vol 20, No, 2, 1995, pp. 35-62  
74 Levy, M.A., Ibid. pp.56-57 
75 Deudney, D., “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security”, Millennium 
Journal of International Studies, 1990, pp. 461-476 
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nature and is therefore not worthy of examination as a risk to national security.76 Whether or 
not Barnett’s argument is suitable in this context is unclear. It seems that Barnett is rejecting 
the movement of redefining security altogether rather than refuting the possibility of water 
related conflict as such. 
Gleditsch offers an objection to Gleick’s analysis of the importance of water in the context of 
Middle East relations-which forms an integral part of Gleick’s analysis as presented here. 
Gleditsch argues that Gleick’s analysis that identifies 51 water related conflict events cannot 
be taken out of context. The events themselves were attacks on water installations (or at the 
very least threats of such attacks) in the conduct of warfare.77 Therefore, he claims that these 
cases cannot be used to show that the conflicts cited “arose out of a disagreement over scarce 
resources”.78   
The argument for water-related conflict perhaps has more empirical appeal and would be 
easier to defend as a potential cause of conflict. However, the criticisms raised by Levy, 
Barnett and Gleditsch show that the argument would need to specify more deeply how water 
related issues are likely to lead to conflict. By showing that water-related conflict offers 
insight into both state-centric and human-centric approaches to water conflict, this 
dissertation can bridge the gap between those who are for and those who are against the water 
wars hypothesis.   
1.5 Methodology 
	  
In what has preceded the argument for the validity of the water wars hypothesis is seemingly 
split by either those who believe that conflict over the access to and use of  water is an inter-
state matter (Jon Barnett, Marc Levy and David Deudney) or those who believe that conflict 
over water is a more likely to occur  occur between local populations (Thomas Homer-Dixon 
and Pieter Gleick). Interestingly very few have applied the merits of both arguments to a 
single case that concerns conflict over water. In the cases that follow, namely Lake Chad and 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, the merits of both sides will be argued to see in what way the 
human-centric approach offers a better explanation for conflict over water in spite of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Barnett, J., “Destabilizing the Environment Conflict Hypothesis” Review of International Studies no 26, 
2000, p. 271 
77 Gleditsch, N.P.,  “Environmental Change, Security and Conflict” in Aall, P, Crocker, C.A., and Hampson 
F.O. (eds.) Unleashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, University of Peace Press, 
Washington D.C. 2008, p.183 
78 Loc.Cit.  
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merits of the state-centric view. In this way the focus is not to be ignorant of the value of the 
state-centric approach but rather it is to show how in the scope of redefining security, it has 
become inadequate. This inadequacy is based in part on the increasing negative effects that 
climate change and the corresponding lack in supply of water has on the populations that rely 
on such a water supply. 
The cases used to discuss the relationship between state-centered and human centered 
security, in this thesis, focus on the use of transboundary watercourses on the African 
continent. The majority of literature that examines water and its impact on security agree that 
Africa is likely to be the most adversely affected by climate change and its subsequent 
contribution to water scarcity within Africa. Through using Africa, the threat that water poses 
to security can be seen from both of the aforementioned perspectives. From the state-centered 
perspective, it threatens the survival of downstream states dependent almost exclusively on 
waters originating outside their borders. In addition, access to water even questions the 
legitimacy of political borders. From a human-centered perspective, the threat is more 
evident in the form of an increasingly poor and uneducated population to maintain food 
security; but also at a more fundamental level how access to water is instrumental to life. 
1.6 Clarification and Scope of Terms 
 
Conflict: The International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) distinguishes between two types of 
armed conflict. The first is between one two or more States. The second concerns armed 
conflict between non-state actors and the State, or a conflict between two of the former 
only.79 This definition focuses on the character of conflict within the framework of 
international law. However, it does not provide an empirical way for one to determine how an 
armed conflict differs from other forms of conflict or even a regular dispute (which does not 
necessarily entail violence). Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research aims to address this problem by restricting use of the term “armed conflict” by 
defining an armed conflict to be “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”80 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 How is the term “Armed Conflict Defined in International Humanitarian Law”, International Red Cross 
Committee, Occasion Paper, March 2008, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-
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80 “Definitions” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, s.v. “Armed Conflict”, 
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consideration of the former, cases that qualify as conflict within the Chad and Nile Basins 
will need to meet the three criteria as defined by Upsalla  University. It is acknowledged as 
Goldstein does that the Upsalla definition is not perfect.81 However, given its strong 
empirical method of validation, that is observing 25 conflict-related deaths it is one of the 
only credible ways to examine possible cases of conflict. In addition because it does not 
discriminate between conflict as something that exists exclusvely between states, it lends 
itself well to a human-centered analysis.82 
Demand-Induced and Supply-Induced Scarcity: The introduction of the terms demand-
induced and supply-induced scarcity is credited to Thomas Homer-Dixon, a member of the 
so-called Toronto group. The group is very closely associated with understanding 
environmental concerns as causes for conflict.83 Both concepts form part of a three-pronged 
understanding of environmental scarcity. Demand-induced scarcity exists when there is an 
increase in per capita consumption water, while Supply-induced scarcity when resources are 
used at faster rate than what they can be replenished.84 A third element is structural scarcity 
which refers to the distribution of the resource, specifically where the ability to control 
appropriation of a water source is concentrated in the hands of one power. It therefore fits 
well in the analysis of River basins in which multiple parties have an interest. In this thesis, 
structural scarcity and distributional scarcity are used inter-changeably. In addition, the 
reader is cautioned that structural supply refers to the amount of water in a water course and 
is not considered inter-changeable with structural scarcity. 
Hydropolitics: In the most basic of terms, hydropolitics concerns the political dimensions of water. It 
is therefore an umbrella term that is used to describe various other concepts that relate to water. These 
include, water security, water scarcity and the relationship between water and conflict (i.e. water 
wars).85 More narrow definitions concern issues related to issues conflict and cooperation, involve 
states as the principle actors, and take place in international river basins.86 More broad definitions tend 
to include the interaction between state and people vis-à-vis water, they consider individuals and other 
non-state actors in debates concerning water issues and also consider issues regarding authoritative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Goldstein, J.S., Winning the War On War:  The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Plume, New York, 
2012, pp.233-234 
82 Ibid. p.234	  
83 Ellingsen, T., and Hauge, W., “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict” in Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 30, No.3, p. 301 
84 Ibid. p. 301 
85 Turton, A., “Hydropolitics: The Concept and its Limitations” in Henwood, R., and Turton A. (eds.), Hydro 
politics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective, African Water Resarch Unit, 2002, p. 13 
86 Ibid. p. 15 
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use.87 In this thesis, the more broad definition is used to provide for a human-centered analysis, with 
individuals as well as the state being party to issues regarding water. In a broad sense hydropolitics 
refers to the political dimensions that concern water and its various uses.88 In the current 
literature, it is debated who ought to be party to political discourse on water.89 Both state-
centric and human-centric writings contest what “hydropolitics” refers to as well as who the 
relevant actors in hydropolitics are.90 For the former the state-level of analysis is sufficient to 
explain who relevant actors to hydropolitics are. The latter however believe that those who 
are affected, in terms of their daily living conditions need to be more legitimacy within this 
debate.91   
Renewable Water Resources: One of the challenges with establishing the numeric value of 
renewable water resources is that water exists in various forms of the water cycle. Renewable 
Water Resources will refer primarily to freshwater, which is roughly 2.5 percent of the 
earth’s total water supply.92 68.9 percent of that freshwater supply (equating to 1.72 percent 
of global supply) is glaciers and permanent snow cover. The remaining 31.1 percent is 
divided between fresh ground water 29.9 percent of freshwater (equating to 0.75 percent of 
global supply), 0.3 percent is freshwater Rivers and lakes storage and 0.9 percent is located in 
swamps and soil moisture.93 In essence, only 0.025 of the global water supply is available for 
human consumption. In this thesis renewable water resources (also abbreviated to TRWR) 
will refer to the 0.025 percent of global water supply found in lakes, Rivers and reservoirs.   
Water Scarcity: Malin Falkenmark has presented one of the most succinct ways in which to 
understand the concept of water security. This is especially true in terms of understanding 
one state’s water scarcity relative to another. The Falkenmark Indicator or Water-Stress 
Indicator essentially examines whether or not the water supply in a given region has the 
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ability to satisfy the needs of a person.94 In essence, the indictor proposes 1700m3 of 
renewable resources per person, per year as a threshold. This threshold is based on estimates 
of water requirements across all sectors of use, including domestic use. In addition, it takes 
into account the needs of the environment. Countries that cannot meet this threshold 
experience water stress. When water supply falls below 1000m3 the country is said to 
experience water-scarcity, and a country that falls below 500m3 is said to experience absolute 
scarcity.95  
Falkenmark also developed a method to test the ability of renewable water resources to meet 
the demands of agricultural yields needed in terms of projected population growth: 
 
Figure 1: Water-Stress Indicator versus Yields needed to sustain population growth 96 
Water Indicator and per capita m3 Agricultural Yield Indicator 
1-2 
1000-1700m3 per 
capita, per annum 
Water Quality and Dry 
Season Problems 
1 Yields will be enough 
3 
500-1000m3 
Water Stress 2 Minimum Increase in 
Yields 
4-5 
< 500m3 
Absolute Scarcity 3 High Increase in 
Yields 
  4 Even High Increase 
will not be enough 
(Source: M. Falkenmark, 1990)   
Based on this countries that score within the high ranges of both indicators are likely to 
experience tension over access to water, since water is not available to increase to increase 
agricultural yields needed to sustain growing populations. Using this analysis, Falkenmark 
suggests that by 2025, 1.1 billion people (representing two thirds of the African continent) 
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will experience severe water scarcity.97 This thesis will use Falkenmark’s indicator to 
determine water scarcity of the units within the case studies to follow.  
Water Security: There is relative agreement on the concept of water security. It is generally 
defined as “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, 
livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related 
risks to people, environments and economies”98 There are three things that determine water 
security: (1) hydrologic environment, which essentially speaks to the structural availability; 
(2) is the socio-economic environment, which is essentially the economy and its actors, and 
(3) is changes in the future environment in either (1) or (2) above.99  
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Chapter 2 
The State-Centric and Human-Centric Approaches to Security 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The referent object of security can be explained in terms of either the State or in terms of the 
individual. The rationale of this thesis relies on a movement within the field of Security 
Studies that seeks to move the referent object of security from being defined exclusively 
within the context of the State to focusing on emerging issues within the international arena. 
The increased attention given to water as an emerging security issue is a validation of this 
trend. However, it remains largely debatable exactly to whom water is a security threat. 
Those who argue in favor of the water wars hypothesis argue that the State remains sufficient 
as the referent object. By contrast those who defend a weaker version of the hypothesis, such 
as the one defended by Homer-Dixon, beg to differ. If Homer-Dixon is correct then the 
concept of security cannot be restricted to the State since there are ostensible ways in which 
security applies to individuals as well.100 However to say that security applies to an individual 
pre-supposes an understanding of exactly how security is applicable to the individual. The 
critics of Human Security, which seeks to put the individual at the focal of analysis argue that 
a lack of specification in terms of how security applies to individuals render the concept 
analytically useless.101 It follows from this that if the alternative offered to the State as the 
referent object of security is analytically useless, and then it seems fitting to conclude that the 
State remains sufficient in the analysis of water security and the potential for conflict over the 
use and allocation of it.  
In this chapter the thesis defends the view that the concept of Human Security (and by 
extension the human-centric view of security) can be refined to make it more analytically 
sound. It begins by providing an explication of the state-centric approach to security. The 
chapter then moves on to analyze the concept of human-centric security. This will include 
placing human-centric security within the broader framework of Critical Security Studies 
(CSS) as well as a critical analysis of Human Security as its foundation. The chapter 
concludes by providing an explanation for the importance of the concepts discussed for the 
chapters that follow.  
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2.2 The State-Centered Approach to Security 
2.2.1 Theoretical Background 
The state-centric approach is traditional in its understanding of security. The understanding 
that the state-centered view brings to security is generally considered to be one where it is the 
security of the state that needs to be protected. This understanding applies to both what is 
deemed to be relevant to security policy and what the appropriate response to threats toward 
such a security policy might be. The concept of the state being the center of security policy is 
rooted in positivist thinking, but is not necessarily a result of it. The notion of state-centered 
security stems from a complex interaction between States within the context of the Second 
World War (WWII) and the Cold War-as a war of ideology between the United States (U.S.) 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R).102 Most of the literature that seeks 
defends the state-centered approach to security appeals to the use of military means in order 
to protect national interest and the political goals of the State.103 The underlying logic is that 
as the military is a tool of statecraft, the functions and scope of its interaction with other 
States and society can only be a matter of State interaction. It is this focus on state-level 
analysis that gives the concept its positivist background.  
Those who defend the traditional approach to security argue that the referent object of 
security has not really changed. The most prominent of these defenders are Barry Buzan and 
Stephan Walt. The argument presented by Buzan is that although the focus on the individual 
or even human kind is appealing, the concept of agency is problematic. His argument is 
contingent on the view that a focus on individual security is reductive a bypassing of state 
security which is a necessary condition for each individual’s security.104 The argument 
therefore is that the concept of individual security is already contained in the concept of state 
security, since the security of people depends on the security of the State.  On this basis, 
moving the referent object of security is not only unfounded it is also completely 
unnecessary.  
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The focus on state-centered security that Buzan argues for is evident in the motivation for the 
development of international security studies (ISS). As Nye and Lynn-Jones argue, the 
development of ISS came as a result of “twin revolutions” in both U.S. foreign policy and 
advances in military technology. These revolutions were characterized by the emergence of 
the cold war and the initiation of atomic weapons into the conduct of warfare.105 The focus on 
the state in terms of security is further evident in the universal acceptance of the realist 
paradigm, which purported the meticulous attention to power politics and national interest.106 
In accepting the realist paradigm of international security, Nye and Lynn-Jones argue that the 
concepts of nuclear strategy and deterrence are simplified. This simplification (or the removal 
of fuzziness which is best suited for creative works) of security is useful in the context of co-
operation versus conflict within strategic partnerships, since decision-making takes fewer 
variables into account.107 Thought of differently, the simplification of concepts related state 
security means that decision-making does not get “bogged down” by considering concepts 
that are either difficult to reach consensus on (such as the allocation of water rights) or that 
are ultimately reductive into issues of state security and therefore are redundant in the 
security decision-making process (such as the use of water for agriculture for agricultural 
dependent economies).  The contributions of Buzan, Nye and Lynn-Jones are indicative of an 
emphasis on military and strategic interaction in how one ought to understand the subject 
matter of ISS. In the proverbial nutshell, security is a matter of militaristic and strategic 
interaction between actors in the international community. These “actors” through the 
underpinning of realist thinking are taken to be States rather than individuals.  
Stephen Walt offers insight into the trend that questions the traditional understanding of 
security studies. In what he calls the Golden Era of security studies, the focus on “the study 
of the threat, use and control of military force” is examined.108 The notion of the state as the 
focal point of analysis during the Golden Era is also evident in the focus on tools of state 
craft within the framework of security studies. These “tools” include diplomacy, arms control 
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and crisis management.109 In this way, Walt does not challenge Nye and Lynn-Jones but adds 
a sophisticated analysis of the foundations of security studies within academia. In response to 
the inclination of Critical Theorists who deem the Golden Era focus outdated, Walt suggests 
that their inclination is founded more on anti-war sentiment during the 1960’s and 1970’s 
than it is with the notion of the state being the focal point of security studies itself.110 
Therefore the so-called inadequacy of state-centered approaches to security remains a matter 
of public perception (most notably those with very little or no military background) and is not 
a methodological flaw within the positivist nature of the Golden Era. The most influential of 
these perceptions are those found in anti-war campaigns during the Vietnam War, which is 
largely considered to be a failure of military means as a form of state-craft.111 However, Walt 
argues that even if the military or military engagement, as the referent object of security 
studies, is unpopular; the emergence of security studies would still need to focus “security” 
on potential threats to national interest.112 Therefore it is evident that Walt sees security 
studies as entailing more than just the use of the military in state-craft. The political concepts 
such as “arms control, diplomacy and crisis management” are also features of state security 
and are therefore equally relevant to national interest.113  
An interesting trend in terms of the state being the focus of security studies also developed as 
a result of the “twin-revolution”. Jonathan Kirshner argues that the focus on military 
engagement of ISS, forced political economy and security to be viewed in isolation from one 
another.114 He further argues, like Walt does, that this was possibly a result of the over-
emphasis of military containment on the part of the Cold-War superpowers-an example of 
which is the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963.115 While this trend is understandable in his view, 
it remains one that makes very little sense since there are clear connections between 
economic activity and the traditional subject matter, being the use of military force of ISS.116 
Therefore he argues that there are connections between I.P.E and motivation to enter into 
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military conflict. For Kirshner this connection is seen within the context of economic causes 
of war. He specifically appeals to “military Keynesianism” in which expand military 
spending and in so doing heighten the security dilemma.117 Other scholars on post-CW 
security studies also contend that there is a close relationship between the end of the CW and 
military arms races. Michael Klare, for example, draws strong correlations between arms 
races within the Pacific Rim in which states sought to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of 
the USSR.118 In so doing, he demonstrates a need for the field to maintain its focus on 
military-centered issues and how the heightening of the security dilemma (as observed by 
Kirshner) can be applied to rising powers as well. 
The arguments in favour of the state-centered view of security place emphasis on military 
history and the use of arms in the process of statecraft. This is most evident in Walt’s analysis 
as presented above. If viewed in terms of methodology, the emphasis on the use of military 
force in achieving the objectives of the state makes sense. This is because the assumptions 
that the state-centered view of security studies makes are relative to the conclusions it draws. 
It is clear from Nye and Lynn-Jones’ definition of security studies Walt’s analysis that the 
focal point of security threats are militaristic in nature and it is even more clear that they 
believe the use of military force ought to be the proverbial omega of security analysis. 
Anything beyond the scope of the military therefore becomes irrelevant to security studies 
and is therefore not considered a threat to national security. However, this view of security 
studies seems to eliminate other essential elements of the state from the realist paradigm, 
upon which Nye, Lynn-Jones and Walt base their arguments. An example of this is the close 
relationship between wealth and national interest, a relationship characterized by the 
importance of the state economy and economic performance. To this end, Kirshner offers 
insight into the economy-security studies nexus, which to some degree posits the importance 
of the economy and economic activity within the context of state-centered security.  
  2.2.2 State-Cantered Security in the Context of Water  
The state-centered approach to security has been argued to have its foundation in the political 
engagement of the Cold War. However, the foundations of the approach demonstrate very 
little if any connection to water as an issue of “state security”. This is possibly a result of 
research such as that of Gleditsch, which suggests that water forms part of larger political 
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goals and is rarely the focal point political goal.119 The lack of connection is even further 
demonstrated by the lack of conflict over water between states, as suggested in the previous 
chapter. The connection between national interest as an objective of state security and water 
needs to be specified further. This is especially true if water security is to be considered part 
of state security.  
The first connection between the state and water in terms of security is that water can be 
considered part of broader political goals. While this was mentioned earlier as part of a 
critique of the water-wars hypothesis, it remains a very powerful assertion in the argument 
for a state-centered approach to understanding security. 
While the 1967 War between Egypt and Syria did have water as a major driving factor 
behind militarized conflict between the two states, the bombing was a strategic tool to further 
other political objectives, since water was declared to be a “question of life for Israel” by 
Levi Eshkol.120 This is of course not to say that water might not have formed an important 
part of those objectives, but it does imply that water was not the focal point of those 
objectives. The relationship between water structures and military force in this case gives the 
notion of state security objectives as the primary focus of security studies some intuitive 
appeal, which accordingly makes the state-centered security analysis very plausible. Thus 
there is a clear connection between those who seek to reject the water wars hypothesis and 
those who seek to defend the use and threat of military force as the referent object of security 
studies.  
Kirshner’s analysis of the economic variable to security studies also creates a connection 
between the validity water wars hypothesis and the referent object of security studies. The 
clearest relationship between water and the possibility of conflict is seen through the lens of 
“Resource Wars”. The concept of resource wars establishes connections between resources of 
economic value to conflict. The common understanding of these resources is that they are 
mineral resources such as oil and gold. Based on Shiklomanov’s analysis, only a very small 
portion of global water supplies are available for human consumption.121 When combined 
with Klare’s argument that, proportionately, irrigation is the single largest sector of water use 
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one can at best determine water to be an indirect economic resource. Regardless of the 
water’s indirect economic value, it is likely that its absence would be a potential cause of 
conflict because of its importance to sustaining human life, as was discussed in the first 
chapter. From this one can deduce that water becomes vulnerable to a resource war based on 
either distributional or structural scarcity (see section 1.6). It is distributional because 
increasing populations are likely to threaten access to water because per capita availability 
will drop.122 It is structural because in order to meet the demands of their population some 
states might dictate or even control water allocation, as is the case with Egypt in the Nile 
Basin (see chapter 4).     
Water makes an important contribution to rising economies, specifically in Asia, Africa and 
South America.123 An important part of the resource wars analytical framework is the ability 
of rising powers within the global economy to meet the demands of both domestic and 
industrial energy needs.124 Resource wars as a theoretical concept therefore focuses on the 
use of energy in its predictions about the possibility of war over natural resources. The 
emphasis on the use natural resources for energy therefore raises questions about the 
connection between water and the potential for resource wars. Water can be connected to the 
increasing need for energy, as an important component of Resource Wars, through the 
development of hydroelectricity.125 The utility of developing alternative energy resources 
stems from increasing climate change debates within policy making circles, but is not what 
motivates states to consider alternative energy use.126 The development of alternative energy 
sources forms part of technological, economic and ideological shifts within state policy 
making that is cognizant of the finite nature of fossil fuels such as coal. More importantly 
these shifts are cognizant of the need to stimulate demand for energy in the absence of these 
fossil fuels.127 The tendency has therefore been to seek sustainable forms of energy, 
hydroelectricity being one of these forms.128 What one therefore sees is that an appeal to 
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alternative energy resources by states as a feature of securing power and national interest in 
light of a perceived inadequate supply of finite resources. 
The ability for states to secure a water supply that is capable of maintaining demand for 
current industrial and domestic uses, in combination with ambitions to maintain sustainable 
energy supplies through hydro-electric schemes become hotspots for many transboundary 
riparian countries. These hotspots usually refer to either appropriation of the total water 
supply amongst riparian countries or the negative effects suffered by down-stream riparian 
countries when an up-stream partner embarks on a hydro-electric project.129  In the Middle 
East for example, both Iraq and Syria claim that Turkey is using disproportionate water 
allocations from the Tigris and Euphrates for the use of the Ataturk Dam.130 Turkey’s use of 
water in its hydro-electric policy has also sparked debates on the environmental hazards of 
using water as a sustainable form of energy. These so-called hazards are specifically directed 
at the possibility of contamination for the supplies of the Tigris and Euphrates used by Egypt 
and Syria as well as populations that live in the surrounding regions of hydroelectric dams.131 
In Africa, particularly in the Nile River Basin, the relationship between up-stream and down-
stream riparian countries has been a point of disagreement. This is specifically true of cases 
where down-stream countries, such as Egypt, adopt fundamentally different views to their 
up-stream counterparts, which in this case is Ethiopia. The crux of the contention between the 
two is the appropriation and use of the resources of the Nile River.132 The issue of access to 
water resources is even further exacerbated in the Nile River Basin with the emergence of 
South Sudan as an independent state.133 This is particularly true in terms of how South Sudan 
will access and use water, and more importantly what this means for Sudan in terms of its use 
of the Nile Basin’s resources.  
The connection between water and state security is therefore more evident in water’s value to 
the economic performance of the state as well as the legitimacy of the government within the 
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state. This principle is known as the Hydro social Contract134 The economic importance of 
water is seen both in terms of its value for energy resources and the ability of agrarian 
industries to maintain their contribution to Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.), specifically in 
developing countries. While water is often part-and-parcel of larger political differences 
amongst co-riparian countries, its value as a strategic resource has increasingly taken on an 
economic character because of the dependence on water related industries, for example 
farming, in places where conflict over water has been evident.135 For this reason, the state-
centric approach to water security (as it applies to this thesis) will examine water as a threat 
to the economic performance of the states in the case studies that follow. 
2.3 The Human-Centric Approach to Security  
2.3.1Theoretical Background 
The human centric approach to security, or human-centered security developed as a part of 
the Critical Security Studies (C.S.S.) School of security studies. An essential part of the C.S.S 
research agenda was the impact of emerging threats to the state-security nexus. In addition, 
the C.S.S. movement questioned the origins and assumptions of the dominant school in 
security studies, namely state-centered security.136 This was marked by a fundamental shift in 
the understanding of security in the post- Cold War era. Importantly, this shift marked more 
than just a decline in the understanding of the “Golden Era” since it introduced a notably 
“demilitarized” international community. It was not demilitarized in the sense that no states 
had military forces, but it was in the sense that the threat let alone the use of military force 
had become unpopular. The “unpopular” nature of military force was marked by a re-
invigoration of the concept of an interdependent international community. While some such 
as Kerr argue that the post-Cold War international community introduced the concept of 
interdependent security, it must be stressed that the concept was hardly new within the 
context of international relations.137 An example of the interdependent security framework 
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was the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C), which sought to eliminate the 
possibility for using military force by making, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands economically interdependent.138 Through various extensions of this 
concept during the 1950’s and 1960’s the European Union as it known today came into 
existence. What the end of the Cold War brought to the concept was that it was not confined 
to one geo-political setting. It more importantly allowed for non-military issues to gain more 
prominence on the security agenda of the international community.  
From a theoretical perspective, the human-centered approach to security represents a shifting 
of the boundaries by C.S.S.139 Krause particularly suggests that shifts in the security 
paradigm can be viewed within the framework of three axes. The first he claims is the 
broadening of the ‘orthodox’ understanding of security as presented by Jessica Tuchman 
Matthews and Richard Ullman.140 So in this way he argues that the security of the state ought 
not to be reductive to military engagement, and should include economic and environmental 
potential threats as well. The second axis concerns to deepening “the- who” to which security 
refers.141 This is commonly understood, as suggested by Kerr, to mean applies the concept of 
security to different levels of analysis. In this case those levels refer to moving from state 
level to individual level. 142 A final axis incorporates the state’s interaction with other factors 
to test and evaluate the relationships between collective or cooperative security and the 
state.143 The final axis is therefore an explication of state responses to threats rather than a 
movement or evaluation the referent object of security. What is apparent then is that the 
traditional view of security is challenged both in terms of its scope and the referent object of 
security as a result of moving that scope. 
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Figure 2: The Project of Critical Security Studies144 
 
 
 
 
 
Refers to: 
 
 
 
In the graph, the arrows moving right represent the first axis (broadening) of security. The arrows 
moving down represent the second axis, changing or deepening of “the who” of security from being 
exclusively states to individuals as well. 
 
2.3.2 Human Security: The Epitome of non-militarized security 
	  
 The emergence of new security threats, in the absence of military threats needed to alter the 
referent object or the “who” of security. The trend to establish a new referent object in the 
field was partly a result of the narrow analysis taken by those who argued in favour of the 
state-centered approach no longer being applicable. Walt’s narrow definition of the field as 
the “study of the threat, use and control of military force” is met with disagreement by 
Kolodziej. He claims that Walt has insufficiently explored different definitions of security 
and that his analysis is accordingly flawed.145 In essence, the objection to Walt rests on an 
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objection to Walt’s normative program in his own article. The objection states that Walt does 
not ask enough questions about what security ought to mean and as such arrives at a rather 
limited understanding of security.146 Interestingly, it is also this limited understanding that 
drives the support for those against the water wars hypothesis. They argue specifically 
because states have not used military force that water wars are unlikely. Those in C.S.S 
schools will argue that once these normative questions(as suggested by Kolodziej) are asked 
one will realize that the state-centered analysis is insufficient to explain water as a security 
threat in the contemporary international system.  
One of the most remarkable changes in the perception of the referent object of security has 
been the emergence of the concept of Human Security. Scholars, such as Kerr argue that 
human security has appeal precisely because it asks these normative questions and 
accordingly identifies a more suitable referent object of security. In this way Human Security 
is considered to be the most analytically sound way in which to connect the individual level 
of analysis to the concept of security.147  However, it has been met with criticism as the 
appeal it provides is too broad for it to be analytically useful in policy-making.148 Before a 
reply to this objection is offered, the concept will be explicated more carefully. 
2.3.3 Human Security in the International System 
Human Security is often credited to have come to the attention of the international 
community through the Human Development Report (The Report of ‘94) of 1994.149 The 
Report specifically articulated the notion that conflicts had come to be fought within 
countries rather between them.150 One of the most powerful and explicit links to the concept 
of human security is that a “…profound transition in thinking-from nuclear security to human 
security” was called for within The Report.151 In this way the tradition of a militaristic focus 
on threats to the security of the international system was challenged to the extent that the 
stability of people’s daily lives also formed an important part of security.  
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The definition of human security is often considered to be a starting point of its analysis 
within security studies. The concern of human security, as the break with tradition would 
suggest, is on human life and dignity. In The Report of ‘94 human security refers to “… that 
people can exercise… choices safely freely-and that they can be relatively confident that the 
opportunities that they have today, are not totally lost by tomorrow”.152 The literature on 
human security often takes this understanding of its meaning as a starting point, although 
some prefer to extend the concept slightly. Acharya for example picks out the notion that 
human security is double-edged in that it calls for freedom of want and fear forming an 
important part the human security paradigm. The double edged-nature seemingly 
dichotomizes the developed and developing world in terms of their security needs, by 
suggesting that for the developed world the former applies, while the developing world the 
latter applies.153 The problem with human security therefore is that although it is meant to 
have universal appeal, the concept can hardly be applied in the same way. This could partly 
be a result of broad concepts such as “an acceptable standard of living” meaning different 
things for developed versus developing countries.154 However this does not mean that one 
cannot use a definition of human security that attempts to be all inclusive. Human Security, 
as it will be used in this discussion, refers to the phenomenon that seeks to balance the 
freedom of want and the freedom of fear, from those things which interrupt the daily, well-
adjusted functioning of any given population or community. This definition will be 
reconsidered once criticisms and its potential application to water security have been 
considered. 
2.3.4Criticisms of Human-Security 
Criticisms of Human Security focus on two broad elements of the concept. One is that the 
concept itself is too broad to be analytically useful, as Roland Paris suggests. The other is that 
the concept is not really distinct from state-centered security, since human security is 
dependent on the state and in turns its security. One of the most cited arguments from this 
perspective is presented by David Chandler.155 
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2.3.5Broad versus Narrow Definitions 
Taylor Owen offers a different critique and claims that a significant amount of the 
apprehension towards the concept of human security is based on broad versus narrow 
interpretations.156 His claim is that rather than viewing the concept of human-security as one 
that is reductive to state-centered security that one needs to define the parameters of the 
concept more closely.157 Some such as Krause, Mack and Macfarlane, according to Owen, 
believe the concept is pragmatic and indeed does have the analytic rigor that those such as 
Paris claim it lacks, but they believe that the concept needs to be more detailed in its link to 
security. 158Archarya proposes that the broadness of the concept is precisely what provides 
the analytic rigor that Krause, Mack and Macfarlane argue for. However, his analysis is 
focused very much on the utility of human security to established theories, such as Realism, 
Liberalism and Liberal-Internationalism.159 This is a very limited approach and does not 
really clarify a normative approach to one’s understanding of human security. None the less 
Archarya’s argument is that the UNDP Report deliberately left the concept open-ended and 
analysts should do the same. 
Archarya is seemingly ignorant of the intuitive appeal that comes with specifying what 
human security is and what it is not. If he is basing his argument, as many do, solely on the 
all-inclusive nature of the UNDP Report then one could suggest that his position is fallacious. 
He seems to take the UNDP Report for more than it was intended and in so doing commits 
the report to a position it does not take.  When reading the report one does not get a feeling 
that the conceptualization of human security was cast-in-stone, if anything the report was a 
foundation-meant for further exploration. So to claim the report as the only authority from 
which to argue against narrowing the scope of human security becomes problematic.  
Krause, Mack and Macfarlane amongst others pick out the problematic nature of a vague 
human-security conceptualization, which is seen as a consequence of it being too broad.  
They do so by arguing that human-security, in its universal form, trivializes security which in 
turn renders it “analytically useless”-as Roland Paris suggests.  Accordingly, they do not 
disagree with Paris per se, but would suggest that the specification of the concept lends itself 
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to better analytical rigor thus nullifying his analysis.  Of course, this presupposes that Krause, 
Mack and Macfarlane, in addition to others with similar objectives, have established ways in 
which to do so.  
Andrew Mack argues that the reason the human-centered approach to security has appeal is 
because it tests the extent to which states pose a threat to their own citizens. In so doing it 
breaks with the state-centered assumption that states automatically seek to safeguard the 
interests of its people.160 What is problematic is that Mack does not take a position on what 
human security ought to refer to.  He simply points out how proving a causal relationship is 
complicated since the concept as it stands requires too many independent variables for its 
analysis to be effective.161Krause however takes a far more definitive approach. He rejects 
the “shopping list” approach to human security and claims that human security ought not to 
refer to “any bad things that could happen…, [which] have no necessary link [to one 
another]”.162 He argues against the freedom of “want” approach claiming that this is what 
makes the human security approach analytically useless. He therefore argues for the 
“…’freedom of fear’…” interpretation that posits the freedom…”from the threat or use of 
violence” as the focal point of human security.163 He claims that human security can be 
linked with organized violence as well as the eradication of force from political, economic 
and social life-all of which have been crucial to the understanding of modern politics and the 
institutions created through it.164 He is therefore seemingly arguing for a definition that sees 
human security as focusing on the interaction between the use of violence and how people 
interact within the political, economic and social spheres of existence. This is closely linked 
to the idea that opportunities for people will not be removed or created through violent 
means; and as such anything which does so is a human security threat. It seems then that the 
former support the notion of narrowing the concept of human security to be more reflective 
of the use of violence in creating or impeding opportunities for people, which is an 
interpretation that Owen supports.165  
Conversely, others suggest that human security means more than just the safety from the 
threat and use of violence-appealing to the use of violence exclusively dilutes the intention of 
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human security within the context of C.S.S.166 Axworthy for example believes that an 
acceptable project of human security would include “[a] bridge [to close] the divide between 
the social and natural sciences”167 The common thread in the literature on keeping the 
concept broad suggests that economic and environmental threats necessarily form part of the 
agenda of shifting the referent object of security. The objection therefore is that if the concept 
of human security is reduced to dealing exclusively with the use of violence, defending its 
validity as an analytical tool becomes self-serving.168 This effectively suggests that human 
security when restricted to violence is only appealing because it would be met with 
agreement by most realist interpretations of security-relatively speaking. The assumption that 
is made by those who support the broad definition is that violence is chosen to operationalize 
the human security variable simply because it fits with intuitive understandings of conflict-
something which the concept of human security is meant to challenge in the first place. Thus 
is because as Buzan puts it “ [human security] drives towards a reductionist understanding of 
international security and reinforces a mistaken tendency to idealize security as end goal”169 
In addition, Buzan argues that if collective security is indeed the object of security then its 
interests are best served by “societal or identity security”.170 One must be cautious however 
of claiming that the broad interpretation of human security makes no attempt to narrow 
application of the concept. Thakur particularly restricts the analysis of the broad approach to 
concerns, which have a “crisis” undertone.171 This would include floods, famine and refugee 
movement, but only once it reaches a certain point, crucially there is no pre-condition of 
violence for the former to be considered security threats according to Thakur. This however 
brings one back to the concept of human security having no clear demarcation for security 
threats versus none security threats.  
The arguments for both narrow and broad applications of human security have merit in the 
context of water. There is an intuitive appeal behind restricting the concept to violence 
because it specifies case selection where violence is used to obtain water and results in at 
least 25 related deaths, thus qualifying the case as water related conflict. On the other hand 
the broad interpretation has equal appeal since the impact of floods on arable land for 
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example also is seemingly important in understanding non-military threats for security, which 
fits in well with Thakur’s analysis. In summary, this criticism is not leveled against the 
concept of human security, but is leveled against the lack of specification of its meaning. 
An adequate definition of human security therefore needs to take into account the merits of 
both narrowing and broadening the concept because this will have an impact on how the 
validity of human security as a lens through which to view water wars.  Therefore, this thesis 
will refer to the human-centered approach as one which sees the potential for violent 
interaction amongst both the state and its people as well as violence amongst the people 
themselves over issues related to the use of water, specifically when the use of water is 
threatened. This threat could be access to water itself or a threat to the viability of an industry 
dependent on water for its functionality.   
2.3.6 No Distinction between Human Security and State Security? 
A final criticism that needs to be addressed, since it challenges the entire rationale from 
which this thesis is written, is that the two perspectives presented here are not really distinct. 
In Security Dialogue David Chandler presents an article that is aimed at questioning the role 
of human security, or as it has been labelled here human-centric approaches to security 
threats.172 His primary purpose was to question the extent to which human-centric approaches 
offer an explanation for how threats of this kind are perceived as different from others.173 Put 
differently, Chandler questions the extent to which issues of human-centric approaches are 
reductive to power and as such can be explained in terms of state security preferences. The 
core of Chandler’s argument, according to Owen, is that the clash between human-centric and 
state-centric security has less to do with challenging traditional security paradigms, and more 
to do with a disjuncture between critical theory and policy academia (which is academia that 
seeks to shape state policy on issues such as human security)174  
From what has been discussed this far, Chandler’s view represents an objection to the role of 
critical theory in traditionally realist fields simply because he finds no explicit distinction 
between the issues of human-centric security and state-centric security, but on what 
assumptions is this view purported and defended?  
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Owen suggests that one needs to evaluate Chandler’s project in three claims: (1) Human 
Security exaggerates new Post-Cold War security threats; (2) Human Security advocates 
locate these new threats in the developing world, and (3) Human Security facilitates short 
term policy-making in the absence of clear strategic foreign policy objectives. Each of these 
claims has the potential to undermine the perspective from which this work takes its impetus.  
The first claim is perhaps the most challenging, and is the one that will be focused on. The 
claim Chandler makes seems to misunderstand that human security emphasizes the 
consequences of threats, more than it does their origin. Chandler even further misses that 
most post-Cold War and post-9/11 threats have stemmed from traditional threats, such as 
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. More human centred approaches, such as poverty 
and disease, have not seen much attention from states as security threats per se.175What this 
means is that the security framework sees threats themselves and their consequences as 
rooted in traditional threats, and a lack of either seems to gain banishment from the state 
security agenda. But what happens when the consequences of non-traditional threats 
outweighs that of more traditional ones such as the impact of 18 million deaths from 
HIV/AIDS in comparison to the 300,000 from conflict?176 It seems rather absurd to suggest 
that the claims of human-centric approaches to security threats are over-exaggerated, and that 
their place within the security framework makes very little sense.  Chandler even further 
claims that the only reason that issues of Human Security are in any way related to security 
threats at all is because of the absence of traditional enemies within the security framework, 
he claims that many issues such as health and the environment have taken the place 
traditional enemies and clearly defined battlefields. 177 Again here, Chandler misses that the 
source of the threat is just as important as its consequences and if even these consequences 
when they are grounded in human-centric approaches need to become important to the 
adaptation of the security policy-making framework.  
While these challenges are not successful, particularly when the response of Chandler is 
considered, they still ought to be kept in mind. The response Chandler provides is that human 
security theorists and their critics speak past one another.178 Whether or not these critics do so 
has very little bearing on the claims that can be extracted from Chandler’s writing. Therefore, 
the roles of constructivist approaches to security have an important role to play in finding 
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empirical evidence to support the elevation of human-centric issues in the security framework 
in the future.  
 
2.4 Human Security Issues in the Context of Water 
The discussion to this point has considered presenting and defending the concept of Human 
Security. Thus it has not been related to water. While in its foundation, human security is 
deliberately broad it should not be taken to mean that it cannot be applied in a specific 
context. The UNDP report lists 7 main categories of concern for human security:  
1. Economic Security;  
2. Food Security; 
3. Health Security;  
4. Environmental Security; 
5. Personal Security; 
6. Community Security, and  
7. Political Security179 
 
The report largely considers economic security to be synonymous with secure employment, 
which pays a wage commensurate with an acceptable standard of living.180 So its 
applicability to water depends on the extent to which water is related to income. So in cases 
where people depend on water for their economic activity, such as in agriculturally dependent 
societies, water becomes a security concern. Since water is related to the opportunity of 
economic activity, threatening water equates to threatening the opportunity to engage in 
economic activity-which according to the freedom from fear interpretation equates to human 
security. As it will be used in this thesis, economic security becomes a security concern if 
violent conflict is a response to the threat of economic activity. 
Food Security refers to both the physical and economic access to food. The notion of access 
to food in the context of human security goes further than just “having enough to go around”, 
it speaks to an entitlement that people have to access to the food that they see fit. Food 
therefore is a necessary condition for security.181 The report suggests that food security be 
considered as more important than economic security since people ought to have food even if 
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they are not economically active or earning an income. Food security can again be linked to 
agriculture in that if there is not enough water to sustain crops, the fear of not having a crop 
that is able to sustain food demand becomes evident. The UNDP report specifically points out 
the impact that “mother nature” can have an impact in creating a food shortage.182 As it will 
be used in this thesis, food security becomes a security concern if violent conflict is a 
response to the threat of not being able to acquire food.  
In the UNDP report, health security is not particularly well-defined-especially when 
considering the precise definition it provides for economic and food security. The report 
speaks of differences in the way in which health security differs amongst developed versus 
developing countries. In developing countries, health security is mostly at risk through 
infectious and parasitic diseases-these in turn are often related to poor nutrition and polluted 
water. In developed countries on the other hand, health security is mostly threatened by 
diseases linked to diet and lifestyle. The other element of health security that is addressed is 
the report is the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). When related to water, it is 
significant to note that an estimated 3.4 million people die of water related diseases annually 
and that approximately 1billion people lack access to a safe water supply.183 In addition, 40 
per cent of states in the world have water that is not suitable for fishing, swimming and the 
support of aquatic life.184Health security relates very closely to the lack of opportunity to lead 
a healthy lifestyle, particularly when one’s health is threatened by the poor quality of water 
within a given region.  As it will be used in this thesis, health security becomes a security 
concern if violent conflict is a response to the threat of not being in a position that one’s 
health is adequately protected.  
Environmental Security is closely linked to the degradation of global and local ecosystems.185 
The UNDP report of 1994 specifically links water to the concept of security-thus making it 
an emerging threat. The largest threat within developing countries in particular is the extent 
to which pollution influences both healthcare systems and food production. In Africa, 
desertification if often claimed to be an increasing concern for security. The UNDP report 
claims that in 1994, when it was written, 65 million acres of land had been lost within the last 
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50 years.186 This when linked to other aspects of human security has an impact on economic 
security-through increased migration leading to fewer jobs hence less income. It is also 
linked to food security in terms of the availability of arable land. As far as a link to security is 
concerned, environmental factors are best explained through human security, a claim that as 
stated before this thesis aims to defend.  
Personal security refers to the security to personal violence, be it from the state, others or 
other groups. It even has refers to the violence perpetrated against women and children. The 
majority of concerns for personal security are seen within the context of gender equality in 
the case of women, particularly in the workplace.187 In the case of children, these personal 
securities tend to refer to the ability of children to obtain an education and even suggest a 
connection between personal security and child-headed households. It does so by explicitly 
stating the argument for child labor being a violation of personal security.  In essence, the 
idea of personal security cannot be closely related to water. As such it will not form part of 
the human-centric analysis presented in the case studies that follow.  
Community security refers to the safety that people derive from being within a particular 
group “that can offer practical support”.188 By extension the insecurity that arises from this 
form of security is the result of the membership to a particular group as well. An example of 
this cited by the UNDP report is ethnic violence.189 The report speaks of the ethnic violence 
between the Tamils and Sinhalese. More cited examples of the Rwandan Genocide are an 
example of how membership of one group causes insecurity. The reasons for this insecurity 
amongst different ethnic groups tend to vary. In the case of South Africa’s 2008 Xenophobic 
attacks on Zimbabwean immigrants, as unemployed South African’s perceived the 
immigrants to be taking jobs meant for South Africans-as such the motivation tends to be 
more economically rooted. In other cases, such as the Rwandan Genocide and to certain 
extent the South African Apartheid system tends to represent a more deeply seeded 
ideological hatred of one group by another.190 The connection to water can be seen in both 
the former since water could have economic value between different cultures, but could 
equally be the source of historical difference between cultures. Thus, community security 
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will accurately be used to evaluate the extent to which culture, rather than national identity 
plays an important role in the understanding of conflict over water.  
Lastly, political security speaks to the notion that people ought to live in a society where their 
basic rights are safeguarded.191 This element of security, at least in the initial report refers to 
the violation (and in some cases adherence to) human rights. The link to political security and 
military spending is posited as important one to gauge the inclination to violate human rights. 
The UNDP report indicates that Iraq and Somalia have average of seven-to-one spending 
between their military and education budgets. While the report evaluates a limited time in its 
case selection, human rights have gained increased attention, specifically through the 
establishment of organizations such as Human Rights Watch and UN Human Rights 
Commission. Water when related to human rights, as the referent object of political security 
is problematic, since its lack of supply will constitute a human rights violation. This would 
not be useful if water was simply not available. The political security element will therefore 
only be applicable in the case where the state or any other organized group restricts access to 
water to another party, despites its structural availability.  
2.4.1Does Universal Appeal imply Universal Application? 
It is clear from this discussion that human security principles tend to overlap one another, but 
this should not be taken to mean that all of the former seven principles apply equally to a case 
of potential or existing conflict. It could case for example that in some cases food security 
outweighs health security in a particular place. Those who argue for human-centered 
approaches-to the peril of the concept- attempt to apply the concept in its entirety without 
acknowledging that some principles might not be evident in the particular case study. So if, 
for example, the human-centered approach only explains food security as an element of the 
approach, it would be misleading to posit that human security explains the case well. In this 
way although the concept has universal appeal, it might not be suitable to apply it in the same 
way-and as such one can steer away from making conclusions that are not supported 
empirically. The over-commitment of the explanatory power of human security as a result is 
what drives those like Roland Paris to suggest that human security is nothing but “hot air”.  
The question then becomes how one ought to rank these principles if they are not to be 
applied universally. In the Philosophy of Ethics, Jeremy Bentham introduces what he calls 
the hedonic calculus. The calculus is meant to rank certain things in terms of how they 
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promote pleasure or pain.192 Transferring the concept to water requires principles that could 
be quantitatively measured. Michael Smith provides a feasible way of linking human-centric 
threats to threats in the larger context of security. He provides the following list of criteria for 
ranking threats to security193:  
1. Destructive Scale;  
2. Geographic and Temporal Change; 
3. Likelihood, and  
4. Recovery 
 
By Destructive Scale, Smith posits that the extent to which the particular phenomenon causes 
injury or death within the context of the threat being evaluated would have an impact on how 
serious the threat is.194 By Smith claims that Geographic and Temporal Change, the extent to 
which the threat is cross border or international in nature could have an impact in how serious 
the threat is.195 In terms of Likelihood Smith argues that one needs to take into account the 
extent to which conflict will materialize if measures are not taken to understand and mitigate 
the threat.196 Lastly, Smith argues that more serious threats to human security are likely to be 
more catastrophic than others.197 This in part would depend on how “serious” each of the 
former criteria are in evaluating the extent to which a human threat outweighs another. The 
idea for using a scale like this is that it gives one reasonable grounds upon which to argue for 
the raking of one of the seven principles above another within a particular case. It could also 
for example be used to quantitatively measure the state-centric and human predictions against 
one another. So if for example food shortages cause more deaths than the use of military 
force, the food shortages could be said to have a larger destructive scale and as such explain 
the lack of security within the examined case better.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to present the state centric and human centric views of security. They 
have been shown to be reductive to traditional versus critical approaches to the field of 
security studies. While the former focuses on the use of military force in achieving the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Worke, T., “A Reconstruction of Classical Utilitarianism” in Journal of Bentham Studies, Vol 3, 2000, p. 2 
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193 Smith, M.E., International Security: Politics, Policy and Prospects Palgrave, McMilllan, London, 2010, pp. 
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interests of the state, the latter seeks a more individual level analysis. Both of the former have 
been critically analyzed in terms of their assumptions.  
In addition, each has been located within the context of literature on the water wars 
hypothesis. The state-centric view fits most adequately with those who are against the water 
wars hypothesis, while the human centric approach fits in with the “water related conflict 
hypothesis” as explained in the previous chapter. In what follows the two approaches will be 
applied to cases to test the extent to which they explain the conflict 
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Chapter 3 
Water Wars in West Africa? The Case of Hydropolitical tension in the Chad River 
Basin 198 
3.1Introduction:  
Lake Chad, within the Lake Chad Basin, is a quintessential case-in-point for the effects of 
climate change on water resources in Africa. It has even further raised questions about how 
security over water ought to be perceived and who would be the worst affected. Majeed 
Rahman argues that the access to water remains a crucial element of survival in Africa.199 So 
if the lack of water supply threatens survival, then neither the state nor human centered 
approach would object to seeing it as a security concern. The questions still remain, however, 
to whom this lack of water is a security concern and how is it a threat to them. In addition, an 
important relationship between the threat and the “who” of the threat, is the extent to which 
“the who” is willing to protect themselves from it.    
In this chapter, the case of the Nigerian conflict with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula 
will be analyzed as a conflict over water to determine which of the state-centered or human-
centered approaches best explains the conflict. In order to do so, this chapter will consider a 
background to the Chad River Basin. It will also consider the case of Lake Chad and the 
Bakassi Peninsula in terms of the potential characteristics that could possibility promotes 
conflict from either a state-centric or human-centric approach. The chapter will carefully 
consider the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, tracing its origins, incidents of violence, 
resolution and the political climate following the resolution. The chapter will then move to 
explaining the origins and the incidents of violence in terms of both state-centered and 
human-centered approaches to determine which, if any can best explain water’s role in the 
onset of violence. The chapter concludes by providing a conclusion regarding the ability of 
the approaches to explain the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi and Lake Chad.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 For the purpose of clarity, the Lake Chad refers to the water structure while the Lake Chad River Basin refers 
to a network of water sources, inclusive of Lake Chad. It is sometimes also referred to as the Chad River Basin 
199 Raman, M.A., “The Geopolitics of Water the Nile River Bain”, Centre for Research on Globalization, 
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3.2 Background: Water Resources of the Chad River Basin  
	  
Figure 3: Lake Chad River Basin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
(Source: WWF200) 
3.2.1Geographical location and attributes 
	  
The Chad River Basin is the largest inland drainage basin in Africa, situated in West and 
Central Africa. It covers eight percent of the total surface area of the African continent at 
2,500,000 km2 and spans over the political borders of Algeria, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic (CAR), Chad, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan and South Sudan. 201 The water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 “Case Study on River Management”, World Wildlife Fund, 
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accessed: 2013-01-04) 
201 Bloxom, M., and Bdlyia, H.H. Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis of the Lake Chad Basin, LCBC-  GEF 
Project  on the Reversal of Land and Water Resources Degradation, p 18, available  from  
http://www.lakechadbasin.net Note: The information in the Report is written before South Sudan become an 
independent State from Sudan-the references to North and South Sudan are therefore my own through 
consulting of political maps the former in combination with maps of the region. For a map of the new political 
borders see: “East Africa: South Sudan Accuses Sudan of ‘Deliberately’ Keeping Troops in Abyei” Gender 
Concerns, 
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%20Sudan%20of%20%27Deliberately%27%20Keeping%20Troops%20in%20Abyei (date accessed: 2013-01-
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resources of the Basin form an important role in the access to freshwater of riparian 
countries. As a result, it is central the livelihoods of a vast population.202  The Basin provides 
valuable insight into the nexus between environmental security and water given its 
importance to freshwater resources of the riparian countries above. Considering that 
empirical data on the Chad River basin is problematic to source, the analysis below is taken 
from a report presented to the Lake Chad Basin Community (LCBC).     
Figure 4 Surface of Basin Amongst LCBC 
State Size of Basin (km2) Percentage of 
Conventional Basin 
Percentage of 
National Territory 
CAR 197, 800 22.00 31.75 
Cameroon 56, 800 
 
6 12.12 
Chad 361,980 36.0 28.42 
Nigeria 188,000 19.0 22.15 
Niger 162,375 17.0 12.70 
TOTAL 967, 000 100 - 
 
The impact of continuous droughts, a decline in rainfall as well as the degradation of 
vegetation have an increasing impact on the ability of riparian countries to interact peacefully 
with one another. More importantly, it has seemingly left populations that are dependent on 
these resources for their livelihoods in a perilous situation. The most profound impact is seen 
in desertification, which impacts on the economic viability of over 15 million people through 
the loss of arable farming land, livestock grazing land and fisheries within the Lake Chad and 
its tributary Rivers.203 The analysis of the impact that environmental concerns have however 
proven to be problematic, since the bulk of empirical evidence that supports the conclusions 
above was taken from a smaller “initial” conventional basin rather than the basin in its 
entirety as presented above.204  The initial conventional basin consisted of roughly 20 per 
cent of the total Basin’s area at 427, 500 km2. It excluded a large area that is considered to 
have very little or no impact on the hydrology of the conventional basin.205 In 1983 a 
summit of the Lake Chad Basin Community (LCBC), the initial basin was “expanded to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202  Bloxom, M., and Bdalyia H.H., Op.Cit. p. 18  
203 Ibid. pp. 18-20 
204 Ibid p. 20 
205 Loc.Cit. 
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include... watersheds in northern Nigeria, southern Chad, and northern C.A.R.”.206 This 
meant that the Basin’s area increased from 427,500 km2 to 967, 000 km2.  
A matter that often raises confusion is the distinction between the Chad River Basin and the 
Lake Chad as the transboundary water body. This confusion is perhaps to be expected since 
the conventional basin listed above is remarkably similar to the Lake Chad’s riparian 
countries. The Chad River Basin refers to a larger network of lakes and Rivers of which the 
Lake Chad is one.207 For the purpose of this thesis, the Lake Chad will refer to this 
transboundary resource rather than the basin in its entirety. In terms of the analysis of water 
and its relationship to conflict Lake Chad is used as an example within the Chad River Basin. 
The analysis of the Lake Chad case and subsequent conclusion that is made from it ought, 
therefore, not to be considered exhaustive in terms of the Chad River Basin.  
3.2.2 The Lake Chad: A focus on Water Depletion and its impact on Foreign Relations  
	  
Lake Chad is a transboundary water resource, within the Chad River Basin on the borders of 
Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger.208 In terms of supply, the Chari-Lagone River, which 
originates in the Mongos Hills of the CAR system, contributes 95 percent of the Lake Chad’s 
annual flow. The Komadougou- Yobe subsystem contributes the other 5 percent of the 
Lake’s annual flow.209 The transboundary management of the Lake Chad falls under the 
auspices of the Chad River Basin Commission (LCBC). Although CAR is not a riparian 
country of the lake, the contribution of the Chari-Lagone to the flow of the lake makes it 
important within the context of decisions that are made concerning the lake through the 
LCBC. This is because of this significant contribution to the flow of the lake that CAR was 
invited to join the LCBC in 1994, in recognition of the fact that 95 per cent of the Lake 
Chad’s waters have their origin within the borders of the CAR.210 The effectiveness of the 
LCBC has however been questioned, specifically in terms of its ability to manage the 
interests of different riparian groups within the context of the “vanishing Lake Chad”. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Transboundary River/Lake Basin Water Development in Africa: Prospects, Problems and Achievements” 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December, 2000, p. 40 
207 Various maps of the Lake Chad Basin, including the one used for illustration above show the area of the 
River Basin to be larger than that of the Lake Chad, see map at the beginning of the background.  
208 Odada, E.O.,  Oguntula, J., and Obyebande, Lake Chad: Experience and Lessons Learnt in Brief, pp. 75-77 
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questions are often based on the lack of the LCBC to manage the resources of the Chad River 
Basin, but importantly point to the inability of the LCBC to curb mismanagement of the 
Lake’s resources by riparian communities.211 
The “vanishing Lake Chad” has come to represent a quintessential token of environmental 
issues as a concern for security. The various riparian groups in combination with poor 
management on the part of the LCBC and shrinking water resources of the Lake have come 
to represent a noteworthy threat to the security of livelihoods. The issue made more complex 
in terms of the referent object of this threat since it is not clear that the threat can be classified 
as a state-centric or human-centric threat exclusively. It is clear through various cross-border 
occupations that the diminished volume of water within the Lake poses a threat for state-
centred security.212 On the other hand, the diminished capacity points to a concern from the 
human-centred perspective as diminished waters have led to diminished fishing opportunities 
along with marginalised economic activity for communities dependent on the Lake’s 
resources as a means of income; as a result wealth is stratified by pastoral activities such as 
farming.213 As it stands the increased desertification of the Lake Chad raises concerns over 
sustainability of peace along the banks amongst riparian communities.   
In 2006, the Human Development Report suggested that the Lake had been reduced to 
roughly one-tenth of its size in 1964. The rapid decline is structural capacity of the Lake was 
an inverse relationship between supply and demand, in which demand exceeded an 
increasingly diminished supply.214 Over the last fifty years, the Lake’s structural capacity has 
been reduced from 25,000 km3 to only 1, 350km3.215 The reasons for the over-extension of 
demand are multi-faceted. These concern three major issues: first is that human consumption 
has become largely disproportionate to the replenishment of the flow of the Lake; second, is 
that over-extension of grazing of livestock in the region has led to vegetation degradation and 
lastly, the decrease in annual rainfall and its subsequent impact on the annual flow of both the 
Lake and its tributaries.216 The figure below shows the gradual depletion of the Lake Chad. 
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  Source: UNEP 
The lake is bisected into north and south by the “Great Barrier”, with a rise in the lake bed 
running from east to west. The vast depletion of the lake’s structural supply has left three 
main ecological zones. Sarch and Birkett suggest that they are the following: 
(1) The areas of open waters which have persisted in the southern basin, 
frequently only in the only in the vicinity of the inflowing Chari River;  
(2) The Archipelago zones where water surrounds the dunes along the north-
eastern coast of the lake, and  
(3) The swamps to the west of the open water, some parts of which are 
seasonally inundated.217    
 
The variation in vegetation and access to water within these ecological zones has left some 
with very little option other than to live almost nomadic lifestyles in search of resources to 
sustain a living. This is particularly true of societies that are dependent on pastoral activities 
to maintain a living, in that they often need to balance the access to suitable land for grazing 
and farming with access to water. In addition, because wealth and access to the economy, 
albeit informal, is defined by pastoral activities access to water becomes essential beyond just 
the standard domestic sector uses.218 One could argue, on this basis, that for some riparian 
communities this means crossing national borders or at the very least entering the traditional 
lands of other ethnic groups. The variation in ecology of the lake lends itself to pressures of 
adequate resource supply-specifically within the context of inter-ethnic relations amongst 
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Figure 5: The Vanishing Lake Chad 
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these communities since groups might need to relocate to find land that is suitable for both 
their capabilities and needs.219   
3.2.3 Riparian Countries of the Lake Chad River Basin 
 
An important element in understanding the crisis of Lake Chad’s waters is unpacking the 
issue of demand-side management within the context of its use. The issue itself can be seen in 
two broad concepts: The first asks who is using the Lake Chad’s resources, while the second 
asks what they are using it for. The issue of demand side management therefore sets aside the 
inadequacy of supply-side impact, in this case the decrease in rainfall, and focuses on how 
the demand for water shapes water insecurity.  
As has been established Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria are the most dependent on the 
resources of the Lake Chad. However, given that the structural capacity of the Lake has 
diminished to the extent that it only falls within Cameroon and Chad, it seems fitting to 
question the extent to which its resources make a discernible difference to the riparian 
group’s livelihood. The Lake is important from a social perspective in that 30 million people, 
most of whom are farmers, fisherman and livestock breeders depend on the resources of the 
lake.220 
The use of the water resources of the Lake Chad cannot be restricted to the lake itself, since 
the annual inflow from the Chari-Lagone and the Komadougou- Yobe is largely dependent 
on the usage of the feeding Rivers. Thus, the upstream use of the waters within the Chad 
River Basin becomes important in understanding how usage adds to water insecurity within 
the basin. However, in terms of relating the water within the Lake to conflict over water 
becomes problematic precisely because usage data tends to focus on the resources of the 
Lake Basin as whole rather than just the Lake. Thus it becomes difficult to determine the 
extent to which conflict between transboundary riparian countries is a function of the Lake’s 
water, which is important for understanding Lake Chad as a case for the water wars 
hypothesis. However, this does not mean that the data on the Chad River Basin is not useful, 
it allows one the opportunity for to examine which countries withdraw more water and as 
such are more likely to view restricted access to water as a threat to security. 
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The table below describes the total water withdrawal in cubic-metres for each riparian 
country by sector. The table shows that Nigeria withdraws the most water from freshwater 
resources while CAR withdraws the least.  According to figure 4 (above), CAR has the 
largest surface area of the basin; it has the second largest proportion of national territory 
situated within the basin, yet it withdraws up to a quarter less freshwater than Chad does. 
Furthermore Chad, which has the largest surface area as well as proportion of natural territory 
within the basin, withdraws twenty-nine times less water than Nigeria, which is third in terms 
of its proportion and size of the natural basin.   
3.2.4 The use of Water Withdrawals by Riparian Countries 
 
 
Figure 6: Water Withdrawals by Sector in the Chad Basin-LCBC Countries 
 CAR Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria 
Agriculture 0,001 2,73 0,19 2,08 5,51 
Domestic 0,0601 0,2468 0,1037 0,2944 4,099 
Industry 0,012 0,0146 0,1037 0,327 1,965 
TOTAL 0,0731 2,9914 0,3974 2,7014 11,574 
Source: FAO221 
Taking into the account, the percentage of national territory that the basin occupies in each of 
the riparian countries it is evident that withdrawal is disproportionate to contribution. 
Referring to Figure 4, which details surface area of the basin, the CAR which has the largest 
national territory within the basin; it withdraws significantly less than any other riparian. 
Nigeria, which ranks third in Figure 4, withdraws almost four times the resources of its 
closest riparian: Cameroon.  
The disparity between withdrawal and contribution can be explained in at least two ways. 
The first is to appeal to the fact that larger populations are likely to withdraw more water 
since larger populations are likely to demand, or in this case withdraw, more water. Taking 
into account the population statistics presented in Figure 8, Nigeria’s disproportionate 
withdrawal can be explained by the fact that its population is almost nine times larger than 
that of Cameroon. Therefore, the fact that it withdraws only four times more is easily 
defendable and is hardly surprising. The second way in which this disproportionate 
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relationship can be explained is in terms of economic need, in which larger economies, more 
developed economies, will require to use more water.222 Taking into account the figures in 
Figure 7 below, tend to correlate more closely with economic power, in the form of GDP and 
GDP per capita, it is evident that more economically powerful states tend to demand and 
subsequently withdraw more water. When viewed in this way Nigeria’s per capita GDP 
explains, in addition to having a larger population why it uses more water.  
Figure 7: GDP and GDP per capita LCBC Countries 2010 (Sources: FAO and World Bank) 
Country GDP Per Capita (US$) GDP Total(Million US$) 
CAR 0,457 2006 
Chad 0,676 6839 
Cameroon  1, 147 22,816 
Niger  0,358 5383 
Nigeria 1, 278 173,004 
Source: FAO (GDP total) and World Bank (GDP per capita223) 
The withdrawal of water is therefore subject to two of the driving forces behind the need for 
resources as explicated my Michael Klare.224 In the case of the Chad Basin, both population 
and economic power drives riparian countries to use more water. One this basis one might 
even be inclined to suggest that “over withdrawal” is justified. However, it does not follow 
from the fact that if states can justify over withdrawal, that such withdrawal will not be met 
with animosity and distrust; both of which have the ability to be pressure points for conflict.   
3.2.4.1 Industrial use of Water in the Lake Chad River Basin 
As indicated by Figure 4 above, it is clear that industrial use of water is rather limited. 
Industrial activities with regard to water mainly form part the primary and tertiary 
sectors.225Agro-industries tend to be dominant in the region, with textiles and tanneries 
following in terms of production. Odada (et.al.) argues that this is possibly a by-product of 
the basin being less industrialized than the rest of the region.226 However, industrialization is 
believed to be on the rise, given that oil exploration and extraction is rapidly increasing 
within the region.227 Based on this, it is evident that water plays a marginal role in industry 
and development within riparian states. A possible explanation for this, as will be argued 
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below, it that it is increasingly difficult to separate agro-industries from domestic use, since 
the majority of agriculture within the basin is used as a form of either sustenance or is used to 
buy status within traditional communities and as a result does not really form part of national 
industrial development. Thus the emphasis on the use of water is perhaps best focused on the 
uses of water within a domestic and agricultural context.  
However, this is not to say that the relationship between industry, development and water has 
not expanded. The expansion of water’s role in industry is best seen through the lens of 
irrigation and hydroelectricity. Of a potential 1.16 million hectares that are suitable for 
irrigation less than 115,000 hectares or less than 10 percent is actually irrigated.228 While 
attempts have been made at irrigating the land that is suitable, irrigation projects have been 
met with very little, if any success. The lack of success can be explained in two possible 
ways. The first is that weak institutional cooperation through the LCBC, which ought to 
oversee the implementation of intra-basin irrigation projects, has left much to be desired.229 
Irrigation projects within Nigeria have, in some cases, fueled tension amongst other riparian 
countries in the belief that the irrigation schemes are withdrawing more than they ought to.230  
As such irrigation projects tend to promote tensions amongst up-stream versus down-stream 
riparian countries, which ultimately hinders cooperation in other issues over the use of water 
within the Lake Chad River Basin. Another, and perhaps more plausible explanation, is that 
the receding water levels of the Lake Chad and its feeding rivers have ultimately made 
irrigation less viable. A U.N. study conducted in the 1980’s suggests that the total amount of 
land suitable for irrigation development is less than 400 000 hectares, which in the light of 
further decreasing water levels of the lake has in all probability dropped even further.231  At 
best, it can be suggested that irrigation ultimately lends itself well to increased arable land for 
farming, which in turn results in water surpluses that can be used elsewhere, an example of 
which is hydroelectric schemes.   
In terms of industrial use, hydroelectric schemes, which ultimately aim to boost the energy 
supplies of both developed and developing nations, is perhaps the most clear-cut connection 
water has to industry. Lazenby and Jones argue that power generation does not account for a 
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large proportion of energy consumption in the region and explain that commercial energy 
itself only represents a small proportion of total energy consumption within West Africa.232 
This seems to support Odada’s finding that industry does not form a big part of energy 
consumption and as such water’s role in industry is rather marginal at best.  However, this is 
not to say that industry will not play an important role within the Lake Chad River Basin and 
the Lake Chad region in the future, since oil deposits discovered in both the Lake Chad 
region and in Chad itself.233 It could argued that both the refining process and energy 
consumed through the refining process of the oil will lend itself well to water being an 
instrumental part in industry within the near future.   
3.2.4.2 Agricultural and Domestic: Water and the sustenance of life in the Chad River 
Basin 
In the Chad River Basin, water has instrumental value in the daily functioning of riparian 
communities. Water has instrumental value specifically in so far in that has value to activities 
that sustain human life.234 Therefore water has indirect value in that it is needed toward an 
element of security, rather than being the “bottom line”. A good example of this indirect 
value is water’s importance for agriculture, or in the terms of human security its importance 
for food security.235 Put differently, water has contributory value to agriculture and by 
extension food security.  One of the most prolific examples of water’s role in food security is 
that it provides fish to poor communities, with very little (if any) other sources of nutrition. In 
1974, the FAO made an observation that those families that engage in these activities 
continue to “…live at the margin of sustenance and human dignity”.236 The popularity of 
fishing within the Chad River Basin suggests that as open-access resource, it provides those 
with this marginalized sustenance and human dignity the opportunity to enter into the 
economy as well as provide for the needs of their families and communities.   
The importance of fishing in the context of the economic activity of riparian communities is 
indicative of a wealth stratification that intertwines various activities by which wealth is 
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metered. For the communities that live within the Chad River Basin and within the Lake 
Chad region, wealth in not restricted to income alone, but is also closely related to access to 
various forms of pastoral activity. One could go even further to say that the diversity of 
pastoral activity such as fishing, farming and herding of cattle is indicative of wealth.237  
From this it is evident that the resources of the Lake Chad form an important part of income 
generation as well as social standing within the traditional communities that are dependent on 
the resources of the lake.  
In a survey conducted in 2003, Bene (et al) concluded that 128 villages are dependent on the 
water bodies of the Lake Chad River Basin. Of these 22 villages (17 percent) are dependent 
on the Lake Chad’s open waters and a further 39 villages (30 percent) are dependent on 
seasonal ponds, and receding channels-some of which are created by seasonal fluctuations in 
the open water levels of the Lake Chad.238 Furthermore, the importance of tributaries is 
accentuated since 30 villages (23 percent) are dependent on “main river” (defined as the 
Chari or Lagone) water bodies for their access to the fishing supply of the River Basin.239 
Since the former have an influence on the supply of fish that reaches the open waters of the 
Lake Chad, it is evident that an analysis of threats to the livelihoods of people cannot be 
examined in isolation from these “main river” dependent villages. It stands to reason to 
suggest that water’s importance to human security within the Lake Chad River Basin as well 
as the Lake Chad region is multidimensional and therefore the threats to security that arise 
from its use cannot be limited to one type of activity related to water. One ought to rather 
examine threats to human security arising from the use of water within the context of a 
network of activities.  
Given that the use of water is closely related to the production of food sources, through the 
herding of livestock, agriculture and fishing it would also stand to reason that one considers 
the importance to food security. Food security in the Chad River Basin as well as Lake Chad 
region is most affected by the fluctuations in rainfall and varying access to the open waters of 
the lake. Depending on their location riparian communities tend to experience differing levels 
of food security in terms of availability throughout the year. What this means is that those 
with less certainty over the continuity of food supply are often forced to borrow food, in the 
form of millet, from richer more affluent households within the community to ensure the 
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continuity of food supply.240 This once more is indicative of the influence of tribal leadership 
within the Lake Chad River Basin community; in that security is seen as a collective 
objective since there is very little if any indication that interest is levied on the borrowing of 
food from the affluent households.  
The reliance on more affluent households by poorer ones, given the variation in methods of 
food production within the Lake Chad River Basin, to some extent raises the question of how 
food production is reliant on the use and availability of water. The answer depends on the 
location of any given riparian community within the River Basin. The communities within 
the Yaéré floodplain have demonstrated that the wealthier households within communities 
tend to focus a lot more of the labour forces (proportionally) towards fishing.241 Moreover, 
the wealthier households are also considered to have a wider variation of fishing methods at 
their disposal. Subsequently, the ability to utilise the resources of the River basin is closely 
related to wealth stratification in the region.242 The situation within Chari delta along the 
western shores of the lake suggests that fishing is relatively inaccessible to the poorest 
households within the community, often meaning that these households are forced to consider 
alternative means of providing an income. The ability to provide for households dependent 
on the lake is complicated even further by the fact that marshlands and ponds, created by the 
receding water levels of the lake have left some of these households with inadequate fishing 
instruments for the water body from which they are extracting their fishing supply. Bene 
refers to this as a technical restriction to the fishing grounds within which certain 
communities find themselves.243 From this one can deduce that water impacts on the 
continuity of food sources depending on the location of a given community and their ability 
to utilise the methods and instruments at their disposal to harvest or make the food source 
available for consumption.  
The dramatic loss of water of Lake Chad has presented another problem for communities 
within the region. As has been established, given that some communities have restricted 
access to fish as a form of sustenance either in terms of access to the open water resources to 
fish or the ability to yield sufficient amounts of fish, as they do not possess the correct 
equipment. However, the receding water levels of the Lake Chad resulted in restrictions to 
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farming of “low water requirement crops”, such as watermelons and cassava.244 While maize 
was planted during the mid-1980’s, the increasing variation in rainfall patterns made it 
exceedingly difficult to plant and harvest the crop successfully, since the crop benefits from 
the moisture of the soil and water from rainfall. Thus crops such as cowpeas are also 
influenced by the availability of soil moisture and rainfall, since the crop’s success depends 
on the moisture of the soil left after the harvesting of maize crops.245 So in the case of 
farming, the availability of water alters the desirability of particular crops as well as the 
probability with which it can be harvested. In terms of sustaining food supply and even 
economic activity within the lake area, water levels and supply dictate the viable income 
from farming-since some crops yield more money than others and are more valuable. Similar 
to the inadequacy of fishing instruments seen in the case of fishing as a source of food 
supply, crop cultivation presents a problem in that communities are in some cases forced to 
rely on crops which they either desire less or have very little if any experience in cultivating.  
 The impact of water on human security within the Chad River Basin can be located firmly 
within the context of people being able to feed themselves adequately, given that 
opportunities are often limited by factors beyond the control of these people, such as receding 
water lines and open access levels of the Lake Chad. In the literature on food security it is 
suggested that the improvement of agricultural schemes potentially holds the key to 
sustaining adequate food supplies in “pressure zones” such as the majority of Africa. 
However, this seems to be premised on the ability of communities involved in these schemes 
to adequately utilize their skills in combination with suitable land and supplies of resources. 
This is something that is seemingly absent in the case of the riparian communities of the 
Chad River Basin.  
3.2.5 Population in the Chad River Basin and Lake Chad Region  
 
One element that has not been analyzed thus far in detail is the threat to security posed by 
population density in the Chad River Basin and Lake Chad region. It is fairly clear from the 
preceding sections that water forms an instrumental part of agriculture, which is very closely 
related to the ability of riparian communities to nourish themselves. What is even clearer is 
that diminishing water supply, through changing rainfall patterns and over-extension of the 
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little open water there is has an impact on the security of the human condition.  However this 
tells only one side of the problem, the other concerns the amount of people who are 
dependent on the diminishing water resources of the Chad River Basin.1 
Source: FAO246 
The population density of the riparian communities that are dependent on the water resources 
is evident in that the higher the population, the more demand will be placed on the water 
bodies of the Chad River Basin and the lake. The table above shows that those dependent on 
suitable water supply will increase by estimated 79 million over the next 15 years, as such it 
presents a potential problem of demand-induced scarcity247 In doing so it appears that the 
Chad River Basin will experience a water deficit in that while demand is increasing, 
structural supply, particularly within the Lake Chad region itself, is likely to diminish.248 In 
addition, various policy makers and think tanks have linked increasing populations with 
increased demand for energy that will create the pressure on governments within West 
Africa, as it has in other regions-most notably Asia and Europe. Given that hydroelectricity is 
considered a viable source of energy, one could argue that hydro-electric schemes, 
notwithstanding their lack of success within West Africa, as a result of poor policy 
implementation and monitoring, will become a pressure point in the relations amongst 
riparian countries of the Chad River Basin.249  
The population density rising poses a particular problem since there is a large dependence on 
water based sources of agriculture for income. This dependence can in turn be closely linked 
to the level of human development of communities within the basin.  In theory, the Human 
Development Index (HDI) is a way to measure how resources impact on the development of 
people rather than measuring just income per se. Therefore, it provides insight into the ability 
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Figure 8: Population and Population Projection for LCBC States Lake Chad Population Breakdown 
Riparian Total Population (2010) Total Population (2025) est. 
Cameroon 19,599,000 27,424, 000 
Chad 11,227,000 15,857,000 
Central African Republic 4,401,000 6,064, 000 
Niger 15,512,000 26, 928,000 
Nigeria 158,423,000 237,115, 000 
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of people to enter into formal employment, through access to education, should their access 
to agriculture and fishing, as primary forms of income be limited. Therefore, HDI offers 
insight into how the livelihoods of people are threatened in the context of competition over 
water resources. 
Figure 9: HDI Rankings for LCBC Member States (UNEP2011) 
 Cameroon Chad CAR Niger Nigeria World Statistics 
World Rank  
(out of 187) 
150th 183rd 179th 186th 156th Low: 
0.456 
HDI Value 0.482 0.328 0.343 0.295 0.489 Average: 
0.682 
Source: UNDP, 2011250 
The HDI rankings for 2011 show that the riparian countries of the lake and its tributaries 
have significantly low human development figures. With the exception of Cameroon and 
Nigeria, riparian countries score well below the figure for low human development. To a 
certain extent, human development is dependent on per capita income; since there is a 
correlation between per capita income (Figure	  7) and human development figures. In this case, 
higher per capita income riparian countries tend to have better development. However, this is 
not always the case since often GDP per capita rankings and HDI rankings also vary largely 
for some countries. 
One of the prominent features of the index that might explain the dependency on agriculture 
is the measurement of access to education. As such, the index can suggest the extent to which  
entry into the formal labour market is restricted, through a lack of education thus leaving 
populations with no other alternative but to earn a living from farming or fishing 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Education Index for Chad Basin Countries 
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Figure 10 Education Index’s for Chad Basin Countries  
 HDI Value Rank Mean Schooling Years 
Cameroon 0.52 134th 5.9 
CAR 0.321 173rd 3.5 
Chad 0.219 185th 1.5 
Niger 0.177 187th 1.4 
Nigeria 0.442 147th 5 
(Source UNDP, 2011251) 
 Figure 10 above demonstrates that the countries that experience the highest mean years of 
schooling are Nigeria and Cameroon at 5.9 and 5 years of schooling respectively. Chad and 
Niger have substantially less than that at 1.5 and 1.4 years respectively. The mean years of 
schooling, and subsequently access to the formal labour market are seemingly dichotomized 
by the richer versus the poorer riparian countries. However, it is important to note that 
Cameroon and Nigeria, despite performing much better than the other riparian countries of 
the Lake Chad, have seemingly left much to be desired when compared to the rest of the 
world. Thus the dependence on other forms of income and sustenance becomes fairly 
obvious.  
Given that access to education is fairly limited, it stands to reason that a large proportion of 
the population is dependent on agriculture as a form of income or wealth stratification.252 One 
could argue that this dependence is largely a result of rural populations in the basin 
proportionately outweighing the urban populations. Effectively, this would suggest that the 
higher the proportion of the rural population in relation to the total population the lower mean 
years of schooling, which results in the dependency on agriculture (inclusive of livestock and 
fish) as a means of wealth stratification. The table below shows the percentage of the total 
population considered to be rural. The table shows that more developed countries tend to 
experience higher levels urbanization, thus leading to more jobs outside of rural areas and are 
less likely to be economically dependent on agriculture or the traditional rather than formal 
labor market for income.   
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Figure 11: Rural Population of LCBC States 
Figure 11: Rural Population of LCBC States 
Country Total Population 
(1000) 
Rural Population (1000) Percentage  
Cameroon 19 599 8 154 42 
Chad  11 227 8 125 72 
CAR 4 401 2 678 61 
Niger 15 512 12 858 83 
Nigeria 158 423 79 523 50 
(Source: FAO253) 
The population dependent on the Lake Chad as well as other resources in the River basin 
presents a number of issues for how one understands the potential for conflict over water. 
Firstly, increasing rural populations automatically increase the demand for water resources, 
especially because they depend on water resources for income and the sustenance of life in 
general. Even if one applies a ceteris paribus rule to the effect this would have on the value of 
water, the increase in demand is likely to increase the value of water resources and in so 
doing is likely to threaten water security. It would stand to reason that given water’s 
increased value in light of increased demand, that any kind of threat to maintaining the status 
quo in terms of supply is likely to become a tension point for the riparian communities of the 
Lake Chad and the River basin. This situation is exacerbated even further in the case of Lake 
Chad because, as the evidence suggests, supply is diminishing. What one has then is the 
inability to maintain the status quo of supply, while at the same time having the pressure of 
increasing demand.     
The populations of riparian countries are important to the understanding of water security in 
three ways. Firstly, the rising population density increases demand on already strained 
resources. Secondly, the low development of the population in terms of access to other forms 
of labour for income is limited as is demonstrated through poor school attendance. Lastly, the 
limitation of other labour as a source of income deepens the dependency of these populations 
on agriculture and other water based pastoral activities.  
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3.2.6 Water Management in the Chad Basin  
As is seen in the background information above, the data presented shows the data for the 
member states of the LCBC. As this chapter focuses on the Lake Chad as an example of 
water conflict, the analysis of repatriation and uses of water is restricted to the member states 
of the LCBC primarily because one of its functions is to manage the repatriation of Lake 
Chad. This section aims to provide clarity regarding the foundation and operation of the 
LCBC as a water management mechanism regarding the lake.  
In an effort to balance the needs of populations that are reside within the basin with the 
challenges that face these populations the riparian countries of the Chad River Basin 
established the Chad River Basin Community The establishment of the LCBC can be seen as 
an acknowledgement that the use of the resources of the basin does not affect only one 
country, but that cooperation for the equal appropriation of its resources requires an 
established framework for dialogue.254 The LCBC was established on 22 May 1964, between 
Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger as an intergovernmental organization to act as the 
framework for dialogue amongst those with an interest in the resources of the Chad River 
Basin.255 The obligation to the collective by each member state is clearly explicated in Article 
5 of the LCBC Conventions and Statutes, it specifically states that:  
The Member States undertake to refrain from adopting, without referring to the Commission 
beforehand, any measures likely to exert a marked influence either upon the extent of water 
losses, or upon the form of the annual hydrograph and limnograph and certain other 
characteristics of the Lake, upon the conditions of their exploitation by other bordering 
States, upon the sanitary condition of the water resources or upon the biological 
characteristics of the fauna and flora of the Basin. 
In particular, the Member States agree not to undertake in that part of the Basin falling 
within their jurisdiction any work in connection with the development of water resources or 
the soil likely to have a marked influence upon the system of the water courses and levels of 
the Basin without adequate notice and prior consultations with the Commission...256 
 
 
 
However, there have been numerous incidents in the past by member states that cast the 
feasibility of joint cooperation regarding water management in the lake region into doubt.257 
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In terms of its functionality, the LCBC has independent legal status, with its membership 
consisting of Commissioners from the membership countries.258 Ideally the contributions to 
the LCBC are meant to be equal for all member states, but provisions have been made to 
allow members to contribute at an agreed rate. This is especially true if the so-called 
equitable contribution forces a member state to spend “extraordinarily” within the context of 
their State budgets.259 In addition, the Statue under Article 8 requires the body to meet at least 
once a year in which decisions are taken by consensus.260 The day-to-day administration of 
the Commission is handled by the Executive Secretariat, which in combination with the 
member state Commissioners forms the organizational structure of the LCBC. The 
Secretariat’s office includes an assistant executive secretary, a financial controller and four 
departments. Since the adoption of the Strategic Action Programme (SAP) the Commission 
has appointed a Steering Committee responsible for its implementation.261    
 
Figure 12: The Organisational Structure of the LCBC 
 
In terms of analyzing the projects of the LCBC has proven problematic. Periods of inactivity 
that out-lasted active periods have had an impact on the ability to forge any sort of 
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longitudinal analysis of cooperation in the basin.262 For example in 1981 and 1982 the 
Commission faced problems in fulfilling its mandate, owing to political tensions in its host 
country (Chad) at the time. However, the headquarters moved back to Ndjamena in 1986 
after being hosted in Cameroon for the duration of political unrest in Chad.263 Ultimately, 
given that the LCBC’s functions concern a region that has been rife with both civil and 
international unrest, Boge and Wirkus conclude its mere existence ought to be judged 
positively rather than seen as an indictment.264 
The largest programme is the Global Environment Facility (GEF) with particular reference to 
the SAP adopted in 1998. The programme, titled the Reversal of Land and Water 
Degradation Trends in the Chad River Basin Ecosystem, aims to achieve coordinated, 
integrated and sustainable management of watercourses and natural resources within the 
basin.265 In 2002 the LCBC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Bureau 
of the Convention of Wetlands (Ramsar Convention) after declaring Lake Chad to be a 
Transboundary Ramsar Site of International Importance in July of 2000. The aim of the MoU 
was to create a platform for conservation areas, at both national and regional levels, with the 
purpose of fostering the sustainable management of water and other natural resources in the 
Chad basin.266  
Given the constraints both in terms of political issues within member states and what can 
generally be described as an attitude of apathy, the LCBC has enjoyed limited success. 
Firstly, the LCBC Ministers, despite a clear mandate within the founding Statute of the 
Organization fail to meet at least once a year-Boge and Wirkus particularly point out how the 
annual meeting rarely occurs, as it should.267In addition, in an official report to World Bank 
as one of the “underwriters” of GEF programs, it was noted that although member states 
expressed willingness to get involved with projects related to the SAP, the commitment did 
not “translate as effective until the end of the project”.268 This lack of commitment, and at 
certain times the ability, has left the LCBC to be deemed a largely ineffective organisation. It 
would seem that the Commission, in particular, has adopted a reputation for “talking-the-
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talk” without “walking-the-walk. Based on this one can conclude that inter-basin 
management although present in principle, leaves much to be desired in practice. From the 
analysis of the LCBC’s work (as presented by Boge and Wirkus) it seems very difficult to 
show how the Commission deals with issues regarding repatriation.  
3.2.7 Conclusion  
While this background is not intended to be exhaustive, it is meant to provide one with a 
wide overview of the issues relating to water and its usage in the Chad River basin. Using the 
Lake Chad as a focal point of the use of shared resources, it becomes evident that water as a 
security issue is extremely complex because a vast number of people depend on it to feed 
themselves.  
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3.3 Conflict over Water Resources in the Chad River Basin: Cameroon v Nigeria 
3.3.1 Background: Two issues; one dispute 
 
Past conflict over the resources of the Bakassi region as well as the border on the Lake Chad 
that is shared between the two are examples of potential water’s contribution to international 
conflict. The history of armed conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon as one that is related 
to water, let alone being caused by water, is however problematic. This is because the 
Bakassi dispute is one which mainly concerns oil while the Lake Chad dispute is one that 
concerns fishing rights and access to arable land suitable for farming and the subsequent 
economic value of the fishing and agricultural produce. Therefore the disputes share no 
common ground other than that the same parties dispute them. Price’s analysis, for example 
sees the history of skirmishes on the Lake Chad border dispute as peripheral to the larger, and 
what some argue to be the more important, dispute over entitlement to the Bakassi 
Peninsula’s resources.269 In Price’s case, water’s contribution to international conflict fits 
within the scope of those who argue in favour of water related wars.   
However, it can be argued that the Lake Chad dispute and the Bakassi Peninsula dispute are 
intrinsically linked to one another. The argument for treating the Bakassi and Lake Chad 
cases as two issues within the same dispute is that the border delimitations as indicators of 
sovereignty were a function of colonial border agreements.270 These agreements have, for 
various reasons, been challenged in the past. Subsequently these borders, as well as the 
resources that fall within them, have been a sticking point for the bi-lateral relations in post-
colonial states. A central element of these bi-lateral tensions is the agreement to and 
adherence to the border demarcations contained in these colonial agreements. Essentially 
Nigeria believed that the agreements hold no validity in post-colonial rule and as such both 
the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad border demarcations, which provide sovereignty to 
Cameroon, are questionable in terms of their legality under international law.271   
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The impact of colonial borders on the resource allocation amongst African States remains 
evident within the context of the dispute over both regions. The Lake Chad River Basin fell 
under the “colonial conquest” of Germany, France and Great Britain.272 The British 
controlled Nigeria, the French Chad and Germans Cameroon. The issue of delineating 
borders was negotiated by all of the former, with France and Great Britain continuing 
discussion in relative isolation after Germany’s defeat in 1916.273 The issue of boundaries 
drawn between water resources received particular attention during negotiations between the 
colonial powers. Germany, for example, both demanded and acquired access to “fluvial 
basins”, particularly within the context of Lake Chad for its Cameroonian protectorate.274 
Water, at least within the context of border markings, was seen as (and still is) an entity that 
could serve as a border amongst nations. It was general practice amongst colonial powers to 
draw the border in the middle of the water structure, when the structure served as a border 
between two of their colonies. Issa argues that this recognizes both the strategic importance 
in terms of infrastructure and its indispensability for the survival of people that occupy the 
banks of the shared resource.275  In the wake of the First World War Germany’s defeat, 
reignited the debate of previously negotiated border delimitations in that both the British 
sought to extend its tenure of Nigeria to include Northern Cameroon such that its territory 
would end at the Shari.276 This was seen as a way of acquiring a territory with vital resources, 
amongst which was more influential access to Lake Chad. The borders under dispute 
therefore were a function of colonial rule that has been a point of bilateral discourse amongst 
Nigeria and Cameroon. The discourse in terms of negotiating the border demarcations of the 
Lake Chad question the legitimacy of the agreement reached by colonial powers, especially 
in the context of independence. What one has then is that African Heads of State question the 
extent to which the border demarcations as they existed under colonial rule ought to be 
considered as legitimate in the context of independent rule.  
The Bakassi Peninsula dispute, similar to the Lake Chad dispute, hinged on the legitimacy of 
border demarcations determined by colonial powers. Nigeria questioned the legitimacy of the 
sovereignty that Cameroon has over region, partly because of the borders agreed upon by 
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colonial powers and not necessarily the Nigerian people or its government.277 The 
sovereignty of Cameroon with regard to the Bakassi Peninsula, is based on the agreements 
reached between the British as the colonial power of Nigeria and the Germans as the 
protectorate of Cameroon on the 11th of March 1913.278 Further agreements, on more than 
one occasion, supported the sovereignty of Yaoundé over the Bakassi Peninsula. The Milner-
Simon Agreement of 1919, for example, reaffirmed the sovereignty of Cameroon over the 
Bakassi. The defeat of the Germans in the First World War also suggested the entitlement of 
Cameroon to the Bakassi, specifically through Article 239 of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
sought to uphold any agreements made by the Germans prior to 1919. Reference to the 
Maritime border of the Bakassi between Cameroon and Nigeria is made in both the Thomson-
Marchard Agreement and Henderson-Fleurran Exchange of Notes in 1929-1930.279 What 
one sees is multitude of agreements formed under the basis of colonial rule, which ultimately 
recognize the sovereign right of Cameroon to the Bakassi. These agreements ultimately form 
the foundation of Cameroon’s argument for the position of border demarcations. The 
relationship to the Lake Chad border therefore rests upon the influence that colonial powers 
had in the border demarcation process. However, what seemingly legitimizes the impression 
that the Lake Chad border dispute and the Bakassi Peninsula dispute be considered as the 
same dispute with two separate issues is the inclusion of the Lake Chad border dispute into 
the application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 6th of June 1994.280 The 
Judgment indicates that: 
On 6 June 1994 Cameroon filed in the Registry an Additional Application "for the purpose 
of extending the subject of the dispute" to a further dispute described in that Additional 
Application as "relat[ing] essentially to the question of sovereignty over a part of the 
territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad". Cameroon also, requested the Court, in its 
Additional Application, "to specify definitively" the frontier between the two States from Lake 
Chad to the sea, and asked it to join the two Applications and "to examine the whole in a 
single case". In order to found the jurisdiction of the Court, the Additional Application 
referred to the "basis of . . . jurisdiction . . . already . . . indicated" in the Application 
instituting proceedings of 29 March 1994.281 
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It is clear on the basis that Yaoundé sought to have the matter resolved as one matter, in a 
single filing, that the Lake Chad dispute and the Bakassi dispute cannot be separated. The 
sentiment expressed by Cameroon, as a party to the dispute, is that the colonially-determined 
borders have a profound impact on the legitimacy of the borders in both post-colonial states. 
This sentiment is also adopted by Nigeria. The ICJ ruling clearly states that “[the Nigerian] 
Government did not object to the [Lake Chad] Application being treated as an amendment to 
the initial [Bakassi] Application, so that the Court might examine the whole in a single 
case”.282 The dispute therefore becomes a matter of either one accepts the colonially-
determined borders or one rejects them precisely because they are a legacy of the colonial 
master. The dichotomy represents the general views of both Cameroon and Nigeria 
respectively.  
This dichotomy is particularly evident in the analysis of the ICJ’s ruling on the matter 
concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.283 In his 
analysis, Bekker suggests that Nigeria did not consider the agreements of former colonial 
powers as binding on post-independence foreign affairs.284 Nigeria sought to nullify the 
authority of the Anglo-German agreement of 1913, as the basis upon which agreements such 
as the Milner-Simon Agreement of 1919 as well as the Thomson-Marchard Agreement of 
1929/1930 were signed. Nigeria’s argument was that the British had no sovereignty over the 
Bakassi and as such agreements with the German Protectorate of Cameroon was null and 
void.285 As far as the Lake Chad boundary is concerned, Nigeria argued that the Milner-
Simon Agreement, Thomson-Marhard Agreement and the Treaty of Versailles were invalid in 
their cession of “trusteeship” of the German Protectorate (that is Cameroon)  on the basis that 
they assumed the validity of the Anglo-German Agreement.286 While Nigeria did not object 
to the Court reviewing the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad border demarcations as two 
issues within the same dispute, it is evident that Abuja did not see the agreements entered into 
by formal colonial powers as particularly valid. Abuja as a result, considered the access to the 
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mineral wealth and resources of the Lake Chad, afforded by these borders to Cameroon, as 
invalid as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                          (Source: Bekker287) 
 
Cameroon’s case for the validity of the agreements under international law was seemingly 
stronger than the counter-argument offered by Nigeria. The ICJ ultimately ruled that the 
sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula as well as the disputed Lake Chad lay with Cameroon. 
The Court, in addition, “fixed” the land boundaries from Lake Chad (North) to the Bakassi 
Peninsula (South) that is shared between Nigeria and Cameroon.288 Once more the basis of 
Cameroon’s argument for sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad can be seen 
in the appeal to the validity of the Anglo-German Agreement, as well as those that followed, 
as formal international agreements under international law.289 The basis of the border dispute 
itself therefore rests on how one interprets the validity of colonial agreements in post-colonial 
foreign affairs. 
The arrows above indicate where Nigeria and Cameroon believe the border demarcation for 
the Bakassi Peninsula ought to be. The arrow on the right indicates the demarcation that 
Nigeria supports, while the arrow on the left is the demarcation Cameroon supports. It is also 
the one that is enforced by the ICJ ruling.  
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Figure 13: Bakassi Dispute Demarcations 
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For the purpose of this case analysis, conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over the 
Bakassi and Lake Chad border disputes will be treated as the same conflict, even though the 
spatial location differs to a certain degree. Since both Cameroon and Nigeria acknowledge 
that the border disputes are intertwined, especially in terms of the natural resources and land 
that is at dispute, the treatment of conflict on the border points at dispute seems relative.  
 
3.3.2 From Tension to Conflict on the borders of Cameroon and Nigeria 
The Bakassi and the Lake Chad border disputes have resulted in tensions amongst Abuja and 
Yaoundé. The tensions rest specifically on the occupation of sovereign territory both in the 
context of the political climate leading to the ICJ application and the reception of the Court’s 
finding.290 The tension itself however, is a function of the discovery of oil in the Bakassi 
Region rather than one of bi-lateral relations amongst the States.291 The tension therefore, as 
it relates to resources, is one that is explained well by Klare and his analysis on Resource 
Wars. 
  
 From this one can deduce the economic value of oil found within the Bakassi has highlighted 
the incentive for contesting colonial borders, which has led to a series of armed occupations 
and confrontations on the Bakassi border.292 Similarly, the depletion of Lake Chad on the 
opposite border between Nigeria and Cameroon can provide incentive (and indeed has done)   
for cross-border occupations by Nigerian citizens, living in villages on the border, seeking 
access to the fishing resources the Lake has to offer.293 The incentive for protesting the 
border demarcations either by the deployment of military personnel in the Bakassi Peninsula 
or cross border occupation by villagers on the Lake Chad is therefore intrinsically linked to 
the economic security of Nigeria and Cameroon as well as the riparian groups that reside on 
the banks of the Lake Chad.  
 
In terms of locating the matter within Security Studies, the contested border demarcations 
essentially threaten access to an economically valuable resource, which is seen as essential 
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for the survival for both the State and its people. In what follows the events of May 1981 and 
February 1994 will be discussed as militarisation of the border dispute. The military 
occupations, in addition to the occupation of land, within Cameroonian territory in Bakassi 
Peninsula and on the Lake Chad by Nigeria’s Armed Forces and citizens respectively, can 
therefore be seen as responses to the threat. If viewed from the words of Clausewitz, the 
conflict over border can be seen as an escalation of the dispute regarding colonial border 
delimitations, since it is apparent that the means of dialogue had failed to produce an 
amicable settlement.294       
3.3.3 The Militarization of the Border Dispute 
	  
The border dispute between Abuja and Yaoundé reached its most critical point on the border 
shared within the Bakassi Peninsula. On the 16th of May 1981, a Cameroonian radio news 
programme announced that Nigerian military patrol boats had crossed the maritime border, 
travelled up the Rio del Ray River and opened fire on Cameroonian Navy vessels.295 Thus 
Nigeria stood accused of violating Cameroon’s national sovereignty within the Bakassi 
Peninsula. The issue had escalated even further since the Cameroonian Navy retaliated, 
killing five Nigerian soldiers in the process.296 The event reveals an important ontological 
feature of the Bakassi Peninsula in relation to the bi-lateral foreign policy between Nigeria 
and Cameroon. The Bakassi and similarly the Lake Chad border delimitations have featured 
prominently on the agenda of bi-lateral meetings and negotiations since that day.  
 
However, the attention the border delimitations received was largely disproportionate to its 
success. The 1990’s in particular witnessed the rise of antagonism towards Nigerians residing 
within Cameroon’s borders. A feature of this antagonism was tax drives that left some 
Nigerians with very little option other than to return back to their native land.297 When 
viewed in the context of Lake Chad, given the fact that many Nigerian people had in fact 
resided within Cameroon’s borders to ensure their economic security (which can be implied 
from the need to hand over 33 unlawfully occupied villages by Nigeria), the antagonism of 
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the 1990’s expressed by Cameroon points to a situation where increased competition is likely 
to have acted as a catalyst for conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon.  
 
The catalytic nature of shared water resources is even further evident in the events of 
February 1994, in which 1000 Nigerian troops were deployed in the Bakassi in reaction to the 
exploitation of Nigerian fisherman by Cameroon through the imposition of arbitrary taxes.298 
The deployments of troops lead to even more shooting, which resulted in many soldier 
casualties and deaths being suffered by both sides. Ngang for example notes that Cameroon 
alone lost 34 soldiers by the time the dispute was lodged with the ICJ on the 26th of March 
1994. By May of 1996, more than 50 Nigerian soldiers had lost their lives in the border 
dispute process.299 In many ways this skirmish was the most influential in 13 years as it 
resulted in Cameroon lodging a complaint in the ICJ on the 26th of March 1994, which 
resulted in the matter being referred to The Court for arbitration and the matter became 
known as The Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening). 
 
The conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula that lead to the ICJ’s arbitration only tells one side of 
the dispute. As noted previously, the Lake Chad border was similarly subject to cross 
occupations by Nigerian citizens in Cameroonian territory. The occupation of land within 
Cameroonian territory by Nigerians was seen largely as a direct impact that the diminishing 
water supply of Lake Chad has on the livelihoods of people living on the banks of the Lake 
and subsequently being dependent on its resources for income.300 The 2006 UNDP Report 
suggests that the depletion of Lake Chad along the Nigerian border, as seen in the difference 
in the Lake’s levels between 1996 and 2001, forced many Nigerian villages particularly in 
Borno state to move closer to the resources they had become dependent on.301 In doing so the 
villagers crossed national boundary demarcations as agreed by colonial powers and post-
colonial governments. The issue of the Lake Chad villages is difficult to separate from the 
Bakassi issue in that Nigeria has transgressed international law by allowing villagers to settle 
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within the borders of Cameroon along the Lake Chad, even incorporating these villages 
within the district governance of Borno state-which is a Nigerian province.302 The Lake Chad 
side of the dispute therefore aggravated the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula in that it could 
be seen as arrogant on the part of the Nigerian government to simply integrate cross-border 
villages into local government administrations, which very possibly was a reaction to the 
treatment of Nigerian citizens within Cameroonian territory in the Bakassi Peninsula. Based 
on findings in the ICJ Judgment, it is clear the Nigeria had in some cases sought to provide 
security in these villages to its citizens through policing and to some extent military forces, 
under the auspices of being under the administration of the Nigerian local government.  
Whether or not this can be considered a militarized occupation to the extent that is it an inter-
state security threat is questionable, but should detract from the fact that the Nigerian 
government had no jurisdiction to deploy even policing forces across its own borders. 
Notwithstanding the former consideration, the link to competition over water-related 
resources, in the form of fishing rights of shared water resources is evident. 
 
The conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Region and the Lake Chad’s 
resources is not by stretch of the imagination one-dimensional. There are seemingly various 
issues that explain the conflict which cannot be attributed to the human-centered approach, 
such as the obvious benefit of oil deposits within the Bakassi. However, equally there are 
elements of the conflict that the state-centered approach cannot explain, an example of which 
is how access to fishing resources within the Lake Chad essentially provides villagers of both 
Nigerian and Cameroonian descent with the only opportunity to have economic security. 
More importantly in the context of understanding from which perspective water security 
ought to be understood, the state-centric approach lacks explanatory power in that one cannot 
attribute water as a resource as the focal point of the Bakassi Region of the inter-state 
resource conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon.  
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3.3.4 The End of the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad Dispute 
The end of the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad dispute (in a legal context) came in the form 
of an ICJ ruling on the 10th of October 2002.303 The ICJ found that the Treaties, Declarations 
and Exchange of Notes as entered into between colonial powers were valid under 
international law and therefore binding upon both Nigeria and Cameroon.304 This meant that 
the border demarcations, along with the mineral rights that they afforded post-colonial 
Nigeria and Cameroon, were in fact valid. Therefore Nigerian villages within Cameroonian 
parts the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad region that were under Nigerian Government 
administration, were in violation of international law and Abuja subsequently ordered to 
return the occupied territories to the control of Yaoundé.  
 
It would be fair to suggest that the finding was met with mixed reviews, which could be 
dichotomized by either Nigerian or Cameroonian interests. The Nigerian Federal Government 
for example argued that the ruling was prejudicial in that the President of the Court was 
French and that both English and German judges were active participants in the proceedings 
concerning the disputed regions. The claim of prejudice hinged on the fact that the matter 
brought before the ICJ was one in which the French, the Germans and the English were 
“parties to the action [and had] substantial stakes” in the outcome.305 Essentially the 
argument purported was that the underlying interest that the former colonial powers had 
ought to have disqualified them from having any significant impact on the outcome of the 
matter brought before the ICJ by Cameroon. It is fairly difficult to determine whether or not 
this is a fair assessment, since it is not particularly clear that the French, German or English 
had a vested interest in the outcome of the case. Secondly, even if one were to grant that the 
former did indeed have an interest in handing the regions to Cameroon it is not clear exactly 
what that interest is (or might have been) and more importantly how awarding of the territory 
to Cameroon served those interests any better than they would have been served if the regions 
were handed to Nigeria. When viewed in the context of post-colonial Africa in combination 
with the fact that the ruling came at the height of the African Renaissance, it is not evident 
that Cameroon would be any more amenable to serving the interests of former colonial 
masters and other Western powers. This is particularly because independent States had 
become preoccupied with the idea of reclaiming Africa from colonial masters, while at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Ozoedmena, C., “Nigeria Government Rejects World Court Verdict on Bakassi”, Vangaurd, 24 October 
2002, http://allafrica.com/stories/printanble/200210240629.html (date accessed: 26-06-2012) 
304 Bekker, P.H.F., Op.Cit p. 390 
305 Loc.Cit.  
79 
 
same time molding an African identity for States on the continent-to serve their interests 
within the international arena. 306  
 
 On the other hand, the Nigerian assessment is not entirely without merit. In addition to 
arguing for the prejudicial nature of the findings, the Nigerian government argued that the 
findings of the court were insensitive to the fact that these Nigerian villages had become 
vested in the territory that they occupied in that they “owned” land and had grown familial 
ties. So simply moving out of the occupied territories proved problematic, since neither issues 
of reparation nor how these villages (dependent on the resources within the territories they 
occupied, particularly those within the Lake Chad region) would be integrated into other 
communities within Nigeria had not been adequately addressed and settled.307 This has been 
and will continue to be a potential pressure point for conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon, 
as will be explicated further in the next section. 
 
Cameroon, while welcoming of a finding in its favor, immediately asked the Court to 
consider ordering Nigeria to pay reparations for the territory that it had occupied 
unlawfully.308 Nigeria responded by stating that the occupations had occurred as a result of a 
“…reasonable mistake or honest belief” of entitlement and as such Nigeria had acted in self-
defense at the time when all major altercations (which can be seen as escalating the conflict) 
occurred.309 The Court essentially dismissed the claims made by both parties and ordered that 
both parties withdraw any and all forces, military or otherwise, from the other parties’ 
territory as defined by the ruling.  
 
While the issue of rightful sovereignty has been handled by the ICJ, its ruling has seemingly 
left many questions, such as the future of Nigerian villagers that resided within the occupied 
territories, unanswered. However, it remains to be seen to what extent water had a functional 
role in the dispute as one between two states. 
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3.4 State-Centered versus Human Centered Approaches: The Bakassi and Lake Chad case 
 
3.4.1 Analysing the State-Centred Approach 
 
To explain conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon with regard to water as a function of 
state-centred security one would need to demonstrate how water is either a focal point of the 
conflict as a resource of value that is essential for the state’s survival or how issues related to 
broader political goals, such as the need for water related sustainable energy supplies, in light 
of increasing demand, have led to threats to state security.  
 
The state-centered view of security explains the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad border 
dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon as a variant of the Resource Wars “hypothesis” 
introduced by Klare.310 However, the Bakassi dispute is not particularly clear on what the 
focal point of this Resource War is and more importantly how the state-centered approach 
explains the resource conflict as one that is fought over water. So whether or not the state-
centered approach explains the security threats that are related to water in the context of the 
relationship between Nigerian and Cameroon depends on what one considers to be the focal 
point of the “resource war”. The position this dissertation takes is that despite the clear 
connections that exist between water and the dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake 
Chad, the evidence seems to suggest that water is a tangential issue to oil. One could argue 
for the former simply by pointing out that the Lake Chad issue, as one that concerns only 
water, was only added to the application three months after Cameroon appealed for the matter 
to be considered by the ICJ. Further, as a security issue between two states, the contention 
that the Lake Chad provides empirical validation for water being the focal point of state-
centered security is problematic in that it is very difficult to find evidence of Nigerian and 
Cameroonian forces fighting along the borders of the Lake Chad, in territory rather than 
water seemed to be a driving force of conflict, particularly in February of 1994 
 
The support for oil as the focal point of the dispute is evident in recent statements by both 
governments to jointly explore the oil reserves of the Bakassi. In an article published by This 
Day Addax Petroleum is identified as a potential candidate for joint exploration, given that it 
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has investments in both the Nigerian and Cameroonian oil sectors.311 The article goes further 
to explain that the joint exploration marks an end to tensions over the Bakassi Peninsula 
between the Nigeria and Cameroon, which essentially questioned the ownership of the oil 
rich region. Cameroon’s chief negotiator was quoted as saying “Work is complete on our 
maritime demarcation, but [this is] not the case [with regard to] exploring oil wells that cross 
the borders…”312 As far as the Bakassi Peninsula and the Lake Chad are concerned it is not 
clear that water features as prominently in the territorial dispute as oil does. The Bakassi 
Peninsula and Lake Chad dispute therefore do not illustrate how water is the focal point of 
the territorial dispute between states, which lead to militarized conflict. In the context of 
inter-state conflict water has, at best, been a contributing factor in exacerbating the dispute. 
By logical deduction however, this is not the same as saying water or even water related 
issues lead states to engage in armed conflict. Thus the state-centered approach to 
understanding water as a security concern cannot explain the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake 
Chad cases adequately, since it is evident that the disputes are politically motivated through 
the questioning of colonial borders. Furthermore, even if one were to concede that resources 
drive this questioning of colonial borders it still seems evident that water has a peripheral role 
to that of oil.  
 
As was established in the previous chapter, conflict over water as a resource depends on 
whether or not one sees water as a resource that can be linked to the broader political interests 
of states, for example where water becomes valuable in terms of hydroelectric schemes that 
seek to provide new alternatives for supply in times of increasing demand. The state’s 
interests and broader political goals are evident in that hydroelectricity can provide energy to 
sustain growing economies.313  The question becomes firstly to what extent is 
hydroelectricity used as an alternative to more conventional energy sources and if so, to what 
extent have these hydroelectric schemes lead to conflict within the Chad River Basin. 
The examination of hydroelectric schemes in the Chad River Basin is best understood in the 
broader context of hydroelectric schemes within Africa, more specifically Central and West 
Africa. The notion of hydroelectricity within Africa can be seen as a function of a general 
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movement towards cleaner energy sources globally, while at the same time maintaining the 
capacity for supply relative to demand. The maintenance of supply has gained even further 
importance given that population density and industrial growth has questioned the adequacy 
of energy supplies.314 The appeal behind hydroelectricity is that it provides for the cheapest 
route to the expansion of energy supplies.315 As a pressure point for international tension 
amongst riparian countries of the Chad River Basin, it is not particularly clear if 
hydroelectricity has indeed led to hostility. Wiseman suggests that it has become increasingly 
popular to define the over-extension of tributaries, marked by hydroelectric and other 
irrigation projects, of the Lake Chad as a prominent feature of the loss in its structural 
capacity.316 From this it is suggested that the drive for alternative energy sources 
fundamentally altered replenishment cycles of the Lake Chad.317 Given that the dramatic loss 
of the Lake’s structural supply directly resulted in the cross-border occupation by Nigeria, 
one might argue that in this way, the use water resources in the realization of state goals that 
is a more sustainable energy supply can be attributed to the territorial dispute of Lake Chad. 
This view reduces the cause of the territorial occupation to the use of water resources by 
states. Put differently, this interpretation questions the causation of the territorial occupation, 
which indeed did lead to hostility amongst Nigeria and Cameroon by regression of the causal 
chain of conflict within the Lake Chad area of the Bakassi dispute. It does so specifically by 
questioning what had led to the territorial occupation by Nigerian villages in Cameroonian 
territory in the first place.  
Figure 14: Water and State goals as a causal factor of conflict over water in Lake Chad Region 
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Michael Klare once again supports the indirect nature of water as a driving force of conflict 
and is a significant “feature” of conflict in the past and today. An example of this that he 
himself uses is contested resources zones and allocation within the West Bank and Israel.318 
Klare’s use of the word feature seems to suggest that water, while at times being a significant 
contributing factor to conflict it is still not a cause of conflict between states. More 
importantly it is only once water as a feature of tension between states threatens national 
security that one sees any significant form of militarised conflict, as was the case between 
Turkey and Syria.319 Therefore hydropolicitical security focuses on understanding how water 
security impacts on national security, rather than focussing on water allocation and norms of 
use.320 Therefore, because it is not clear that water is the driving force behind political tension 
between Nigeria and Cameroon it is difficult to see how conflict on the Lake Chad border is 
caused by water. What is clear is that water as a feature of the cross-border occupation does 
have, and in the case of February 1994 did have, an impact on national interest being 
threatened.   
 
There are also notable correlations between climate and migration, which lends its self to 
cross-border occupations and ultimately threats to national interest and sovereignty. There is 
also consensus that climate change at times induces migration and very possibly challenges 
that status quo of resource allocation. One could argue that the Nigerian occupation of 
Cameroon’s territory is one such case, since it is clear that the receding water levels did in 
fact have an influence on the movement of Nigerian villages. This essentially means that 
climate change and the receding waters of Lake Chad had an impact on the settlement of 
these villages, as it is clear people ignored political borders in search of water.321 The 
migration is necessitated by those in need of arable and grazing land, as well access to water 
to maintain human life and is as a result a function of food security rather than national 
security.322 A striking feature of these occupations, by Nigerian villages, is that they were not 
occupations by the military acting as agents of the state in the state’s national interest. In this 
case the cross border to maintain access to water does not seem to have been a function of 
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strategic interest, as was arguably the case the 1998 incursion of the Katse dam in Lesotho.323 
So although water had an indirect role in the intervention by the South African Defence Force 
(SADF), which Meissner believes to be one of geopolitics and regional security, a state 
agency deployed troops at the Katse to protect an asset of national interest.324 The state-
centred approach to security can explain the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
intervention because water formed an important part of regional stability. More importantly 
though the use of the military as the only agents that are relevant to maintaining security for 
the state-centred approach was the party that the party that occupied and secured the Katse 
dam facility. The reason the state-centred approach cannot thoroughly explain the cross-
border occupations from Nigeria into Cameroon is because the people crossing the border 
were military personnel acting on behalf of the state to secure national interest. They were 
simply moving to maintain access to a resource they deemed critical to their survival.  
 
In the case of the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad dispute, waters role in the onset of 
violence can at best be described as one related to territorial occupation. Furthermore, even 
the territorial occupation as it relates to securing water cannot be explained by state-centred 
security because those crossing the border were not soldiers acting to protect the national 
interest of Nigeria. On the basis that one cannot defend water as the focal point of the 
resource conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon, one cannot conclude that water can explain 
the motives behind the onset of conflict as far as state security is concerned. In fact, as far as 
literature on the dispute between Abuja and Yaoundé are concerned, oil has a much a larger 
impact as a catalyst for conflict than water does. As far as what can be seen in the literature, 
water’s role as a catalyst in the conflict has been tangential at best. Secondly, evidence would 
suggest that as far as tensions within occupied and within other regions are territorial in 
nature and do not necessarily have as much to do with water as it does with the violation of 
international border demarcations. More to the point, the initial dispute was related to the 
disagreement of colonial territorial borders and had very little, if anything to do with water.   
Therefore one cannot claim that state-centred security adequately explains conflict over water 
in the context of the Bakassi and Lake Chad dispute. 
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85 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Analysing the Human-Centred Approach 
 
The human-centred approach will attempt to explain conflict over water as a response to a 
threat in security concerning issues related to the “freedom of want” and “freedom of fear”, 
as the broad scope of human-centred threats.325 Also related to human-centred threats, is that 
the opportunity to have an acceptable standard of living is enshrined in the human condition. 
326Thus one need only examine how water creates a threat to the freedom of want or fear. The 
causal nature of water on this approach is weakened (when compared to that which would be 
required by the state-centred approach) to give credence to the belief that water still has a 
noteworthy impact on threats to security amongst people, in spite of the lack of credible 
impact it might have on conflict amongst states. Subsequently, the approach aims to 
demonstrate how issues not necessarily related to the state have exerted pressure on the 
tension points within the occupied territories between Nigeria and Cameroon. The analysis 
presented here will be limited to economic, food and health security, since they are the 
principles of human security that can most easily be related to issues regarding water.  
 
The importance of food security, particularly with regard to agriculture and other food 
sources dependent on water continue to be of concern to populations around the world.327 The 
impact in changing climate conditions and its subsequent impact on water scarcity has placed 
crop yields under considerable pressure to meet the demands of increasing population 
densities globally. The inability to meet these increasing demands on food supply is likely to 
see a persisting condition of undernourished children globally.328 The riparian communities 
of the Chad River Basin are no exception. 
 
The impact that the access to water has on communities that are dependent on the Lake Chad 
varies dependent on the dominant practice of traditional communities within the various 
riparian countries. In Niger for example, traditional villages are dependent on arable land for 
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farming as well as land suitable for the grazing of livestock. In the case of Niger, livestock 
still acts as a form of currency and is still very popular amongst grooms-to-be as a form of 
payment to his prospective brides family. In other parts, specifically within Nigeria, 
Cameroon and to a certain extent Chad, the dependency on the fishing resources of the Lake 
has meant that the threat presents itself in the form: namely the access to a food source either 
for personal consumption or as Bene suggests, is used as an opportunity for villagers to enter 
into economic activity by selling more expensive fish and using the profits from the sale to 
buy cheaper fish and use the surplus towards other household needs.329 Based on this it is 
evident that threats to security from water, when interpreted on the human-centred approach, 
fit well with interpretations that seek to examine how water is related to the lack of security. 
This is particularly true when the lack of security is characterised by things, such as access to 
food, that ultimately impact negatively on the human condition. Of course, the generic appeal 
presented here ought not be considered as reductive to claiming that the human-centric 
approach explains the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute in its entirety.  
 
3.4.2.1The Human-Centred Approach: the case of Nigeria and Cameroon 
 
It would seem that, from the discussion above that the state-centred approach security cannot 
adequately account for the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon as one that had water as 
its focal point-it was argued to be territorial in nature. In addition, where a resource of value 
could clearly be identified it concerned oil more than it did water. However, to claim that 
water had no impact on the conflict between Abuja and Yaoundé would be misguided if not 
blatantly incorrect. For example, one of the initial outbreaks of violence in the Bakassi 
followed the killing of Nigerian fisherman, who in the search of fish for either their economic 
activity or in their own households, crossed into Cameroonian territory.330 So in this case 
while the inter-state conflict can be attributed to a violation in sovereignty thus making the 
inter-state conflict territorial, the human-centred approach offers insight into the conditions 
that lead to the territorial violation in the first place.  
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The evaluation of water as a security concern, through the human-centred lens gives 
validation to the notion that water often plays an important role in the factors leading to 
conflict even if the conflict itself cannot be attributed to water. The state-centred approach 
was particularly unable to explain the Lake Chad conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon as 
one that could be attributed to water, since it was clear that the animosity was directed more 
towards the occupation of sovereign land. More importantly, the aforementioned occupation 
was not even made by the Nigerian military, but by its citizens in search for water from the 
diminishing Lake Chad, upon which they depend for income and sustenance. Water played 
an instrumental role in the occupation of Cameroonian territory by Nigerian villages in the 
Lake Chad region. The receding water levels of Lake Chad had left villagers with very little 
choice other than to move closer to the banks of the lake in order to ensure access to the 
resources of the lake. The villagers that crossed border were essentially ensuring themselves 
of an opportunity to enjoy freedom from want in the form of food security.331 Therefore the 
human-centred approach rejects the immediate causality that is explained by the state-centred 
approach and ultimately seeks to identify the immediate causes or instigating factors behind 
territorial conflicts that are related to water. Based on Figure 15 below, the human-centred 
approach would be able to explore the causal chain further that lead to the territorial 
occupation, thus being able to identify pressure points in other situations that have perhaps 
not lead to violent conflict, but seemingly present a threat to security regardless. 
 
From previous discussion, it is evident that food security, economic security and health 
security are closely linked to one another in the onset of conflict between Nigeria and 
Cameroon. The link between food security and economic security is fairly obvious when 
taking into consideration that there is a large dependency on food for economic activity, 
particularly in light of the lack of access to other parts of the labour market.  If one considers 
food security to be closely related to the availability and sustainability of food sources, the 
lack of food security automatically implies a lack in economic security since the relative 
certainty of sustaining an income is threatened. In terms of relating food security to health 
security the impact is fairly obvious since a lack of nourishment, which is gained by food, 
seems to be a fairly obvious indicator of health security. Seen in a different way, if food (in 
the case of the Chad Basin and Lake Chad in particular fish) is seen as a bartering tool and is 
often used to gain profit, the lack of food can be seen to compromise the access to healthcare. 
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Therefore there is a direct correlation between affording healthcare, or economic security, 
and food security. It would stand to reason that the three forms of security related to water are 
interdependent, however food security seems to be the focal point of the human-centred 
approach in this case.   
 
Figure 15: Regression of Causal Chain to explain factors that impact on territorial occupation 
in the Lake Chad Region 
	  
	  
 
3.4.2.2 Human-Centered Factors and their impact on the territorial occupation in the Lake 
Chad Region 
 
One of the most striking features of the human-centred approach in this case is that it can 
explain the impact that non-state actors have on the occurrence or initiation of conflict 
between Nigeria and Cameroon.332 The state-centred approach, as suggested before, assumes 
that the state is the principle actor in international relations and therefore cannot adequately 
predict or explain situations of conflict in which non-state actors had a fundamental role in 
shaping. While one cannot explicitly criticise the state-centred approach for this inadequacy, 
the human-centred approach might be able to provide valuable insight into how the interests 
of non-state actors ultimately impact on the relationships between states. It can be argued that 
the Nigerian occupation of Cameroon, which led to armed conflict, is indeed one of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332  Bego, A., “Let’s Take Back Our 33 Villages And…-Daggish” Weekly Trust, 20 March 2004, 
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Conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon along the banks of the Lake 
Chad (Territorial Occupation) 
Territorial Occupation of Sovereign Land (State-Centred Analysis) 
Riparian Communities seek access to Lake Chad's resources that 
ensure economic and food security, particularly since these are poor 
communities with little or no other means to esnsure survivial 
(Human-Centered) 
Environmental Change along with over-grazing and over-cultivation 
of the Lake Chad region lead to receding water levels (Human-
Centered) 
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cases. The cross-border occupation meant that Nigerian villages, now within Cameroon’s 
sovereign territory were under the administration of the Nigerian Federal Government. This 
could be perceived as a pseudo-annexing of Cameroon’s territory and resources by Nigeria. 
More importantly, if as mentioned earlier Nigerian citizens were being exploited in villages 
under Nigerian Federal Government rule it would plausible that militarised conflict, would be 
a function of the state ensuring its peoples security. So on this interpretation the Nigerian 
government would have otherwise had no reason to forcefully occupy Cameroonian territory. 
 There is sufficient evidence to suggest that non-state actors had an influential role in the 
escalation of tensions between Abuja and Yaoundé over both the Bakassi and Lake Chad 
regions. In both the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad region, non-state actors in the form of 
local fisherman had an important role in the context of the larger dispute between the two 
nations. A quintessential part of the non-state actor within the context of this dispute is the 
role of traditional leadership or villages in the management and allocation of water based 
resources.  
 
The role of traditional communities in the allocation of water-based resources is perhaps 
testament to the human-centred focus of resource management within the Chad River Basin. 
In what is known as a Traditional Management System (TMS), there seems to be three forms 
of water resource management taking on the roles of traditional, modern and mixed 
management schemes.333 The table below shows the authority centers with regard to the 
allocation and management of water resources within the Chad River Basin 
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Figure 16: Resource Management Systems in the Chad Basin 
(Source: Bene et. al.) 
 
The majority of effective management systems, according to Bene, Neiland and Jolley, are 
located within the traditional type, with an average of 47 percent out of 38 villages in three of 
the most fishing intensive riparian countries. The minority is represented in the form of 
modern systems, in that only 6 of the 38 villages or 16 percent of villages operate on this type 
of system. The 37 percent or 24 villages operate on a mixed system in which both the state 
and traditional he authorities regulate the activities of populations as far as extraction of 
water based resources is concerned. The table below indicates the findings of Bene et al.334 
 
The findings of Bene in this article seem to suggest that traditional leadership and lifestyle 
seems to underpin community engagement in the Chad River Basin, but specifically seems to 
fit well with transboundary management of the Lake Chad. In addition to the dominance of 
traditional management systems depicted above it is evident from Bene’s arguments 
elsewhere that traditional lifestyles dominate wealth stratification and social interaction. The 
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 Figure 16: Resource Management in the Chad Basin  
Management 
System 
Authority Centre Cameroon Chad Nigeria 
 
n % n % n % 
Traditional 
Traditional 
Leaders with 
riparian villages 
14 70 11 38 3 33 
Modern 
Government 
Office 
Administered 
- - 5 17 1 11 
Mixed 
Partly Both. 
Requires 
interaction of 
both mechanisms 
6 30 13 45 5 56 
 Total 20 100 29 100 9 100 
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human centered approach has been presented as one that is fundamentally in opposition to 
state-centered approaches, which are underpinned by the focus of the state as the focal point 
of security. If one takes the human-centered approach to be the opposite, which is focused on 
non-state actors as the focal point of security, then human-centered approach explains why 
Nigerian villages would have found it beneficial to move into Cameroonian territory. In the 
case of occupying the territory of the Lake Chad border, it could be argued that local leaders 
saw it as beneficial in maintaining the status quo both in terms of their own social status and 
that of their subjects. The fish of the Chad Basin is linked to the wealth and social standing of 
local village leaders.335Therefore moving in order to maintain social standing and wealth in 
this case can only be understood at community or human-centered level. This would fit well 
the third link in the causal chain presented above. Ultimately, the human-centered approach 
provides insight into the role of non-state actors and how they perceive water to be related to 
their security. A material fact of the cross-occupation is that villages rather than the military 
invaded Cameroonian territory, principally in search of maintaining food and economic 
security. 
3.4.3 Current Day Affairs in the Bakassi and Lake Chad  
	  
In recent years, the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon has taken a more cooperative 
nature, and even more nurturing one from the one witness during the time of the ICJ’s 
hearing of the border dispute. The general consensus, at least from Nigeria is that cooperation 
is an essential element for both nations to realize their potential in many spheres of 
interaction.336 The areas of focus for cooperation include the potential use of hydrocarbons 
along the border, which is indicative of water’s increasingly prominent role in the evolution 
of the dispute.337 However, to date the cooperative element of bilateral relations seem to be 
more ideologically than empirically grounded.  
An essential factor related to real empirical evidence of cooperation amongst Abuja and 
Yaoundé, is the seemingly constant doubt over the legitimacy of the ICJ’s ruling on the 
matter. Professor Anthony Asiwaju of the Society for International Relations Awareness 
(SIRA) in his analysis of Nigeria’s grounds for applying to review the 2002 ICJ verdict, he 
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suggests there are three broad categories in which such an application would be possible.338 
The first is if there are any grounds and evidence of fraud at the time of judgment. The 
second is that if there are new facts to the case not considered at trial. Lastly, is that a body of 
law, such as a legal statute, was overlooked in the judgment process.339  An example of the 
second category is the doubt (at least as Nigeria sees it) over the ratification of the 1913 
Treaty. Asiwaju makes particular reference to research suggesting that the German Diplomat 
charged with signing the 1913 Treaty had not done so, thus casting into doubt the strength of 
the ICJ’s judgment that relied heavily on various Treaties, which were supposedly ratified 
under international law.340 Essentially if Abuja can provide grounds that a material fact, such 
as the ratification of a Treaty (or the lack thereof) had not been properly scrutinized, one 
might well conclude that Nigeria has sufficient grounds for applying for as review of the 
2002 Judgment.  
Cameroon has responded to Nigeria’s ambition to have the judgment reviewed claiming that 
“Nigeria is…chasing shadows”.341From Cameroon’s perspective, the potential review of the 
Bakassi matter has other implications that reach far beyond the ICJ case. Currently, bilateral 
relations allow citizens of both countries to pass borders without visa’s, even though neither 
Cameroon nor Nigeria are under any legal requirement to do since Cameroon is not a 
member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).342 Based on 
Nigeria’s ambition to have the Bakassi matter reviewed, it is not clear whether the 
relationship between Abuja and Yaoundé will recover, with some likening the Bakassi to the 
on-going tensions over entitlement in the Falkland Islands and the South China Sea.343 What 
is clear however is that Cameroon views the attempt to have the ICJ’s initial ruling reviewed 
as an afterthought and essentially dubs it a money-making scheme. 344 
Once more, as was the case with the facts of the dispute presented to the ICJ and even the 
immediate climate after the ruling, the current state of affairs is sharply dichotomized by who 
the initial ruling favours. Nigeria, through the lack of a properly ratified Treaty which ceded 
the areas of dispute to Cameroon believe that they meet the second condition in that the lack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Adebayo, I., “Nigeria: FG Ignored Our Advice on Bakassi-Prof Asiwaju” Daily Trust, 7 October 2012, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/20120070310.html (date accessed: 2012-10-08)  
339 Loc.Cit.  
340 Loc.CIt. 
341 “Bakassi: Nigeria Chasing Shadows-Cameroonian Diplomats” Osun Defender, 08 October 2012, 
http://www.osundefender.org/?p=39934 (date accessed: 2012-10-08) 
342 Loc.Cit 
343 Loc.Cit 
344 Loc.Cit.  
93 
 
of signature presents a new fact, which might have been significantly overlooked. Cameroon 
on the other hand seems to reject the claim by reducing the appeal to a matter of Nigeria 
constantly questioning the validity of Cameroon’s entitlement to the Bakassi simply because 
Abuja is not happy with the outcome of the case once all the merits of International Law had 
been taken into account.  
 To date, Nigeria has indicated that it will not challenge the decision based on the fact that a 
negative result could be more harmful to Nigeria’s diplomatic image.345 A negative result is 
very likely since Nigeria would not be able to demonstrate sufficient cause for review before 
the review process becomes Statute-barred.346 As such Nigeria does not see it as beneficial to 
national interest to have the 2002 judgment reviewed. However, one needs question whether 
or not the damage has already been done.347 The review, or at least the potential thereof, has 
perhaps questioned the foundations of trust that has allowed the seamless passing through 
borders. When related to access to water, it is perhaps this seamless flow between borders 
that provides access to the waters of Lake Chad to Nigerian villages on the border. What the 
shaken trust potentially implies is that the seamless flow that ensured at least marginal access 
to the Lake Chad for Nigeria has been jeopardized. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
 In this chapter the case of conflict within the Chad River Basin over water resources was 
presented. The aim of this chapter was to determine which of the state-centered or human-
centered approaches explained the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon as a conflict over 
water the best. Taking into account the discussion above, the following conclusions can be 
made.  
 
It remains unclear exactly how water relates directly to the understanding of violent conflict. 
The case of the Bakassi seems to confirm a long-standing trend of water being a catalyst 
rather than an initiating cause of conflict between states. This case seemed to have oil rather 
than water as the focal point in terms of conflict. So as a state-centered resource war, water 
and water-related resources played a minor role in the onset of conflict. 
 
 From this the human-centered approach offers insight into questioning causal chains that 
lead to conflict, by demonstrating an indirect relationship between water and violent conflict. 
According to the human-centered approach the Nigeria-Cameroon conflict can be seen as one 
over water, since the livelihoods, which depend on the water, did in fact have a direct role in 
the onset of conflict. In the Bakassi Peninsula it was the “gunning” of Nigerian fisherman by 
Cameroonian soldiers in an apparent border violation and in the Lake Chad it was the 
occupation of Nigerian-governed villages in Cameroonian territory. The approaches therefore 
seem to dichotomise waters role as a conflict variable by direct and indirect causes of 
conflict. These causes are seemingly represented by state-centered and human-centered 
approaches respectively.  
On this basis it stands to reason that water, at best has an indirect role in the onset of conflict 
and the prospect of water wars seems to fit well with “water related wars” rather than “water 
wars” as such.    
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Chapter 4 
Conflict over Water in the Nile Basin: The Case of the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956  
4.1 Introduction  
 
Some innocents ’scape not the thunderbolt. 
Melt Egypt into Nile, and kindly creatures 
Turn all to serpents… 
 
 Cleopatra (Act: 2 Scene: 5) 
 Anthony and Cleopatra  
 
The flow of the Nile River has historically been linked to the survival and prosperity of the 
Egyptian people. In what can be termed an argument from historic access, the Egyptian 
Government believes the Nile to be pivotal in to its survival. At the most simple level, Cairo 
appeals to almost non-existent rainfall and very little, if any access, to other forms of water. 
However, given that Egypt is the most downstream riparian of the Nile, its access to water is 
underpinned by the needs and ambitions of other countries within the Nile Basin. 
In this chapter, the thesis explores how Egypt’s quest for water security within the Nile Basin 
explains the Suez Crisis of 1956. The chapter explores the extent to which access to water 
drove the decision to nationalize the Suez, which ultimately led to militarized conflict 
between Egypt, Britain, France and Israel. In so doing, the chapter seeks to clarify to what 
extent the Crisis formed part of broader political issues (such as the ideological contestation 
of the Cold War) or alternatively to what extent the Crisis represented access to water as a 
political end in its own right. In addition, the chapter seeks to determine in what way, if any, 
the increased need for access to water is underpinned by concerns within the context of 
human-centered security.      
The chapter begins by considering a background to the Nile River Basin, including 
background on its repatriation, uses and riparian population. The chapter then considers the 
Suez Crisis of 1956, providing background to what can be considered militarized conflict 
over water in the Nile basin. Following from this discussion, the chapter considers the extent 
to which both state-centered and human centered analysis (as presented in Chapter 2) 
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potentially explains the occurrence of the crisis. The chapter concludes by summarizing the 
findings of the chapter.  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 (Source: Block348) 
 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Block, P.J.,(et.al.) Integrated Management of the Blue Nile Basin in Ethiopia, International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, 2007, p.3 
Figure 17: The Nile River Basin 
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4.2 Background 
 
The Nile River is the longest River in the world, spanning a total of 6700 km.  In 
combination with its vast size, its resources are shared by ten countries, making it one of the 
world’s most precious resources.349 The countries that are riparian to the resources of the Nile 
River Basin are Burundi, Sudan350, South Sudan Rwanda, Zaire, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia 
and Egypt.351 Poverty and underdevelopment in the basin is rife, which when coupled with 
population growth adds to an already tense political climate regarding the use of the Nile’s 
waters.352 Climate change, as with the Chad River Basin, has also had a profound impact on 
structural supplies of the Nile. So, as with the Chad River Basin, the inversed relationship 
between supply decreasing and general demand increasing adds strain on intra-basin relations 
in that riparian countries monitor uses more closely. For example, Ethiopia has begun to 
question Egypt’s dominance in the use of the Nile’s resources and why, despite its significant 
contribution to the Nile’s flow, it receives a minuscule proportion of the resources.353 
Therefore, the Nile Basin’s political tension is partly fueled by disparate withdrawals 
amongst co-riparian countries. Of the now riparian countries, eight are classified amongst the 
least developed countries in the world-with Kenya and Egypt being the exception.354 In 
addition to the low levels of development, the Nile River Basin has also become increasingly 
vulnerable to the impact of climate change within the region. This impact is most notable 
within the context of food security since a large portion of the riparian population, owing to 
low levels of development, are dependent on agriculture for both sustenance and economic 
activity.355 This is dependence on agriculture is what partly fuels the debate on the 
distribution and allocation of water resources, as is seen in the case of Egypt and Ethiopia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 El-Fadel, M., (et.al.) “The Nile River Basin: A Case Study in Surface Water Conflict Resolution” in Journal 
of Natural Resources, Life Sciences and Education, Vol. 32, 2003, p.108 
350 In cases marked with an * I refer to Sudan prior to South Sudanese independence 
351 Swain, A., “Mission Not Yet Accomplished: Managing Water Resources in The Nile River Basin” in Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2008, p. 202 
352Roest.,K, Schoumans, O., and Siderius, C., (et.al.) “The Nile River Basin”, Chapter 10 in Mysiak, J., (ed) 
Adaptive Water Management pp. 158-159 
353 Fleishman, J., “The Nile, Egypt’s lifeline comes under threat” in Los Angeles Times, 11 November 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/202/nov/11/la-fg-egypt-troubles-nile-20121111 (date accessed: 2013-01-06 
354 Swain, A., Op.Cit. pp. 202 
355 Ibid. pp.202-203  For further reading see: Taye, M.T., Ntegeka, V., and Ogiramoi, N.P., “Assessment of 
Climate Change Impact on hydrological extremes in two source Regions of the Nile River Basin” in Hydrology 
and Earth System Sciences, Vol. 15, 2011, pp.209-222 
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From a historical perspective, the political tension over water can evidently be seen from a 
multitude of perspectives. The most important distinction when examining the potential for 
conflict over the Nile, with regard to the current and potential future utilization of its water 
supply is that of the relationship between upstream and downstream riparian countries. This 
distinction is the most analytically useful in that it highlights the various opportunities and 
threats for different countries, particularly since the access to water determines the nature of 
opportunities that riparian countries have.  
In recognition of the interdependent nature of water resource management between upstream 
and downstream riparian countries, various intergovernmental programs have emerged. The 
most notable of these is the Nile Basin Imitative (NBI), which is aimed at the “united 
common pursuit of sustainable development and management of [the] Nile waters” between 
countries of the Nile basin.356 In addition, non-governmental organizations and Academic 
Institutions, such as the Global Water Project (GWP) and the Climate Change Research 
Group at Addis Ababa University respectively, have added to the debate around management 
of the Nile basin’s resources by creating a forum for dialogue amongst specialists on the 
Nile.357 One of its main focuses is to provide experts from various fields with a means to 
contribute to the information and data concerning the Nile basin, such that policy decisions 
made by riparian countries are not based on outdated or incorrect information.358 While these 
programs are virtuous in principal one cannot comment on their efficacy without considering 
various important factors, such as repatriation of water resources as well as what those 
resources are used for.       
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Karyabwite, D.R., “Water Sharing in the Nile River Valley” Using GIS/Remote Sensing for the Sustainable 
Use of Natural Resources, UNEP/DEWA/GRID, Geneva, January 2000, pp. 38-40 
357 Stakeholders of the Nile River Basin, United Nations Environmental Programme, October 2010, 
https://www.unep.org/climatechange/adaptation/Portals/133/documents/NileRiverBasin/ClimateChangeAdaptat
ion_Stocktaking_Nile20%Basin.doc, p. 35 
358 Ibid. pp. 38-41 see also The Nile Basin Society (NBS) website http://nilebasin.com/index.html and The Nile 
Basin Dialogue website  http://nilebasin.com/index.html (date accessed: 2012/08/15) 
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4.2.1 Distribution of the Nile River Basin Water Courses amongst riparian countries 
 
The Nile flows from south to north and is fed by two main River systems, namely the White 
and Blue Nile.359The White Nile has its origins on the Equatorial Lake Plateau within the 
political borders of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire and Uganda, while the Blue 
Nile has its sources within the Ethiopian highlands. The sources for both feeding Rivers are 
located in humid regions with an average rainfall of 1000mm per year. The more arid regions 
start in Sudan, which experiences varying amounts of annual rainfall ranging from 1500mm 
to 20mm on average per year. In Egypt precipitation dwindles to less than 20mm per year.360 
Based on this, upstream versus downstream relations are underpinned by varying amounts of 
natural precipitation, which ultimately have an impact on withdrawal versus contribution 
disputes.  
Figure 18: Share of the Nile Basin amongst Riparian Countries 
Figure 18 Share of the Nile Basin Amongst Riparian Countries 
Country Area of Country 
within Basin 
(km2) 
Nile Basin within 
border  
(%) 
Share of Nile  
Basin Area 
(%) 
Burundi 13,260 47.6 (%) 
Rwanda 19,876 75.5 0.4 
Tanzania 84, 200 8.9 0.6 
Kenya 46, 229 8.0 2.7 
Zaire 22, 143 0.9 1.5 
Uganda 231, 336 98.1 0.7 
Ethiopia 365, 117 33.2 7.4 
Eritrea 24, 921 20.4 11.7 
Sudan 1 978 506 79.0 0.8 
Egypt 326, 751 32.6 63.6 
  (Source: Karyabwite, 2000361) 
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Frenken, K.,  and Faures, J.M. Irrigation Potential in Africa: A basin approach Food and Agricultural 
Organization, http://www.fao.org/docrep/W4347E/W4347e0k.htm (date accessed: 2012/08/11)  
360 Loc.Cit. 
361 Karyabwite, D.R., Op.Cit.  p. 10 
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4.2.2.1: Watercourses of the Nile Basin: An Overview 
	  
The Nile basin consists of a number of structural water bodies. The basin can be divided into 
six regions: the Lake Plateau, the Sudd, the White Nile, the Blue Nile, the Ethiopian Plateau, 
the Main Nile and the Nile Delta.362Each of these contributes, in varying amounts, to the total 
flow and the repatriation of the Nile Basin. 
Within the Lake Plateau, one finds the most upstream tributary of the Nile in the form of the 
River Kagera. As the main feeding basin of Lake Victoria, it is found in the territory of 
Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. A principal feature of this basin is a series of 
interconnected lakes and swamps, which ultimately result in a low discharge.363 This, to some 
extent, confirms the argument that structural water availability is higher within upstream 
countries. One could also suggest that the Lake Plateau, from the perspective of inter-basin 
management, is important since riparian countries within it have, on average, more than half 
their national territory forming part of the Nile basin. Therefore any action taken by these 
riparian countries individually that could influence the flow of water systems to downstream 
riparian countries such as Egypt, demonstrates the need for well-informed inter-basin 
management. 
The Lake Plateau itself consists of various water bodies. These are Lake Victoria, the Upper 
Victoria Nile, Lake Kyoga, the Lower Victoria Nile, Lake Albert, the Semliki River, Lake 
Edward and Lake George.364 On a small scale, the Lake Plateau demonstrates the 
interconnected nature of water resources and indicates the significance of a “domino effect” 
that a compromise in the flow of one of these water bodies might have on the network of 
water resources in the Nile Basin.365 For example, the Semliki River connects Lake Edward 
to Lake Albert. Lake Edward is in turn also connected to Lake George through the Kazinga 
channel and is believed to be Lake George’s only viable carrier of water.366 From this it 
would stand to reason that any change in the structural flow of the water bodies within the 
Lake Plateau might have a profound impact on the withdrawals of the populations that reside 
within the Plateau countries. One could extrapolate this even further by suggesting that a 
change in withdrawal patterns of upstream riparian countries could have a severe impact on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Ibid p.13 
363 Ibid. p. 14 
364 Loc.Cit 
365 Karyabwite, D.R., Ibid. pp. 14-15  
366 Karyabwite, D.R., Ibid.  p.13; see also Mamdough, S. Hydrology of the Nile Basin, Elsie River Science 
Publishers, Amsterdam, 1985, pp. 15-29, 317-349 
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the ability of downstream riparian countries, such as Egypt and Sudan, to maintain their 
withdrawal status quo. Evidence for this suggestion could be seen in the extensive 
consultation required for projects on the watercourses of the Nile Basin.367  
The Sudd and Central Sudan basin also has various water courses. They are the Upper White 
Nile (also known as the Bahr al Jebel), The Bahr al Zarhaf and The Bahr al Genzal. Similar 
to further upstream characteristics, the Upper White Nile or Bahr al Jebel has a broad and 
lethargic flow and has swaps as well as lagoons on its periphery. The flow between Nimule 
and Rejaf is believed to be 156 kilometers long and is particularly characterized by its flow 
through a rocky area-which creates fast moving rapids. Further downstream between Rejaf 
and Bor the flow tends to flatten, with channels across a swampy valley floor.  From this 
point, the movement to the north of the Bor valley becomes particularly swampy and is 
known as the Sudd. The region is noted by its relative absence of dry land. The Bahr al Jabel 
joins the Bahr al Genzal at Lake No. This stream turns east under the name of the White Nile. 
At this point the swamps also cease.368 On this basis it would seem that while structural 
capacity of water is evident, through the existence of swamps and lagoons, it is not 
particularly clear that the water is accessible or even suitable for consumption. In addition, it 
can suggest that the waters of the Bahr al Jebel are not particularly suitable for farming 
practices given the prevalence of swamps within the course of its flow.  
The Bahr al Zarhaf has a course of roughly 280km with its mouth at the While Nile, roughly 
80km from Lake No.369 Similar to the Bahr al Jebel, the Bahr al Zarhaf flows through 
swamps and forms lagoons in its winding course. These swampy conditions are found as far 
as 100km from its mouth at the White Nile. The banks of the River elevate as it flows 
northward until the Zarhaf is limited to a narrow channel.  
The Bahr al Ghazal flows from Meshra al Req to Lake No. Although its course does not 
exceed 160km, it is considered to be the largest sub-basin of all the Nile Basin’s tributaries. 
Along the south and the east of the River are large areas of swamp, which are fed by streams 
within the sub-basin. The upper courses of the stream are covered by a savannah like forest, 
with the ravines forming a tropical rainforest, like those found within the Lake Plateau 
region. On the lower courses of the Bahr Ghazal, large areas of swamp deplete the majority 
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369 Karyabwite, D.R., Op. Cit.  p.17 
102 
 
of the flow carried by the sub-basin tributaries. The Sudan-Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) political border also marks the division between the Congo and Nile basins.370 While 
most streams lose their definitive course along this demarcation the Jur preserves its course 
and joins the Bahr al Ghazal. The lower Ghazal has papyrus on its periphery, although it does 
not grow well and is of inferior quality to that on the Bahr al Jebel.  
The White Nile is the stretch of watercourse from Lake No to the merging point with the 
Blue Nile. Within the upper 120km from Lake No, to the mouth of the Sobat River, the 
course of the River is marked by swamps, Khors and Lagoons. However, from Malakal to an 
area just upstream of Khartoum the channel of the River is almost free of swamps. The 
drainage of the White Nile is also extensive covering areas such as the Lake Plateau in the 
south, the junction point with the Blue Nile in the north, the Abyssian Plateau in the east up 
until the Nile-Congo basin division in the southwest and the Nuba Mountains in the west.371  
The Ethiopian Plateau, like the Lake Plateau is made of various tributaries within the 
downstream segment of the Nile basin. The three most important of these are the Sobat, the 
Blue Nile and the Atbara.372 The flow during the high season is estimated to be forty times 
the flow the flow of the low season. This is indicative of the importance of the flooding or 
rainy season within the discharge of the Ethiopian Plateau watercourses.  
The Sobat River basin includes parts of the Abyssian Mountains and the Lake Plateau.373 It 
also consists of the plain to the east of Bahr al Jebel and Zarhaf. Given the Sobat River 
basin’s large area in combination with a high variation in topographic characteristics, rainfall 
varies as much as 1350mm between the most elevated parts of the basin and the River mouth. 
The River itself is formed through the junction of its main tributaries, the Baro and Pibor 
Rivers. From the junction point to the mouth of the River, the River course has been found to 
be intersected by swampy areas. These swamps are characteristic of temporary streams, 
which flow during and just after the rainy season.  
The Blue Nile and its tributary watercourses all originate within the Ethiopian Plateau at an 
elevation of 2, 000 to 3000 meters.374 The source of the Blue Nile is found at an elevation of 
2900m and is roughly 100km south of Lake Tana. The majority of the Ethiopian Plateau is 
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grassy, with valleys and areas of scattered trees. The deep ravines and canyons in which the 
watercourses flow also characterize the upper parts of the Plateau. In some places the 
watercourse is believed to flow about 1,200m below terra firma on either side. Rocky out-
crops are found within the Riverbed and are known as the Demzin Rapids. The River 
emerges from the Plateau within close proximity to the western border of Ethiopia. At this 
point it runs north-west at an altitude of 490m into Sudan. The River flows through a clayish 
plain before entering the joining point with the White Nile in Khartoum known as the Gezira 
Plain.       
The Atbara River is a seasonal River, which enters the Main Nile at roughly 320km 
downstream of the Gezira Plain. The River is 880km long and the majority of its catchment is 
located within Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Lake and Ethiopian Plateau. At its highest point 
the catchment reaches, 3,500m.375 The River relies on a number of tributaries, of which the 
Setit (Takazze) is one. Above its junction with the Setit, the Atbara receives its flow from a 
number of tributaries. The Bahr al Salam is considered to be the principal tributary. The large 
sediment load as a proportion of flow volume is a result of a big elevation between the head 
and junction of the Salam River.   
The Main Nile is found between the Gezira Plain and the Mediterranean Sea. The Main Nile, 
like other sub-basins has various watercourses and water structures. The Main Nile is most 
notable for its use of water for cultivated as well as water storage facilities. In the Nile Valley 
one finds the old Aswan Dam just below the Aswan Cataract, which was constructed in 1902. 
The Dam was heightened twice-in 1912 and 1934.376 The construction of the storage works, 
in combination with the construction of Lake Nasser, has changed the flow of the Nile from 
Aswan to the sea. The flow has become almost completely regulated from being a free-
flowing one. The Main Nile is agriculturally diverse, but water scarcity within some regions 
confines agricultural practice to parts of the Nile Valley and Nile Delta. Estimates suggest 
that 3 percent of the total surface area of Egypt is cultivated, while desserts occupy 23 and 74 
percent respectively.  
The Nile Basin can be divided into three general areas in terms of its flow. The first is the 
Plateau area, which consists of the majority of tributary sources for the Nile. The second is 
the joining or merging areas, such as those found in the Sudd and Central Chad Basin. Lastly, 
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is the Main Basin area marked by the development of storage bodies and cultivation areas 
suitable for farming.  The division of the Nile Bain into these areas coincides with the flow of 
the Nile Basin from upstream to downstream respectively 
The watercourses of the Nile Basin accentuate an important part of geopolitics within the 
basin. In terms of its climate, upper parts of the Nile Basin receive very erratic. As a result, 
South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt rely heavily on the flow of the Nile for water supply. What 
the large variety of watercourses suggests is that the large number of riparian countries in the 
Nile basin is not the only relevant factor to take into account in the hydropolitics debate. 
When taking into consideration that the water supply of Egypt, South Sudan and Sudan 
originate from outside their national borders, it is clear why Egypt and Sudan* have 
historically exerted a lot of pressure on upstream riparian countries not to pursue water 
related projects.377 In a lot of the literature, presumably for the sake of brevity, reduce the 
Nile to having tributaries. El-Fadel (et.al.) for example only, cites the Nile as having the 
White Nile, Blue Nile and Atbara rivers as tributaries.378 By narrowing the analysis of the 
Nile Basin to these three rivers only one inevitably contaminates the analysis of geopolitics 
within the basin. For example, the White Nile is dependent almost exclusively on the Sudd 
and Central Chad Basin for its flow. The Bahr Gazal for example flows to Lake No, which in 
turn feeds the White Nile and yet receives very little attention in the explication of the Nile 
Basin’s watercourses.379 Therefore, it appears as if analysis of the Nile Basin treats 
watercourses of the basin as reductive to these three rivers, when it in fact is on. Through the 
overview above, the reader is invited to take note of the fact that hydropolitics of the Nile 
Basin is more complex than just the analysis of the three rivers listed by El-Fadel (et. al.)     
In addition, the varying availability of arable land could also have an impact on migration of 
communities dependent on farming, and ultimately the waters of the Nile Basin. These 
migrations could specifically mimic the conditions seen in the dispute between Nigeria and 
Cameroon in the Lake Chad region. Therefore, understanding the interconnectedness of 
watercourses in the Nile Basin does have an impact on the understanding of structural 
availability, that is which watercourses can be used for the activities that sustain life.   
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Figure 19: Overview of the Nile Basin's Watercourses 
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4.2.2 Uses of the Nile Basin amongst riparian countries 
 
The uses of water in the Nile basin can be categorized into three parts: Agriculture, Industrial 
and Domestic or Municipal use. The most dominant of these in the Nile basin is 
Agriculture.380 Given low levels of infrastructural development in the riparian countries of 
the Nile basin, in combination with dire socio-economic conditions of its population, 
agriculture forms an important part of sustenance. Furthermore, as with the Chad basin is the 
only opportunity that many have to participate in the economy.381 Industrial use for water 
remains limited again as a result of underdeveloped infrastructure to utilize water for 
industry. Ethiopia has, for example, been identified to have enormous hydroelectric potential, 
but Egypt’s over-exploitation of watercourses within the Nile basin and a lack of financial 
backing of has meant that this potential has remained largely untapped.382 Domestic uses of 
water in the Nile basin are fairly insignificant when compared to the quantities used on 
agriculture and irrigation. However, domestic uses as the table below suggests are larger than 
uses for industry. This is mainly because domestic uses of water refer to household activities 
such as cooking and cleaning and do not take into consideration the uses of sustenance 
activities. The latter are included in agricultural uses given the large dependence on 
agriculture for sustenance of human life within the basin. 
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(Source: FAO) 383 
*indicates data for what is now known as South Sudan as well 
 
4.2.5.1 Agricultural and Domestic Use 
 
The agriculture sector in the Nile basin is arguably the most important to any of the riparian 
countries. This is because agricultural use also includes those crops that are used for export, 
despite sustenance farming being more prevalent. In addition to the demand placed on 
agriculture from human and commercial demand, post-harvest losses add to the complexity 
of balancing supply with demand.384 The majority of questions concerning the adequacy of 
water supply to meet demand stem from the burgeoning population that resides within the 
basin, which is speculated to have almost doubled between 1989 and 2010.385 Production in 
the Nile basin is believed to have met up to 75 per cent of demand through local production 
with the shortfall being made up by imports. The FAO reported that one can dichotomise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Riparian Counties AquaStat Profile- see: Food and Agriculture Organization 
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384 Appelgren, B., Alam, U and Klohn, W., Water and Agriculture in the Nile Basin, Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, Rome, 2000, p.11 
385 Loc.Cit.  
Figure 20: Water Uses by Riparian Country in the Basin (2011) 
Country Water Use (km3/year) 
Total Industrial Domestic Agricultural 
Burundi 0.288 0.015 0.0431 0.222 
DRC 0.6222 0.1468 0.4649 0.11 
Egypt 68.3 4 5.3 59 
Eritrea 0.582 0.001 0.031 0.55 
Ethiopia 5.558 0.0511 0.81 5.204 
Kenya 2.735 0.1 0.47 2.165 
Rwanda 0.15 0.102 0.0614 0.102 
Sudan* 37.14 0.3001 1.143 36.07 
Tanzania 5.184 0.025 0.527 4.632 
Uganda 0.3174 0.442 0.1149 0.12 
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agricultural activities among commercial-for-export versus subsistence-for-local crop 
productions.386  Based on this one can deduce that an important element of meeting demand 
related to local populations, within riparian countries, is the ability to use water resources for 
farming. The problem is exacerbated even further for downstream countries considering that 
the stability of water supply becomes increasingly dependent on the flow of the Nile as one 
moves further downstream. This could explain Egypt’s resistance to Ethiopia’s aspirations 
for water-related development.387 There are three main streams of agricultural activity in the 
Nile Basin: (1) crop farming; (2) fishing, and (3) livestock or herding. In recent years this 
diversification in farming practice has come to represent the phenomenon known as adaption 
methods in agriculture, specifically in response to climate change.388 
The crops that are harvested tend to vary depending on the region of the Nile in question. 
Primary staple crops in the Eastern and Lower Nile sub-basins are wheat, millet and 
sorghum. In the Southern Nile, crops trend to vary from roots and tubers as primary staples. 
Maize is also consumed extensively within some regions of the Southern Nile sub-basin.389 
However, the question of which crop is produced within sub-basins is largely dependent on 
the availability of arable land and water supply to meet the demand of planting and 
harvesting any given crop. As was suggested already, such availability is largely dependent 
on the ability of riparian countries within sub-basins to effectively utilize the land and water 
supply within their borders.  
Fisheries also contribute to the use of water from an agricultural perspective the Nile basin. 
The resources and production potential are believed to be proportional to the surface areas of 
open watercourses of the Nile basin.390 The most significant contribution towards agricultural 
production from fisheries stems from the Lower Nile sub-basin, but the overall contribution 
is relatively insignificant.391 However, this does not mean that fishing does not have potential 
within the context of alleviating food insecurity as well as economic security since it provides 
both a form of sustenance and a form of income, as is the case with the Chad basin.392 
However, the viability of developing this potential further is impeded by poor reporting 
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practices where in some cases fish yields are counted twice and exploitation remains rife.393  
This ultimately means that statistical data concerning the fishing industry within the basin 
does not make development of the industry desirable. Based on this, the fishing industry 
within the Nile basin seems to be largely underutilized and underdeveloped.  
As a result, the use of fish for export is also problematic considering the various levels of 
quality required by the importing country. Taking into account the general underdevelopment 
of the Nile basin it stands to reason that the countries of the Nile basin, particularly within the 
Sudd basin as a result of sewage discharge, would find it challenging to meet the standards 
for certain markets as there is a possibility of contaminating the fish in those waters as 
well.394  This could for example be true of exports to the European Union (EU), where the 
standards for import of animal product are stringent. The concern raised from a food safety 
perspective is that the handling of fish after it is caught is problematic for developing 
nations.395 Essentially the concern hinge on the ability of developing nations within the Nile 
basin to adequately pursue quality control, such that fishing imports by developed nations 
(particularly within the EU) do not contaminate local food sources. The EU has banned 
fishing imports on three occasions during 1997 and 1999, citing the lack of quality control 
and poor hygiene standards amongst others. While the EU remains a preferred trade partner 
regarding Kenyan fishing exports. The ban however forced Nairobi’s hand in exploring 
alternative markets, particularly within the Middle East. The most notable of these alternative 
markets is Israel.396 Ultimately, the lack of development as well as the peripheral place of 
fishing within the agricultural sector deems it to be less desirable than harvesting of crops, 
both as a form of potential income and food security.  
Livestock, like fishing and crop farming, can also be divided by the intended use for export 
or sustenance.397 The uses of livestock as with other resources dependent on the secure access 
to water are dichotomized my upstream and downstream riparian countries. In the Upper Nile 
basins, cattle are used as a source of income and food security-similar to the way in which 
access to agriculture stratifies wealth within the Lake Chad region. The Lower Nile tends to 
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herd cattle for the purpose of meat production.398 The most effective way to herd cattle within 
the Nile basin is through transhumance farming, which effectively requires herders to move 
with their livestock in order to find suitable grazing land.399 However this is problematic 
firstly because it is foreseeable that nomadic settlers could be involved with disputes with 
local herders, similar to the use of fishing resources within the Lake Chad region. In addition, 
climate change and potential overgrazing could heavily impact on the ability of herders to 
find suitable grazing land.400 Ultimately, as with the case of fish the potential for 
contamination of local food sources to importing countries raises concerns regarding the 
viability of livestock as a source of income from exporting markets. The FAO has 
specifically stated that various issues concerning food safety and cattle products, such as 
meat, would need to be addressed for it to become a viable form of agricultural production 
for the export market.401 So based on this, one could argue that livestock is used 
predominantly as a form of food security and wealth stratification within the Nile basin.402  
In terms of domestic uses for water, very little data exists to accurately determine in what 
ways local population tend to use water within a domestic setting. The majority of the 
literature focuses on the appropriation of water within agriculture as well as that of industrial 
use-which is in turn focused very much on hydroelectricity. However, given its fairly 
insignificant proportion within the context of inter-basin relations, it is the assumption of this 
chapter that domestic uses included water for cooking, cleaning and personal hygiene. This 
assumption is made given that riparian countries have not expressed concern for the adequate 
supply of domestic water. The former can be defended by appealing to the increased drive for 
irrigation by Ethiopia, something it would not be able to do under the Ethiopian Civil Code of 
1960.403 In this way Ethiopia would not be able to develop irrigation schemes if domestic 
supply was inadequate.  
4.2.5.2Industrial Uses 
Industry consumes a fairly insignificant proportion of the Nile basin’s water supply. Some 
argue that this is because the economies of the Nile’s riparian countries are prohibited from 
developing the industrial potential of water. The underdevelopment of water’s industrial 
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power can be attributed to at least three issues. The first is that the economies of the basin 
with the potential to do so are underdeveloped and are often plagued by various other 
political issues-such drought and even civil war in the case of Sudan* and Ethiopia404The 
second is that Egypt’s dominance of the Nile basin means that any form of unilateral 
development, particularly on the part of Ethiopia for example is met with hostility.405 Third 
and related to the second is that the development of industrial water capability has an impact 
on the status quo of the Nile basin’s distribution, which given that upstream riparian 
countries are the most capable in terms of availability, could have severe consequences for 
the desired use of downstream riparian countries-most notably Sudan* and Egypt.406  
Hydroelectricity as a form of industrial related water use remains fairly marginal on the 
development agendas of upstream riparian countries. Ethiopia has, for example, indicated a 
need to develop irrigation and the agricultural sector to feed its people and overcome what 
can only be described as a severe famine.407 The seriousness of the “current regime” within 
Ethiopia concerning achieving self-sufficiency is driven by a need for irrigation and 
agricultural practice rather than it is about harnessing the energy potential of water within its 
borders. Ethiopia is not alone in the view that agriculture and irrigation ought to outweigh the 
ambitions of hydroelectric development. Rwanda for example also seeks to develop irrigation 
and agriculture before embarking on hydroelectric schemes. They ultimately see development 
of hydroelectricity as peripheral to the use of water in other sectors.408 The evidence therefore 
supports the notion of water being used primarily for sustenance and food security, which 
ultimately affords local populations participation within their respective economies. However 
based on their analysis, Arsano, Baligira and Swain would suggest that the potential for 
developing water-based energy sources remains large, effectively deeming the hydroelectric 
potential of upper stream riparian countries to be severely under-utilized.409 
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Figure	  21:	  Hydroelectricity:	  Potential	  v.	  Use	  in	  the	  Nile	  Basin	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Source: Swain, 2011410) 
 
Uganda, unlike its fellow upstream partners has focused a lot of its focus on the development 
of hydroelectricity as an integral part of social development.411 Uganda as with other upper 
stream countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda have developed only a very small amount of a 
large potential. This effectively means that Uganda is in the position, at least in terms of 
capacity, to continue its development strategy. It is particularly able to harness the potential 
surplus from its hydroelectric generation to service the needs of other African countries, 
including South Africa.412 Uganda is in a position of comparative advantage with regard to its 
hydropower energy with the potential to harness the power of nine different water courses. Of 
these at least five are in service, under construction or planned for construction.413 As a result 
of this ambition, Uganda has remained fairly critical of the bilateral agreements of 1929 and 
1959 as well as Nasser’s decision to construct the Aswan High Dam, thus regulating and 
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Figure 21 Hydroelectricity: Potential v Use in the Nile Basin 
Country Hydropower Potential (MW) Hydropower Installed (MW 
Burundi 1, 366 36 
DRC 530 000 2829 
Egypt 3210 2825 
Eritrea - - 
Ethiopia 162 000 378 
Kenya 30 000 611 
Rwanda 3000 59 
Sudan 1 900 225 
Tanzania 20 000 339 
Uganda 10 200 155 
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fully utilizing the annual flow of the Nile.414 Post-colonial Uganda’s has gone further and 
called Egypt’s over exploitation of the Nile’s watercourses “egoistic”. The Minister of Water 
Resources even further claimed that Egypt had only been concerned for its own fate and not 
that of other basin countries.415 In this way one can see that Uganda is dependent on the 
movement of the status quo regarding extraction of the Nile’s water resources. Like Ethiopia, 
it needs to question and ultimately persuade Egypt to fundamentally alter its repatriation 
patterns, which given past evidence remains unlikely.   
Swain interestingly notes that Egypt does not object to hydroelectric projects in upstream 
countries. This is because these projects do not necessarily impact on the flow of the Nile, but 
they do help remove sediments reaching Lake Nasser.416 This could explain the hesitant 
nature of Egypt toward Ethiopia’s claim (and need) for a larger share of the Nile basin’s 
resources. The argument could be made that Egypt’s success has come at the expense of 
others through the construction of various water storage facilities, such as Lake Nasser and 
the Aswan dams, which has essentially sought to regulate control of the firmly within Cairo’s 
grasp.417 
From a water wars perspective, especially between states, hydroelectricity seems to be of 
particular importance. The reason for this is two-fold: (1) is that the development of 
hydroelectricity as a form of energy is mainly to sustain increasing population growth, which 
has led to Ethiopia’s increased efforts to secure a larger stake in the Nile’s water allocation; 
and (2)  that Egypt in wanting to maintain the status quo of water allocation, which it deems 
essential to national security, has excreted political pressure and historical influence to 
discourage any major construction on within the Nile Basin.418 
4.2.6 Population and Socioeconomic Data     
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The population that resides within the Nile basin, as with the Chad basin, is diverse. Almost 
40 per cent of Africa’s population will reside within the Nile Basin. Some scholars project 
the population that resides within the basin to reach 600 million by the year 2025.419  
The relationship between urban and rural population suggests that the majority of the 
population reside within rural locations. However, some scholars argue that this is changing 
and the Nile basin is witnessing a relatively quick rate of urbanization. For example in 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda the urban population is projected to increase 
substantially as a proportion of the total population. As figure 22 demonstrates, the 
population of Nile Basin countries is expected to rise on average by almost ten per cent in the 
next ten years, from what it is now, see Figure 23.420 This is problematic because the 
populations in urban areas tend to consume more water both domestically and industrially 
than those from rural areas.421 This, in addition to increases in the population, will add even 
more pressure on distributional scarcity. Furthermore, since many urban centres within the 
basin lack proper treatment systems, the increase in urbanisation poses particular risks for 
health and even food security.422 
Figure 22: Urbanisation Trend in Africa (1985-2025) 
	   	   	    
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: World Urbanisation Prospects, 2011423) 
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Figure 23:Rural versus Urban Population in the Nile Basin 
 People Pop. living in rural 
areas 
Pop.  living in urban 
areas 
Burundi 8,749, 387  89 11 
DRC 69, 575, 394 66 34 
Egypt 83, 958, 369 57 43 
Eritrea  5, 580, 862  79 31 
Ethiopia 86, 538, 534 83 17 
Kenya 42, 749, 418 76 24 
Rwanda 11, 271, 786 81 19 
South Sudan 9, 614, 498 82 18 
Sudan 36, 107, 585 67 33 
Tanzania 47, 656, 367 73 27 
Uganda 35, 620, 977 84 16 
(Source: State of the Nile Basin, 2012424) 
Figure 24, below shows the withdrawal per capita of each riparian country. It also shows the 
per capita Total Renewable Water Resources (TRWR) per capita for each country. From the 
data one can see that the upstream riparian countries tend to withdraw far less per capita than 
is available. The country with the smallest disparity between what it contributes and what it 
draws Sudan*, which withdraws under a third of its total TWTR per capita.  
While Ethiopia, when compared to other upstream countries, does not seem to be an outlier 
as far as the disparity between its withdrawal and its TWTR per capita its case for more 
equitable distribution of the Nile’s resources becomes more evident. In so doing, it provides 
the objections to Egypt’s over-exploitation of the Nile substantial merit. Ethiopia, according 
to FAO, withdraws only 80.5 cubic-metres of water while it has 1471 cubic-metres within its 
borders. Of course the argument could be made that it necessarily needs to withdraw 
significantly less to allow downstream to repatriate their share, especially because as part of 
the fact that the Ethiopian Plateau contributes 85 per cent to the Nile’s flow. However, when 
one compares the figures for Egypt it becomes evident that Egypt is in fact withdrawing 
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disparately to its contribution.425 In fact Egypt is the only riparian country in which the 
withdrawal figure exceeds that of the TWTR per capita figure. As stated previously Egypt 
claims historical importance and a large population for its “excessive” withdrawal of the 
Nile’s resources. But the validity of this premise to its argument is mitigated because the 
Ethiopia’s population is in fact larger than that of Egypt’s, yet it withdraws significantly less. 
The extent to which this has an impact on conflict over water will be discussed in the analysis 
after the Suez Crisis for this chapter has been explicated.  
W 
Figure 24: Per Capita Withdrawal v Per Capita TRWR (2011)  
Country Per Capita Water Withdrawal 
(m3) 
Per Capita Total Renewable 
Water Resources (m3/year) 
Burundi 43.27 1496 
DRC 11.85 19 449 
Egypt 973.3 706.4 
Eritrea 121.3 1 199 
Ethiopia 80.5 1471 
Kenya 72.96 757.8 
Rwanda 17.25 894.2 
Sudan 1037 1481 
Tanzania 114.7 2147 
Uganda 12.31 1975 
Source: FAO426 
Water Poverty Nexus Explained? 
Thus far, the explication of the population within the Nile Basin has focused on explaining 
two features of water as they relate to the Basin’s demography. The first feature has been to 
examine the different sectors of use, to identify particular sectors of activity that could be 
potential hot-spots or pressure points for conflict. The second was to explain spatial features 
of water’s use, specifically as it relates to urban versus rural use. To this end, it appears that 
the majority of the water within the Basin is used by agriculture and the majority of its users 
are in fact located within rural parts of riparian countries. 
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This can be explained by the large proportion of the labour force employed within the 
agricultural sector. In their analysis, Swain and Krampe found that 60 percent of the 
population within the Nile Basin is reliant on the agricultural sector for income.427 
Furthermore others, such as Awulachew (et.al.) posit that there is a strong relationship 
between water, poverty and agriculture.428 Thought of differently, one would need to explain 
in what why poor people experience risk in their livelihoods resulting from a lack of water 
security and threats to agricultural production differently from the rest of the population. 
Awulachew (et.al) introduces the notion that in order to truly understand the relationship 
between poverty and water, one needs to separate the concepts of poverty and vulnerability, 
which is people’s ability to respond to risks that they are confronted with in pursuit of an 
acceptable living, from the actual loss in well-being that the risk causes. 429 They see poverty 
as a measurable concept that is determined by economic well-being, while vulnerability 
speaks more to the ability to recover from an ad hoc loss of well-being from a particular 
event.430 Therefore to argue that poor households within Basin are more vulnerable to water 
related risks, one would need to determine in what way people are unable to respond to risk 
in their lives and more importantly to identify what the risk itself might be.  In the case of the 
Nile Basin, with the understanding that a large proportion of the population is dependent on 
agriculture for this livelihood, both in terms of sustenance and income one could safely argue 
that the risk to these populations is a risk in the loss of agricultural production through water 
scarcity. The risk therefore is that if the population does not have access to agriculture as a 
form of sustenance and income, then both food and economic security are threatened. The 
ability of this sector of the however to respond to this threat differs fundamentally from those 
in more urban areas, since they are more easily able to enter into the formal labor market and 
obtain formal employment. Formal schooling is used to predict a person’s ability to learn-on-
the-job as well as to gauge cognitive ability for a particular vocation in the first place.431 In 
the Nile Basin specifically, people are unable to harness their potential cognitive ability 
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within a formal schooling environment because education within in the basin is 
comparatively low to that of the rest of the world.  
Figure 24:Education Index for the Nile Basin 
Country Education Index Rank Mean Years of 
Schooling 
Burundi 0.353 169 2.7 
DRC 0.356 168 3.5 
Egypt 0.560 128 6.4 
Eritrea 0.271 179 3.4 
Ethiopia 0.237 183 1.5 
Kenya 0.582 121 7.0 
Rwanda 0.407 157 3.3 
Sudan 0.247 181 3.1 
Tanzania 0.454 143 5.1 
Uganda 0.475 141 4.7 
 (Source: UNDP432)  Figure 
The riparian countries of the Nile basin score consistently within the low education range. 
The most substantial difference with regard to human development in terms of other indexes 
is that Egypt does not score the highest in this index. Kenya places at least seven places 
higher than Egypt. Kenya and Egypt have a “Mean Years of Schooling” figure between 6.4 
and 7.0, which represent index scores of 0.582 and 0.560 respectively. One needs to be 
careful of assuming that a higher index score and raking necessarily implies having more 
mean years of schooling, since although Tanzania is third in terms of years of schooling its 
index score is lower than that of Uganda, making it third on that basis.  
Chimhowu and Prowse point out that development and agriculture do in fact impact on one 
another, since roads and other forms of infrastructure are used to generate an income from 
farming activities. This is particularly important considering that access to non-farming 
activities, as a form of income generation is a likely, and very possibly the only viable, way 
of exiting poverty. This is a case made particularly within the context of Ethiopia.433 The 
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argument that can be made here is that the low levels of income suggest a lack of viable 
employment alternatives for the basin population, which in turn is correlated with insufficient 
education to make the majority of the population functional within the formal labour market. 
 
Figure 25: Socio-Economic Indicators for the Nile Basin 
	    
 Gross National 
Income 
(Per Capita, 2011 
PPP$) 
Living in Poverty 
(% Living on less than 
PPP $ 1.25 /day) 
Human 
Development Index 
(2011) 
Percentage of labour 
force economically 
active in agriculture. 
(FAO)*** 
Burundi 368 83.3 0.316 45 
DR Congo 280 59.2 0.286 22 
Egypt 5, 269 <2.0 0.644 8 
Eritrea 536 - 0.349 29 
Ethiopia 971 39.0 0.363 38 
Kenya 1, 492 19.7 0.509 32 
Rwanda 1, 364 76.8 0.429 41 
South Sudan - 51.0** - - 
Sudan 1, 894* - 0.408* 16.2* 
Tanzania 1, 328 67.9 0.466 38 
Uganda 1, 124 28.7 0.466 33 
(Source: State of the Nile Basin, 2012434) 
*Represents Data for Both Sudan and South Sudan 
** Represents available date for South Sudan 
*** Taken from FAO Country Profile and not State of the Nile Basin  
	   	  
From Figure 26, above one can see that there is a correlation between development and 
poverty, in that the riparian countries with lower HDI indicators also receive far less than 
more developed riparian countries in terms of GNI per capita. There is also a correlation 
between those that are economically active in the agricultural sector and GNI per capita 
income, in that a higher percentage of those economically active in agriculture also receive 
less in terms of GNI per capita. This is indicative of urbanisation, as a precursor to the formal 
labour market, leading to higher income. Therefore, if the GNI per capita is taken in 
conjunction with Figure 23, there is a clear correlation between urbanisation and higher 
income. 
If Awulachew is correct, the ability of the population within the Nile Basin to respond to 
changes in circumstance and eliminate threats to their survival, is very much dependent on 
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having the ability to adapt to these changes.435 If water security is threatened for those 
dependent agriculture for economic activity, then one might argue that to adapt or nullify the 
risk they ought to enter the formal labour market and urbanise. However, if education is an 
indication of the ability to enter the formal labour market, it is clear that more agriculturally 
dependent populations would not be able to do so. This is especially feasible when taking 
into account their poor education relative to that of the global population, and is based on the 
assumption that a formal education is more likely to teach people skills that are 
commensurate with higher income.436 	  
The socio-economic variable is important to understanding potential threats to water security, 
specifically from the perspective of distributional scarcity, since it could explain why rural, 
agrarian dependent, populations might be more likely to cross national borders in search of 
water and suitable arable land. The motivation, on the basis of the data above, would be that 
these populations are left with no alternative form of income generation as a result of poor 
education and an inability to enter the formal labour market.  
4.2.2 Inter-Basin Water Management in the Nile Basin  
	  
As with other Transboundary basins the need for cooperation is evident in the Nile Basin. 
This need is underpinned by the fact that upstream withdrawals will have an impact on the 
ability of downstream riparian countries or regions to withdraw an adequate supply to meet 
their needs. The argument could also be made that downstream withdrawals could impact on 
upstream withdrawals, particularly if the downstream withdrawals are considered to 
disproportionate or generally unfair when compared to the other riparian countries.437  
Cooperation amongst countries within the Nile Basin was weak, if not practically non-
existent until the 1960’s.438 The first body to be established was the Hydromet Survey 
Project. This was followed by a project called the Technical Cooperation Committee for the 
Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin 
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(TECCONILE). TECCONILE transitioned into the Nile Basin Imitative (NBI) in 1999.439 
The commitment of cooperation within the Nile Basin is an important element in the 
argument against the water wars hypothesis, since it confirms that cooperation projects do 
exist and to some extent confirms the notion that states are willing to cooperate rather than 
fight over water. However, if the Hydromet Survey, TECCONILE and the NBI are the chains 
that bind riparian countries within the basin, then the cooperation is only as strong as the 
weakest point of the cooperation mechanism. 
The Hydromet Survey at its very essence was data collection collaboration. Burundi, Egypt, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Ethiopia (with observer status) agreed to 
collectively study Lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert to conduct a Hydrometeorological 
survey of their catchments. A mechanism of cooperation was established through the 
Hydromet Survey by way of a technical committee, which was periodically supported by 
UNDP, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and UNEP.440 The Hydromet Survey 
was conducted as a longitudinal study, with the data collection lasting almost thirty years. It 
was completed in 1992, shortly before the Water Ministries of the former met to form 
TECCONILE. TECCONILE was specifically seen as a way to minimize the impact of power 
politics within the Nile Basin.441 It is evident on this basis that the Hydromet Survey laid the 
foundation from which future cooperational mechanisms could even begin to functional. 
Once information regarding catchment of feeding lakes had been obtained, discussions 
amongst the countries of Nile Basin concerning issues of repatriation (such as withdrawal 
versus contribution) could be meaningfully discussed and was in part recognition that the 
polarity of the Cold War also had an impact on the prospects for cooperation in the Nile 
Basin.442 In addition, one can also suggest that the Hydromet established a historical validity 
to the level of cooperation given its thirty year existence.  
TECCONILE can be seen as a “spill-over” of the Hydromet in that it is evident that 
TECCONILE extended its competencies. Its main objective as an organisation was to foster 
the development of the Nile Basin through the equitable use of water.443   TECCONILE has 
launched a number of activities with both short and long term objectives included. These 
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activities include a Water Resources Atlas of the Nile River Basin, the Nile River Basin 
Action Plan, the upgrading and reconditioning of its headquarters, training sessions on 
modeling programs used for statistical purposes and the Nile 2002 Conferences.444 
TECCONILE at its very essence was a lot more proactive both in encouraging dialogue as 
well as generating information to make dialogue more meaningful when it did occur. In terms 
of its long term ambitions, TECCONILE aimed to move basin countries away from 
assumption-led decision making to decisions based more on empirical data. More importantly 
however, is that TECCONILE encouraged collective decision making regarding the 
management of the Nile basin at an intergovernmental level.  
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was launched in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in February of 
1999.445 As TECCONILE was to the Hydromet Survey, the NBI is an extension of the 
competencies of TECCONILE’s functions and objectives. The NBI presents a regionally 
integrated approach to water course management within the Nile basin. Karyabwite claims 
that the NBI marks the first time in which a serious concern over the need for joint discourse 
over water management within the Nile basin, was explicitly articulated. However, it seems 
absurd to suggest that TECCONILE’s objectives would not have marked the 
acknowledgment of the need for a shared discourse over the Nile’s basins resources, even if it 
was implicit. Again, one could defend the notion of “spill-over” with regard to the 
competencies of inter-basin cooperation within the Nile basin. As it cannot be said that the 
Hydromet and TECCONILE’s objectives were replaced by that of the NBI one could argue 
that the NBI marks the growth of inter basin management from inception in the form of the 
Hydromet to TECCONILE and subsequently the NBI as it stands today. Therefore, rather 
arguing that TECCONILE replaced the Hydromet one could argue that the former provided 
the foundation for the latter. Again one could make a similar a case for the NBI in that rather 
than replacing TECCONILE, the NBI built on the foundation of both the Hydromet and 
TECCONILE. Ultimately, the movement towards the Nile basin management recognizes the 
notion that as the conditions concerning structural capacity of the Nile changes; the way in 
which it is managed changes also.446   
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The integrated approach towards basin management fits well with the general trend of other 
regional integration attempts within Africa.447 Twsfaye specifically uses the role SADC as 
regional success, and the motivation for its viability, in the negotiation between South Africa 
and Lesotho with regard to the Orange River.448 Based on this there is seemingly an increased 
appeal to the use of regional approaches to the problems of distribution and allocation of 
resources in the Nile Basin. 
 
 Bi-lateral Water Agreements in the Nile Basin 
Bilateral agreements regarding the Nile basin tend to have strong colonial undertones to 
them. The most prominent agreements regarding the Nile were ratified by African colonial 
powers, most notably Britain, and riparian countries of the Nile.449 The increased bi-lateral 
mediation of the use of the Nile basin is suggestive of its economic importance within the 
context of development, sustainability and growth of riparian countries along the Nile. It is 
believed that this is particularly true for Egypt and Sudan because of their dependence on 
water from outside their national borders.450 Allan also suggests that the majority of bilateral 
Nile agreements, particularly in the context of colonialism served the interests of the British 
since London controlled the majority of riparian countries (either directly or indirectly) other 
than Ethiopia, which was under the Italian protectorate. However, in terms of actual water 
management within the basin, Italy had marginal if any power at all.451  
The most important bilateral agreements concerning the Nile basin are the 1929 Nile Waters 
Agreement and its successor the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. The Nile Waters Agreement of 
1929 provided the impetus for British domination and is pre-occupation with the 
development of the Egyptian economy.452 The Agreement prohibited any development or 
action by upstream riparian countries under the British protectorate that hindered or impacted 
negatively on the Egyptians repatriation of the Nile’s resources.453 Between 1956 and 1958 
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Egypt and Sudan as principal riparian countries of the Nile basin, had come into “serious 
disagreement” with regard to the sharing of the Nile.454 These disagreements in essence 
concerned the construction of the Aswan (Egypt) and Roseires (Sudan) Dams.455 Once more, 
the conflict over water courses and their repatriation within the Nile basin rested on the 
diverging interests of upstream and downstream riparian countries-in this case Sudan and 
Egypt respectively. The end of this “disagreement” was marked by the military junta rising to 
power in Sudan in 1959 and the subsequent ratification of a new water treaty with Egypt by 
its “pro-Egyptian government.456 The agreement contained clauses concerning the allocation 
of water distribution amongst the two countries as well as solid regulations and compensation 
plans with regard to the Aswan High Dam and the Sudanese nationals displaced by the 
construction of Lake Nasser. In addition, Sudan was granted concession for the construction 
of the Roseires Dam. Egypt and Sudan also agreed to develop water resources lost through 
the Sudanese swamps. However, the most important development regarding management of 
water within the Nile basin is that Egypt and Sudan had agreed not to negotiate on water-
related issues with third parties unless they had bilaterally agreed on a common position.457 
The 1959 agreement remained in place for almost thirty years, until the fall of Sudanese 
President Numayri.458 
Egypt’s dominance of the Nile basin had also stirred-up dissatisfaction by Ethiopia, largely 
considered one of its most important riparian countries, given its contribution as a principal 
feeder of the Nile basin. Ethiopia’s population growth and subsequent increasing food 
demands placed pressure on its water supply, thus prompting is to seek a larger portion of the 
Nile basin’s repatriation.459 In the absence of any agreements prohibiting Addis Ababa from 
unilateral watercourse development, Ethiopia proceeded to divert Nile indicated in February 
of 2005 that it would be seeking to utilize the waters of the Nile more to avoid having to 
“beg” for food.460 In combination with increased need for food, Ethiopia’s emergence from a 
civil war and famine period saw considerable growth in economic promise and ultimately the 
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backing of western powers. This newly found legitimacy meant that Ethiopia was more easily 
able to negotiate terms of the Nile’s almost exclusive use by Egypt and Sudan. However, to 
date Ethiopia has not been able to harness its political stability in order to prepare more 
adequately and avoid severe distributional scarcity of water and food. This is specifically 
worrisome given that by 2025, as Swain suggests that Ethiopia could have as much people as 
Egypt if not more.461 
While bilateral cooperation is evident in the Nile basin, it is not clear to what extent these 
agreements serve the needs of post-colonial Africa. More importantly, in the absence of a 
large power to underwrite any responses to potential threats to water security it is even less 
clear how these agreements serve the needs of the Nile riparian countries within the context 
of independence. Put differently, it is not clear how the power-politics of the Nile Basin one 
observes today is not a function of colonial water agreements of the past.462 If one considers 
that independence essentially changed the legitimate actors within the context of water 
management in the Nile basin, then the intuitive appeal of larger multilateral management 
becomes more obvious.  
In essence, the cooperation between riparian countries determines to what extent structural 
scarcity is present in the Nile Basin. In section 1.6, structural scarcity refers to one state 
having a center of power with regard to the allocation of water rights as well as the 
distribution that follows from having the aforementioned power. In essence, Egypt has been 
responsible for structural scarcity of water witnessed by Ethiopia, for example. This is 
because Egypt has on numerous occasions rail-roared its co-riparian countries into 
maintaining access to, and the dominance of, the Nile. In addition, given that Agreements 
regarding the use of water favour historically, one can conclude that structural scarcity within 
the Nile Basin is institutionalized within bilateral cooperation. 
4.2.7 Conclusion to Background 
 
The Nile Basin demonstrates the complexity of water-related issues and the political tensions 
witnessed between Egypt and Ethiopia. This is because the watercourses, the people that use 
them and what they are used for cannot be seen in isolation from one another. The 
dependency of Egypt and Sudan, for example, on water supplies originating from outside 
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their borders can also not be separated from tensions witnessed between upstream and 
downstream riparian countries with regard to the development of the watercourses within 
their national borders. The general weakness of cooperation in the Nile Basin is indicative of 
the mistrust between riparian countries and is seemingly a function of structural scarcity. In 
addition, the population of the Nile Basin, through relatively low development and 
dependence on agriculture, demonstrates the importance of distributional scarcity to 
understanding hydropolitics in the Nile Basin. 
 
4.3 Conflict over Water in the Nile Basin: The Suez Crisis of 1956 
 
There is not one particular conflict within the Nile basin per se that has been fought over 
water. However, the repatriation of the Nile along with the relationship between inter-basin 
countries has had a fundamental impact on the onset of water induced conflict elsewhere, 
particularly in the Middle East. Taking into account Egypt’s dominance within the Nile basin 
and the substantial influence Cairo has in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 could be defended as an 
example of a Water War, and it generated one of the clearest historical cases of a 
Hydropolitical crisis seen to date.463 This argument hinges on four principles: (1) is that the 
decision by Nasser to nationalize the Suez was a direct result of the refusal of the Eisenhower 
administration to fund the construction of the Aswan Dam; (2) that the Suez as an 
international water course was of fundamental strategic and economic interest to both Britain 
and France; (3) that the Aswan Dam as well as the Suez formed an important part of high 
politics both within the Nile basin, and by extension the Middle East, particularly for Egypt 
464, and (4) that Egypt’s dominance over the Nile had become both increasingly questioned 
and ultimately threatened by upstream countries, such as Sudan*.465 
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“The Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian joint-stock company) 
is hereby nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are transferred to the 
Nation and all the organizations and committees that now operate its management are 
hereby dissolved” 466        
Article I of the Egyptian Decree 
 
On the 26th of July 1956, Nasser nationalized the waters of the Suez Canal. His intention was 
to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam, since assistance from neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union had been forthcoming.467 Nasser believed that tolls generated 
from the use of the Suez would be in region of $100 million dollars per year, in contrast to 
the $ 3 million the Egyptian government had been receiving prior to the nationalisation.468  
While the Crisis is often used as an example of the contention for spheres of influence within 
the context of the Cold War, it provides valuable insight into the nature of water as a direct 
cause of militarized conflict.469 Some argue that the nationalization of the Suez Canal was a 
response from the Egyptian Government to the sale of arms meant for NATO to the Israeli 
Government by the French.470 Therefore the nationalization of the Suez was more a function 
of Arab-nationalism than it was of hydro politics.471 On this view, the Suez as a water course 
is seen as more peripheral to the containment of Western influence, by way of Israel, within 
the Arab world. An analysis like this however, seems to reject that the Suez Canal was 
perceived to have enormous strategic importance. One could equally argue that the sale of the 
arms to Israel was equally peripheral given that the revenue generated from the Suez Canal 
through toll collection was intended for water related infrastructure and had very little if 
anything to do with a militarization of the Middle-East. This is particularly true, taking into 
account Egypt’s concern over the use of the Nile following Sudan’s intentions for   
hydroelectric development in 1954 and subsequent independence in 1956.472  
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4.3.1Mediation Efforts 
 
In response to the nationalization of the Suez, both the British and the French implicitly, if 
not explicitly, indicated that regaining control of the canal would be subject to military 
intervention of some sort. The two countries had decided that they would “persuade or force 
Egypt to accept their minimum demands”473 The motive behind the militarized action was the 
substantial economic loss that would be suffered as a result of oil shortages, amongst other 
things.474 The British therefore drew direct correlations between economic performance and 
national interest and the reclamation of the Suez waterway.475 In a telegraph to President 
Eisenhower, Prime Minister Elm had said that the British would “use force to bring Nasser to 
his senses”.476 In response to this President Eisenhower attempted to establish an 
International Board that would govern the use of the Canal and essentially mediate the 
situation such that an amicable solution could be reached. The U.S., France, and Britain 
conferred in London between 1st and 3rd of August 1956 and decided to call a conference on 
the Suez.477 On the 9th of August the efforts of the Eisenhower administration was dealt its 
first blow when Nasser formed the “Home National Army of Liberation” and was dealt its 
second and more substantial blow when Nasser announced he would not attend the 
Conference on the 12th of August 1956. In addition, it can be argued that Nasser even further 
antagonized the situation by declaring the starting day of the conference a national day of 
mourning-which to some extent signalled a failure for Eisenhower to contain the Crisis.478  
  The countries that met in London on the 16th of August 1956 included the original 
signatories to the Constantinople Convention, along with other maritime powers and frequent 
users of the Canal. The Constantinople Convention, under Article 1, sought to maintain 
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access to the canal even during times of war.479  18 of the 24 countries that met approved the 
proposal and on the 3rd September presented this proposal to Nasser, which he rejected six 
days later.480 In response to this rejection, the countries that had met only 4 weeks earlier 
reconvened and suggested the creation of a Suez Canal User’s Association on the 19th of 
September.481 At roughly the same time, given the canal’s economic importance, Britain and 
France, on the 23rd of September 1956, referred the matter to the United Nations Security 
Council since Eisenhower had been reluctant to do so.482 The Secretary General at the time, 
Dag Hammarksjold, suggested that the establishment for such an Association would need to 
be guided by fundamental principles, which included:  
 
(1)   There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, 
overt or covert- this covers technical aspects;  
(2) The Sovereignty of Egypt be respected;  
(3) The operations of the Canal [ought] to be insulated from the politics of any 
country;  
(4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between 
Egypt and other users;  
(5) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to the development, and  
(6) In cases of dispute unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the 
Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of 
reference and suitable provisions for the payments found to be due.483  
 
Nasser contended that the proposals presented to that point, particularly the one originating 
from the First London Conference, had not met these requirements.484 Presumably Nasser 
would have contended that the second principle was violated in that the potential agreements, 
as well as management of the Canal stemming from them, would leave Egypt with very little 
control over a watercourse, which strictly speaking fell within its national territory.  This 
ultimately resulted in a stalemate concerning the resolution of the Crisis.  
4.3.2 From Mediation to Conflict 
	  
In response to this resolution, in combination with Eisenhower’s reluctance to explicitly 
intervene in the situation, both Britain and France had ceased communication with the U.S. 
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regarding the seemingly imminent military solution to the crisis.485 On the 29th of October 
1956, in what is known as operation Kadesh, Israel attacked Egypt killing or capturing in the 
region of 30 000 Egyptians by November 3rd of that year.486 It is believed that since Nasser 
had already withdrawn a large number of troops to protect the newly nationalised Suez from 
invasion as well as to regulate the access to it, the protection normally afforded in the Sanai 
dessert became a weak-link the Egyptian    
In an attempt to invoke the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, Britain and France signal the 
intention for the occupation of Anglo-French forces within the Canal Zone, should the 
hostilities not have ceased. The ultimate goal of this ultimatum was to diffuse the situation 
and almost force the Egyptians and Israeli’s into a truce.487 Israel agreed to the ultimatum, 
while Egypt did not488. Thus on the 31st of October, Anglo-Saxon forces, motivated by 
Nasser’s refusal of their ultimatum, invaded the Canal area.489  
Given its historical context, the invasion of Egypt had not gone unnoticed by both the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower administration was enraged and the Soviet Union’s 
Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, suggested the two superpowers joined forces against the allied 
(read Western) European powers. Eisenhower declined the invitation saying that “Those boys 
[France and Britain] are just scared… [Which,] makes for the most dangerous possible state 
of mind”?490 Essentially this meant that Eisenhower saw no utility behind “fighting fire with 
fire” despite a clear indication of the Soviet Union’s willingness to do so.  
In spite of the Soviet Union’s ambitions, a cease-fire was negotiated on November 7th 1956 
after the UN intervened.491 However, the British refused to withdraw until such time that a 
UN Peacekeeping Force would fill the vacuum left by London’s departure. The Peacekeeping 
forces arrived on the 15th of November, slightly more than a week later. The arrival of UN 
forces was met with relief since the economic situation within Western Europe had 
deteriorated significantly.  Eisenhower in turn forced the hand on the British by refusing to 
deliver any form of assistance until such time the British forces withdrew. This ultimately 
happened on the 22nd of December 1956. Eisenhower had been less stern with Israel, whose 
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occupation of Gaza only ended on the 7th of March 1957.492  The Canal was reopened on the 
8th of April 1957, after the effects of Egypt’s onslaught in the Canal had been cleaned up.  
The Suez Canal crisis is a clear example of the potential for militarized conflict over the use 
of water resources. This is evident in that both France and Britain engaged in a militarised 
solution to the Suez Crisis, as it formed an important part of national security.493 In addition, 
from Egypt’s perspective, Nasser only nationalised the Suez for construction of the Aswan 
Dam, something which he deemed important to Egyptian national interest. His main 
objective was to ensure continued influence on Cairo’s access to water within the Nile Basin, 
as well as to avoid issues of distributional scarcity.494 Based on this one could very easily 
conclude that water wars are indeed very likely and that there is no need, as Homer-Dixon 
suggests, to defend the water wars hypothesis in the context of water related conflicts. 
However, this would be premature.  
In the analysis section that follows, the thesis considers the extent to which the Suez Crisis 
can be explained by the state-centred or human security approach. The analysis will pay 
particular attention to the political climate at the time of nationalization of the Canal as well 
as the factors that lead to the need for the Aswan High Dam to begin with. The analysis will 
therefore defend the Suez Canal Crisis as a water conflict related to the repatriation of the 
Nile basin.   
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4.3.4Abbreviated Chronology of Events 
21 November 
1955 
Egypt, U.S. and Britain meet in Washington to discuss the possibility of Aswan 
High Dam Financing 
19 July 1956 
Dulles withdraws Aswan Dam Financing Offer 
26 July 1956  Nasser Nationalises the Suez Canal to secure financing for the Aswan Dam, given the refusal of both the US and the Soviet Union 
1-3 August 1956  Britain, France and U.S. agree to call Conference regarding the Suez in an attempt to diffuse the situation 
12 August 1956  Nasser announces that he will not be attending Conference on the Suez. 
16 August 1956 Start of Conference and Nasser declares start of Conference a day of national mourning in Egypt 
3 September 
1956 
Australian Prime Minister Menzies presents the potential resolution to the 
Crisis to Nasser 
9 September 
1956 Nasser rejects proposal of London Conference started on 16 August 1956 
19-21 September 
1956 Second London Conference to adapt rejected proposal 
23 September 
1956 Britain and France refer the matter to the UNSC 
13 October 1956 Security Council and Egypt accept six Principles for the Agreement on the use of the Canal. 
22-24 October 
1956 
Britain, France and Israel meet secretly to form coalition as Moscow invades 
Budapest 
29 October 1956 Israeli forces attack Egypt in Sinai Dessert given the absence of Egyptian troops 
30 October 1956 Britain and France deliver ultimatum to Nasser and veto UNSC resolutions 
31 October 1956 Anglo-French forces attack Egyptian airfields 
4 November 
1956 Egypt accepts ceasefire 
7 November 
1956 Anglo-French alliance accepts cease-fire 
15 November 
1956 UN Peacekeeping forces arrive in Egypt 
7 December 
1956 British troops withdraw from Egypt 
7 March 1957 Israeli troops withdraw from Gaza 
8 April 1957 Suez Canal reopens 
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4.4 Analysis of the Suez Crisis as a form a Water Wars 
4.4.1The State-Centred Approach:  
 
To defend the Suez Crisis of 1956 as a water conflict within the Nile basin, this section will 
consist of two themes. The first will be to defend of the nationalization of the Suez as water 
related rather than purely politically motivated conflict. The second would be to demonstrate 
how the Suez Crisis helped Nasser to achieve broader political goals through the use of the 
Nile basin water courses. 
As stated earlier, many posit the Suez crisis to be a form of Arab-nationalism in that Nasser 
deliberately sought to place the Arab world in a position to severely influence, if not dictate, 
the geopolitics of the Middle East.495 Peter Woodward suggests that the Suez Crisis in 
particular demonstrated the compatibility between a Pan-Arab movement and the ideology of 
Egyptian Nationalism.496It is clear, based on the substantial writing on the subject already 
that Nasser aimed to place Egypt as an active player in three over-lapping circles of interest-
the Arab, Muslim and African worlds.497 It could be suggested that the decision in 1951 to 
blockade the Gulf of Aqaba was a direct movement on the part of Egypt to test the 
compatibility of the Pan-Arab movement with Egyptian Nationalism. Based on the UNSC’s 
instruction to Egypt in September 1951, one could argue that the blockade was directed 
towards Israel.498 Be that as it may, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
nationalization of the Suez under Nasser politically motivated within the context of the Pan-
Arab movement, at least not exclusively so.499 Therefore, it stands to reason that the 1951 
blockade (as an Egyptian political motivation) acted as a catalyst rather than a cause of the 
1956 Crisis. Many scholars and historians who write on the 1956 Crisis posit the refusal of 
the US to fund the Aswan High Dam project as a more direct cause of Nasser’s 
nationalization of the Suez and the subsequent war that ensued.500 Moreover, given that the 
Crisis occurred during a delicate time of the Cold War, there is more evidence to suggest that 
if any ideological motivation would be attached to the issue of financing the Aswan High 
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Dam it would be the contestation between the US and the Soviet Union under the anti- 
communist versus the communist movement.501 This is supported even further by between 
Washington and London, which expressed:  
We are afraid the Nasser, whether innocently or deliberately is dangerously 
committed to the Communists. Consequently we believe that it would be 
advantageous, in any event, to overthrow him if possible.502 
Harold Macmillan in a telegram to Washington on 28 November 1955 
 
The view taken here is that because the decision to nationalize the Suez was made 
fundamentally to secure a source of funding for the Aswan High Dam, it does not make sense 
to say that the decision was a function of anti-Israeli sentiments within the Arab world.  
On this basis one would need to ask what the significance of the Aswan High Dam was, still 
with regard to broader goals related to water within Egypt. The claim of historical advantage 
from Egypt is premised on the fact that Egypt receives very little rainfall and therefore relies 
heavily on the flow of the Nile to feed its crops and meet its water demands. Nasser thought 
of the Dam as critical for both the independence and survival of Egypt.503 Furthermore, 
Nasser believed that the Dam would provide a secure influx of water supply that could be 
harnessed for inter alia hydroelectric developments, which would in turn provide a platform 
for growth of the Egyptian economy.504The necessity of the Dam, at least in the mind of 
Nasser, could be encapsulated even further in the context of an independent Egypt, given the 
often uneasy nature of its relationship with Sudan to the south.505 As Nasser’s ambitions 
came well before the 1959 bilateral Agreement between Egypt and Sudan to not unilaterally 
obstruct the other’s share of the Nile basin’s supply, Nasser would not require Sudan’s 
approval, even if he wanted it. Therefore, failure to find support for the construction of the 
Dam would see the notion of turning Egypt into Africa’s proverbial bread basket severely 
compromised. This essentially meant that Egypt perceived its survival, not only as a 
formidable power both in Africa and the Arab, world but also as a self-sufficient state 
threatened.  
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If one extrapolates the fear on the part of Nasser to the basic assumptions of the Realist 
theory, the principle of survival elevates the construction of the Aswan High Dam as one of 
high politics. This then creates an infallible connection between the intended purpose of the 
Dam, which was to secure an uninterrupted water supply for Egypt, and broader political 
goals of the Egyptian State. Based on this, the Dam would provide valuable resource for 
Egypt, essential for its survival. What this means is that the Suez Crisis can be construed as 
violent conflict initiated over the access to and use of water.  
An objection that could be raised, however, is that the nationalization of the Suez had very 
little, if anything, to do with access to water itself as much as it did with access to the water 
way itself. McDermott and Bowie both explain that since the Suez was Britain and France to 
transport oil, the nationalization posed a threat the functioning of their economies. What this 
means is that rather than place value in water Britain and France placed value on the utility of 
the Canal as a transporting mechanism506. The route through the Suez Canal when 
transporting oil from OPEC countries within the Middle East is substantially more cost-
effective in transporting oil. The only other alternative for shipping oil from the Middle East 
to Western Europe is to navigate around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) and 
essentially sail around the African continent moving from the Indian to Atlantic Ocean. 
Therefore within the context of the Suez Crisis Britain, France and Israel used the waters of 
the Canal as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. That end has nothing to do with 
water, but rather concerns the ability to secure a cost effective way to transport raw materials 
to each of the former countries. One can further argue that the given the compromising 
position Britain and France were put under by the nationalization of a water way they 
perceived to be vital to both their national interest and survival, it would stand to reason to 
say that the use of force to protect that interest fits well with the most basic of goals for the 
state.  
The Suez Canal Crises of 1956 fits well within the broader framework of state-centered 
security. It is clear that both Egypt and Western powers in the form of France and Britain 
perceived the access or the lack thereof as vital to their broader political goals. However, one 
must be careful of claiming that the belligerents valued the access to the Canal in the same 
way. Indeed both sides, for and against nationalization, used the canal instrumentally to gain 
some other end. For Nasser it was funds to construct the Aswan Dam and for the western 
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European powers it was a cost effective way to transport raw materials needed for the 
survival of their economies.  However what separates the two is that Egypt’s end was in fact 
to secure more water, or at least a constant supply of water was directly linked to national 
security in an explicit way.507 Water was central to the political goal behind the 
nationalization of the Suez. The evidence seems to suggest that Britain, France and to some 
extent Israel were motivated by economic growth, or the threat of stagnation as the case, to 
avoid this was there political goal. Whether this qualifies as a Water Wars case is hard to say 
simply because there was not a single political goal for the belligerents. However, given that 
securing water was Nasser’s primary goal behind the Aswan High Dam, which in turn was an 
issue regarding the adequacy of water supply for Egypt, one needs to conclude that this case 
is the closest that state-centered security can explain the potential for conflict over water.  
4.4.2The Human Security Approach 
 
The main impetus behind the construction of the Aswan High Dam was the ability of Nasser 
to provide enough water to feed Lake Nasser. In addition the Aswan provided storage for 
excess water that could be released throughout the year. In so doing, the Aswan High Dam 
was Nasser’s way of ensuring all year round irrigation of crops such that the population 
remained fed and economic growth became stable. In this way, the desire to build the dam 
can very clearly be linked to food security as an element of the human-centered approach.  
The extent to which the human-centered approach can explain the Suez Crisis as one that is 
related to water rather than caused by water is not clear. One might on the basis of discussion 
on the state centered analysis above argue that Nasser’s goal to secure water storage through 
the Aswan High Dam was essentially motivated by food security. This would mean that 
Nasser’s goal was less about securing the survival and advancement of the Egyptian State 
and was more about maintaining the ability to feed its people. One might support this 
argument by claiming that Egypt’s historic acquired rights argument-which is premised on 
the notion that the Egyptian people have been using the Nile as a source of sustenance for 
centuries and should be allowed to continue to do so.508 Therefore Nasser was protecting a 
historic right, more than he was acting towards a broader inter-state political goal under the 
umbrella of Egyptian nationalism and the Pan-Arab movement. However, Egypt has defined 
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the access to water as matter of national security on various occasions. For example Boutros 
Ghali once said that “national security of Egypt is a question of water” and on another 
occasion former President Mubarak stated, “Egypt’s national security was closely related to 
water security”.509 For Nasser, it would seem that the access to water was characterized by 
this historic argument and was the ultimate motivation behind the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam. Therefore in asserting a historical right, it would seem that Nasser was acting in 
the interest of national security.  
Given the close ties between national security and survival for the belligerents of the Suez 
Crisis one cannot claim that the human-centered approach explains the conflict over the Suez 
Canal between Egypt, Britain, France and Israel. This is because the need to it secure was in 
fact a matter of state-centered policy, even though the interest the policy sought to protect 
was characterized differently.  
Cascão suggests that the status quo of repatriation remained largely unchecked until Sudan, 
amongst others achieved independence form the British and French.510 Based on this one can 
argue even the potential threats from other riparian countries was based more on their broader 
goals, such as the development of irrigation and hydroelectric schemes, than it was on the 
need for human security as such. Sudan’s disregard for the 1929 Water Agreement seems to 
be a particular function of the desire to change the status quo of the Niles’s water repatriation 
in the post-colonial era.511 
In summary, one cannot defend the Suez Crisis or any other conflict related to the Nile’s 
repatriation within the context of human-centered security since there are various overlapping 
issues concerning the repatriation of water, such as historic access used by both Egypt and 
Ethiopia. The majority of these concern harnessing the use of water to gain as well as 
maintain economic growth and sustainability of the individual riparian states. Disputes 
related to water are therefore best examined in the context of state-centered security.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 Ibid p. 248 
510 Loc.Cit. 
511 Swain, A., “Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute, p. 679 
138 
 
4.2.1 If not the Suez the Suez Crisis, can Egypt’s emphasis on water be explained through 
human centered security? 
 
The single largest threat that stems from water within the Nile Basin is the ability to sustain 
its agricultural production. The FAO suggests that water management including irrigation, 
drainage, water conservation and control is imperative to manage the sustainability of crop 
yields.512 This in turn has an impact on the ability to supply food to meet demand in already 
densely populated areas within the Nile Basin.  
One could argue that a primary motive behind the intended construction of the Aswan High 
Dam was intricately linked to managing water supply from the Nile such that crop yields 
remained constant and ultimately that the population within Egypt dependent on agriculture 
had “security” under the human condition. In this way there is a clear connection between 
water and human security concerns. This connection is that without the “guaranteed” flow of 
the Nile to Egypt, which is (practically) its only source of water, taking into account very 
sparse rainfall, Egypt as a formidable nation within the Arab world and the African continent 
would severely compromised  
The UN has also suggested that the conflict in Darfur has been partly driven by climate 
change and environmental degradation.513 The reduction in rainfall had a profound impact on 
the clashes between herders and farmers regarding the equitable use of pastoral land and 
declining access to water holes. Therefore, there is a strong correlation between the lack of 
water security and the escalation of conflict within one of the Nile Basin’s most important 
riparian countries.514 These clashes, according to the UN, underpinned the “genesis” of the 
internationalized conflict in Darfur.515 This demonstrates the vulnerability of the African 
continent, and in particular the Nile basin’s countries to changes in their water supply. 
Therefore there is a correlation between the in security between human insecurity and the 
Nile basin in a context larger than Egypt’s dominance of the Nile.  
The majority of these vulnerabilities that African countries are subject to, according to the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), concern access to water and related issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 Burke, J., Faures, J.M., and Turral H., Climate Change, Water and Food Security, Food and Agricultural 
Organisation, Rome, 2011, p. 5  
513 Brown, O., Hammill, A., and McLeman, “Climate Change as the ‘new’ security threat: implications for 
Africa”  in International Affairs, Vol. 83, Iss. 6, 2007, p. 1144 
514 Gehring, J., “Humanity’s diminishing water well: Everybody’s need-everybody’s right” in New Routes, Vol. 
3, 2011, p. 3 
515 Ibid. pp. 1144-1145 
139 
 
such as agriculture.516The issue of climate change in Africa is securitized through the threats 
that a posed to populations within Africa regarding the income and sustenance where water-
related activities form an important part of the ability provide income and sustenance. This is 
particularly because of concerns regarding the ability of the African population to adapt to 
the effects of climate change on agriculture.517 This in turn places their ability to sustain the 
human condition, specifically in terms of maintaining adequate levels of income and 
sustenance under threat. Based on this, one can draw clear connections between income, 
agriculture and water. 
 The question remains, to what extent can Nasser’s decision to build the Aswan High Dam be 
considered a function of, mitigating the influence of climate change on the ability of the 
Egyptian population to sustain and feed themselves? While the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam had clear importance to the development of a post-revolution economy under 
Nasser, its importance to agriculture and the continuous supply of water to Egypt is 
notable.518 The Dam was constructed with the specific intention to ensure all-year-round 
water supplies from the Nile as well as create the possibility of newly irrigated land within 
Egypt. Moreover, one is not inclined to think that Nasser developed the High Dam project at 
the expense of human-security. The relocation of Nubian tribes on two occasions upon the 
heightening of the Old Aswan Dam demonstrates the historic human-centered focus of water-
related development.519 In addition, the relocation in light of the Aswan High Dam’s 
construction witnessed villages of about 25, 000 homes in 33 villages, using the same village 
names as before demonstrates a particular attention to the identity of populations within the 
Nile Basin not being hampered by the development of the Dam.520 From this, one can see that 
the construction of the Aswan High Dam was not intended to place the state-centered 
interests of Egypt above those of communities that would be affected, rather it was to balance 
the various needs of populations (particularly within Sudan and Egypt) with the ambitions of 
Nationalist Egypt under Nasser.  
Through the construction of the High Dam, it is evident that the Egyptian Government (at 
least to some degree) sought to mitigate the impact that developments by up-stream riparian 
countries as well as to off-set the unreliable nature of “natural water supply” to Egypt-
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demonstrated through its low TRWR.521 The historic importance argument is premised on the 
notion that the flow of the Nile had always been central to the survival of the Egyptian 
people. To some extent this is indicated in the literature regarding the Aswan High Dam. 
Over and above the need to regulate the flow of the Nile on an all-year-round basis, there are 
indications that the Aswan High Dam would be sensitive to the needs of the Egyptian people 
at any given time. One specific purpose of the Dam was to ensure “regulation of the 
discharge downstream of the dam to match the actual water needs for different 
requirements”.522 Another example can be found in terms of altering crop yields in the Nile 
basin from “change in the system of basin irrigation (one crop per year), to perennial 
irrigation (two or more crops per year)”523 Based on the fact that wealth and access to the 
economy are both dependent on agriculture, it can argued that diversifying the crop yields as 
well as ensuring continuous flow ultimately provide local populations within the Nile basin 
(particularly in Egypt). It can further be argued that diversifying crops yield do not restrict 
the yields of farmers to seasonal income, but provide them with more of an opportunity to 
access income throughout the year. 
 
Based on the fact that the Aswan High Dam was envisaged by the need to ensure a 
continuous flow of water to Egypt, for both the development of the state economy and the 
sustenance needs of the population, one can at best explain the motivation for the Suez Crisis 
as related to Human-Centered Security. Firstly, the need for the dam was closely related to 
food security-which has been presented as a potential motivation behind human-centered 
conflict. In addition, a need to protect the continuous flow or supply of the Nile was a direct 
factor in the nationalization of the Suez in 1956. One could make this argument by citing that 
the decision to nationalize the Suez only came after the refusal of the US to fund the Aswan 
High Dam project. Therefore there are clear connections between the Suez Crisis and the 
Egyptian government wanting to maintain food security-seen through water’s importance to 
agriculture.  
Importantly, the link to the human-centered approach for the Suez conflict is largely based on 
the Aswan High Dam and its construction being closely related to water security, which in 
turn is related to food-security of the Egyptian population. Thus the human-centered 
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approach allows insight into indirect causes for water conflict, in that one can explain the 
motivation for the Aswan High Dam as closely related to Egypt’s food security. 
 
4.5 Current State of Affairs in the Nile Basin 
 
In terms of current affairs relations between Nile riparian countries are still sharply 
dichotomized by upstream versus downstream countries. In addition, Egypt’s securitization 
of the Nile has also endured into the modern day political rhetoric regarding its own use of 
the Nile and by extension that of others.  
The most crucial relationship is the one between Egypt and Sudan since collectively the two 
states account for 87 percent of the Nile’s water use.524  Some commentators, such as Dalia 
Moniem, point out several factors of common ground amongst Egypt and Sudan specifically 
in light of Hosni Mubarak’s departure from power in the early stages of 2011.525  The 
increased common ground amongst the two does reaffirm the general stability around issues 
concerning water and particularly allows one to conclude that the water agreements between 
the two are likely to solidify cooperation rather than fuel conflict. However, to some extent 
the expression of almost identical relationships between national security and water could 
prove to be problematic, specifically in terms of relationships with up-stream riparian 
countries.526 While upstream countries have recently played a more active role in water 
related projects these roles are still largely underpinned by the consent of Egypt and Sudan as 
dominant powers within the Nile Basin.527 Despite the dominance relative to their upstream 
partners, the emergence of South Sudan as an independent state is the most immediate 
concern for water distribution given that the Water Agreements signed in 1959 have less 
weight as a mechanism for cooperation, since it is not clear how the agreements are legally 
binding on South Sudan. However at this juncture it seems that upstream water developments 
pose a more immediate threat than South Sudan’s emergence does.  
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In terms of upstream developments Ethiopia has been the most vocal and active in terms of 
utilising the Nile’s resources as well as curbing the dominance of Egypt and Sudan. Within 
Ethiopia there is an increasing tendency to liken Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam with that of 
Egypt’s Aswan dams. This tendency effectively makes the assertion that Ethiopia’s ambition 
to develop her own water projects no less legitimate than that of Egypt’s in relation to the 
Aswan dam projects.528 The project perhaps has more appeal than previous proposals and 
ambitions in that Ethiopia has been able to demonstrate to Egypt that the development of the 
Renaissance Dam would have an impact on the amount of water reaching Egypt.529   
Furthermore the construction of the Renaissance Dam has not taken place in isolation from 
its potential impact on other countries that share the Nile’s water; in fact quite the opposite is 
true. In October 2012, the Nile Tripartite Committee named a Panel of Experts and visited the 
site of construction for the dam to investigate what the potential impact of such a dam might 
be on downstream riparian countries.530 The Panel is seemingly aimed at the bridging the 
distrust that has historically divided upstream versus downstream ambitions for development 
of water courses in the Nile basin.531 However despite this, various claims of Egypt and 
Sudan planning to attack the construction of the dam have tainted the objective of the Panel 
of Experts in that it is not clear to what extent various actors within downstream governments 
share the progressive views regarding upstream development.532 Therefore the is a stark 
contrast between what is said openly vis-à-vis upstream development and what is said behind 
closed doors, which fuels the debate concerning Egypt’s true policy regarding upstream water 
development. So while at face value there seems to be trust building mechanisms in place, 
reported disparities in confidential policy tend to erode the progress made in terms of mutual 
trust. 
Essentially the Renaissance Dam will forge new possibilities for Ethiopian industrial 
capacity. This is specifically true of hydro-electricity and the expansion of agriculture 
through irrigation.533 The increased production of electricity in combination with the 
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potential to increase livestock production in Ethiopia has the potential to place Addis Ababa 
on the proverbial map with regard to exporting to new markets, for example the E.U.534 From 
what has been discussed however the most formidable challenge in this regard is balancing 
the ambitions or potential of water development for upstream riparian countries while safe 
guarding Egypt’s access, which it has on numerous occasions claimed to be a matter of 
national interest.   
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered which approach explains conflict over water within the Nile 
basin better. With the use of the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, it was demonstrated that water 
forms a very important part of national security within the basin. It also forms an important 
part of economic growth and sustainability. Based on this one can say that conflict over 
water, particularly within the context of the Suez Crisis, can be explained firmly within the 
context of state centered security. However, the human-centered approach explains the 
motivation behind the factors leading to the motivation behind the crisis as functions of 
security issues related to the use of water.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis has attempted to explicate the understanding of “Water Wars” within the field of 
Security Studies. It has particularly aimed to determine if human-centered security is able to 
explain conflict over water, especially where state-centered security has failed to so. In this 
chapter the author discusses the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the theoretical 
explanation of water wars, based on the conflict witnessed in the Bakassi Peninsula and the 
Suez Canal. In addition, the author highlights similarities between the two cases presented in 
the preceding chapters. The chapter concludes with a discussion regarding the limitations of 
this research as well as potential relationships to explore in future research, based on the 
findings of this thesis.  
5.2 Similarities and Differences between the Chad Basin and the Nile Basin    
 
The most similarity that can be drawn from the two cases is one’s understanding of water 
resource management in post-colonial Africa. In the Chad Basin, the right to utilize water 
resources hinged upon the validity of border delimitations instituted by former colonial 
powers, namely the British and the French. Within the context of post-colonial Africa, it was 
shown that Nigeria disagreed fundamentally with the legal character of the border 
agreements; essentially question their validity and ultimately the rights they succeeded to 
Cameroon in particular.535 In the case of the Nile Basin while the Water Agreements 
(specifically the 1929 Water Agreement) held their validity, changes in leadership in Sudan 
altered the extent to which Egypt’s repatriation further downstream was “guaranteed”. In this 
way Egypt’s uninterrupted repatriation was contingent on the Sudanese government’s attitude 
towards Egypt-specifically whether or not the Sudanese government was pro-Egypt or anti-
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Egypt.536 What this demonstrates is that in both cases independent governments created 
tension points concerning the access to, and repatriation of water.  
A fundamental difference between the Chad and Nile basin is the extent to which the effects 
of climate change as well as environmental degradation, illustrate the potential for conflict 
(and indeed wars that are fought) over water. In the Chad basin, the gradual depletion of 
water in the Lake Chad had an instrumental role in the cross-border occupation by Nigerian 
citizens into what was, under International Law through the colonial agreements, 
Cameroonian territory. If one were to subject the occupation of Nigerian villages to a 
counterfactual conditional, one could suggest that the Lake Chad region would not have 
formed part of the Bakassi dispute. As was argued in Chapter 3, the Lake Chad region (as a 
constituent part of the Bakassi dispute) only formed part of the dispute lodged with the ICJ as 
a result of Nigerian villagers following the receding water line of the lake. The changing 
nature of the lake’s structural capacity had a fundamental role in the territorial dispute 
between Nigeria and Cameroon in the Lake Chad region.  
By contrast, the Nile Basin at least as far as conflict or disputes over repatriation are 
concerned seem to be a function of equitable distribution. Ethiopia’s claims for an increased 
share, as well as the claims of Egypt’s exploitation of the Nile, hinge on distributions of 
current supply and do not seem be overly motivated by the impact that climate change has on 
the Nile’s resources. Notwithstanding the increasing importance of climate change in forums 
such as the NBI, it is very difficult to equate the political tension concerning water 
management in the Nile basin solely with concerns regarding structural capacity. The fact 
that upstream countries question the disparity between withdrawals relative to contribution 
(measured through TRWR) seems to suggest water related disputes in the Nile Basin a more 
a function of inadequate distribution than they are of inadequate structural supply. Therefore 
the Chad Basin and Nile River Basin (at least as far as the cases presented are concerned) 
highlight the difference between structural and distributional scarcity can be applied and 
subsequently understood. 
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5.3 Findings 
 
Two important themes can be drawn from the discussion in the previous chapters. The first is 
that water, as a causal mechanism is context sensitive. The second is that the validity of 
colonial agreements, especially in the context of post-colonial Africa, has a fundamental 
impact on issues related to the repatriation of water resources. 
5.3.1 What is Water’s Causal Role? 
  
When Aaron Wolf suggests that no single war has been fought over water, his argument is 
premised on the notion that water has not been a determinate cause of a war fought between 
two or more states. He therefore concludes that water has not had a direct role in the onset of 
violent conflict.537 This can be taken to mean that there is not one single factor, concerning 
water that has been at the route of conflict. This is contrasted by conflict such as the 
witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. It can be argued that both of the former could be reduced 
to having single determinate causes. In the case of Afghanistan, one might argue that 
Washington saw the need to neutralize potential threats from Al-Qaeda and in the Iraq War it 
can be argued that Washington aimed to neutralize a potential arms race.538  Each of these 
cases demonstrates a particular political objective that conflict was meant to reach. Based on 
this, Wolf argues, war cannot be seen as an end, but is rather a means to an end.  
This begs the question how ought one to understand water’s role in causing conflict amongst 
states? The answer to this firstly depends on understanding the multidimensional nature of 
water. One needs only to consider the differences in use of water amongst developed versus 
developing countries, or even urban versus rural areas, to understand that water is valued 
differently by different actors within the international system. Based on this it could be 
argued that States do not perceive water as equally valuable to their interests. This is perhaps 
best demonstrated through the disparate achievements of the LCBC and inter-governmental 
cooperation organizations such as TECCONILE in the Nile basin. 
The varied level of success in inter-basin management between countries suggests that water 
management is not considered as much of a priority in one basin as it is in the other. The 
progression of multilateral cooperation in the Nile basin, marked by the growth of 
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cooperation from the Hydromet Survey to the NBI, seems to suggest that the management of 
water within the basin forms part of central policy issues amongst the riparian countries. 
Moreover, there is most certainly an inclination that perceives sufficient water management 
as a collective problem rather than an individual one. By contrast, the LCBC as a multilateral 
water management mechanism has been less successful. Access to information regarding its 
functions, programs and policies is scarce and often outdated in cases where it is available. In 
addition, the lack of commitment, at least in the implementation of issues regarding 
management and repatriation of resources in an explicate way.  This can be defended 
especially taking into account the lack of meetings between Commissioners as the principal 
Rivers of Organizational policy.  From this, this thesis can recommend that the LCBC works 
more carefully in establishing a mandate that clearly, such that Programmes to reverse the 
impact of climate change and environmental degradation are considered alongside dialogue 
meant to consider how to deal with current repatriation issues. Considering repatriation issues 
related to access to water, such as one country’s people crossing another’s borders to 
maintain access to the water body could have proved vital as a dialogue mechanism in 
avoiding conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon in the Lake Chad region.  
However despite the disparity between the effectiveness of the water management 
mechanisms, the conflict witnessed in both the Chad basin and the Nile basin hinge on 
maintaining access to water.  In the Chad basin case the principal actors concerned with 
maintaining access to water were actors at individual level, namely Nigerian villagers. In the 
Nile basin case the principal actors concerned with maintaining access to water are seen at 
state level, specifically in the form of Egypt and its relationship with other riparian countries 
in the basin. The ability to predict water’s role in conflict is therefore underpinned by the 
actor seeking to maintain access to water. In addition, their need to maintain access cannot be 
seen in isolation from their objective.  
Based on the cases presented, it is evident that food security had a fundamental role in the 
onset of conflict over water and water related resources. In both cases the need to maintain 
water for agricultural produce was a motive that had a vital role in the onset of conflict over 
repatriation of water. In the Chad basin case, the food security motive is seen in Nigerian 
villagers wanting to maintain access to the lake watercourse since the fish within the lake 
provide a valuable source of sustenance and income. On the other hand, the Nile basin case 
the food security motive is seen in that the Aswan High Dam essentially sought to provide 
Egypt with an almost guaranteed all-year flow of the Nile River, which would ensure that it 
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could maintain current agricultural production as well as diversify crops. This in turn bolsters 
trade in the form of more diverse exports. In both cases it would seem that because food 
security through access to agriculture provides sustenance, income and in some cases 
stratifies wealth, the motivation can be strongly associated with human security. The access 
to water provides food, which essentially entails freedom of want as per Kerr’s evaluation of 
the human condition. From this, this thesis concludes that conflict over water is motivated by 
food security even if, as with the Suez Crisis, the actual conflict can be explained by State-
centered security. Human centered security therefore characterizes the indirect nature of 
water conflict. What this ultimately suggests is that conflict over water is likely to be 
motivated by water-related issues rather than water as such and therefore contributes to how 
one ought to characterize the concept of  “Water Wars” within the field of Security Studies 
and ultimately policy-making fields. 
5.3.2 Post-Colonial Africa and Water 
 
In the cases presented, colonial agreements concerning the allocation of land, and by 
extension water rights, have had a fundamental impact on the onset of conflict. The impact is 
seen in one of two ways. On the one hand, independent governments question the validity of 
the agreements and in so doing also question the rights these agreements confer to former 
protectorates. On the other hand, independent governments potentially seek to alter the 
repatriation of water within a basin, depending on relations with other countries within the 
basin.   Evidence for this is seen in the can be seen in the cases presented.  
In the Chad basin evidence of the former is seen through the questioning of both the Milner 
and Simon Agreement of 1919 and the Thomson-Marhard Agreement of 1929/30. The 
contestation of these agreements on the part of Nigeria, indicating that the colonial 
agreements had not taken into account consultation with local leaders, suggests that 
independent governments question why they ought to be bound by border delimitation and 
other aspects of colonial agreements if (at least as they perceive it) the agreements were 
ratified by illegitimate authorities. What this means is that if water repatriation and food 
security are dependent on the legitimacy of these agreements, for example in terms of arable 
land and water withdrawals within sovereign land, then questioning their legitimacy has the 
potential to alter the status quo of water withdrawal and the ability to use arable land for 
agriculture. Therefore there is a clear link between the legitimacy of colonial agreements 
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(under international law) and the ability maintain access to water, which as was argued above 
underpins motivation for conflict over water. Goldstein for example suggests that the ICJ’s 
reinforcement of these colonial agreements has driven an even deeper rift between Nigeria 
and Cameroon, despite recent attempts at cooperation.539 
The Nile basin demonstrates how relationships between riparian countries potentially alter 
after independence of a former colonial state. Although not extensively discussed in this 
thesis, tension between Egypt and Sudan (in light of changes in Sudanese leadership in the 
mid to late 1950’s, which lead to the 1959 Water Agreement) is perhaps an example of this. 
There are clear connections between issues concerning repatriation and the relations between 
Egypt and Sudan in that the tension over the construction of the Aswan High Dam (Egypt) 
and the Roseries Dam (Sudan) hinged on the bilateral relations of the two States, such that 
the Water Agreement was only feasible after a pro-Egyptian government had taken over 
power in Sudan. This argument is made even stronger if one takes into account that the threat 
of military force in 1958 marked the height of disagreement concerning water course 
development within countries. Based on this one could argue that the relationship between 
riparian countries has an impact on the ability to maintain adequate access to water, which in 
turn as was argued above is a potential motivation for conflict related to water.  
A conclusion that can be drawn from this is that water agreements and the access to water 
they confer are essentially subject to the authorities that ratify them. In addition, they are 
subject to the relationship between states that enforce the ratified agreements. Therefore in so 
far as they motivate water-related conflict, changes in power within governments are 
indictors of where water access might be impeded thus leading to a higher probability of 
conflict regarding the repatriation of a shared water course.   
           
5.4 Limitations of this research  
 
The first and perhaps most important limitation to this research is the formation of South 
Sudan as an independent State from Sudan.  In January 2011 a referendum was passed after 
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and the South Sudanese voted to form Africa’s newest State.540 South Sudan forms the 10 
most southern states of what is formally known as Sudan. In terms of geography it includes 
“expansive grassland, swamps and tropical forests and sand banks on both sides of the 
Nile”.541 It is also ethnically and culturally diverse and includes groups such as the Dinka, 
Nuer and Shilluk.542  South Sudan declared independence on the 9th of July 2011.543 
The reason the discussion regarding Sudan takes place in absence of this development is that 
many Organisations that collect data, such as UNEP and the UNDP, have either not had the 
data available at the time of writing or had not compiled any reliable data from which 
meaningful comparisons have been withdrawn. In addition given that many prominent 
sources used within the Nile basin chapter, in particular those that specifically focus on 
comparative data analysis, were written well before the referendum even took place. 
Therefore the reader is invited to note that the analysis concerning Sudan as it is discussed 
within this thesis does not make any reference to the repatriation of South Sudan.  
Another limitation that warrants discussion is the availability of empirical data. In particular 
with the Chad basin, the data available was often very cumbersome and in some cases varied 
amongst different sources. From the research that had been done, the author was unable to 
find any extensive writing on the Chad basin especially when compared to the Nile basin. 
Writing and information regarding the LCBC was particularly thin and problematic in terms 
of current projects. In addition, the availability of data on the LCBC website as the principal 
organisation dealing with water related issues in the Lake Chad region, amongst others is 
rather outdated and relatively un-user friendly.  
Thirdly, in some cases there is an almost over-reliance on some sources because the articles 
which they cite for important information were problematic to find. For example, the 
explication by McDermott relies on U.S. Congressional Library Papers and therefore it is 
difficult to cite the original text with accuracy. In addition, constraints within licensing of on-
line Journal access were at times problematic.  
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A limitation worth discussing is that this research is not intended to be exhaustive. It is not 
the case that other factors did not have an impact in the onset of conflict examined in the 
Chad and Nile Basin cases. In fact, the examination of both state-centered and human-
centered factors within the same case lends itself well to the notion that other factors did have 
an instrumental impact with regard to the onset of conflict. What the thesis establishes is that 
if one were to consider water as one of those factors, its threat to security and subsequent 
catalytic nature vis-à-vis conflict is best explained by the human-centered approach. It is for 
example plausible that mineral rights related to oil also catalytic nature vis-à-vis conflict, 
which as argued in chapter 3 is best explained from the state-centered approach. Similarly, 
Arab Nationalism as a political, state-centered phenomenon also has catalytic within the 
context of the Suez Crisis, in chapter 4. Therefore, when this thesis speaks of “water wars” as 
being best described by the human-centered approach, it should only be seen as valid for 
water as a cause for conflict.  
5.5 Suggestions for future research  
 
From conclusions above, the author makes three recommendations for future study. The first 
concerns adding South Sudan to the analysis of repatriation in the Nile Basin. The second to 
explore the potential links between land tenure (as it relates to agriculture and access to 
water) and climate change. The third would be to extrapolate the model of analysis used 
within the case studies presented in this thesis to other regions that have been plagued by 
similar water-related tensions.   
Given that this study isolates the independence of South Sudan from the empirical analysis of 
the Nile basin chapter in particular, future research could include the analysis of South Sudan 
as another riparian country within the basin. Questions regarding the changes in the status 
quo of repatriation, relations with other riparian countries and potential important water 
courses that fall within South Sudanese sovereign territory could raise questions regarding 
access to water, as was the case with Nigeria and Cameroon for example. In addition, one 
might ask to what extent South Sudan is in fact bound by the 1959 Water Agreement and 
more importantly to what extent its existence threatens the water supply of Egypt.  One could 
even venture as far as to do a comparative study on states that have declared independence 
within the Nile basin and how their relative weakness impacts on their ability in asserting 
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their water rights-for this purpose one could use Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia as the 
other case study.  
On the basis that land tenure is closely linked with repatriation of water, such as with the 
Lake Chad region, one might question the extent to which land tenure impacts on access to 
water and more specifically what land tenure’s role in future conflicts might be. This could 
be especially useful considering the close relationship between land tenure, access to water 
and income. For example if wealth is stratified by access to land and agricultural produce one 
might want to investigate to what extent conflict is likely over remaining land. One could 
also using the case studies, perhaps the Chad basin in particular, investigate to what extent 
climate change impacts on the ability of populations to provide an income for their families 
and to what extent they would move across into other sovereign territory in order to secure 
the “freedom of want” for food security.  
In the analysis of the cases presented in this thesis, the author made reference to water-related 
political tensions and objectives with regard to Turkey and the Southeastern Anatolia Project 
known as GAP.544 In the past, as mentioned, Syrian and Turkish armed forces have had 
skirmishes on the border related to access and the use of shared watercourses. It would be 
interesting to determine in what way, if any the multi-level analysis could be replicated 
within water-related conflict cases within the Middle East.  
5.4 General Conclusion  
	  
In the beginning of this thesis, the author set the aim of this work acting as a bridge between 
two seemingly incompatible approaches to Security Studies. What this work has shown is 
that the two approaches to Security Studies are not necessarily in opposition, they simply 
explain different kinds of motivations more effectively, depending on which element of any 
given conflict is under examination. In this thesis, water as an element of conflict proved to 
be best, and more consistently, explained in terms of human-centered security. Water as a 
conflict variable is therefore best understood as an issue of human-centric security.  
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